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EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	
In	 2015-2016,	 migration	 towards	 Europe	 has	 pressured	 on	 the	 EU	 asylum	 and	 migration	 systems,	
challenging	 the	 adequacy	 of	 the	 legal	 design	 of	 the	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System	 (CEAS).	 This	
impact	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 both	 the	 CEAS	 and	 national	 asylum	 systems	 in	 practice	 called	 the	
further	 harmonisation	 into	 question.	 This	 baseline	 study	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	
commentaries	and	evaluations	that	were	made	on	the	functioning	of	 the	CEAS	between	January	2014	
and	December	2017.	This	 study	 is	part	of	 the	CEASEVAL	project,	which	 is	an	EU	 funded	Horizon	2020	
project	 evaluating	 the	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System.	 An	 earlier	 version	 has	 been	 submitted	 as	
deliverable	to	the	European	Commission	in	March	2018.	
	
The	CEAS	under	pressure	
Many	 authors	 signal	 the	 high	 influx	 of	 refugees	 in	 recent	 years,	 which	 has	 put	 a	 spotlight	 on	 the	
functioning	of	the	CEAS.	EU	wide	responses	to	the	refugee	crisis	have	also	been	evaluated.	The	Council’s	
attempt	 to	 provide	 relief	 for	 Italy	 and	 Greece	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 Decisions	 on	 relocation	 is	 often	
criticised	 for	not	being	very	successful	 in	 terms	of	 the	results	 that	have	been	achieved.	Only	a	 limited	
number	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 have	 been	 relocated	 so	 far.	 The	 relocation	 scheme	 has	 failed	 to	 relieve	
pressure	 for	 Italy	 and	Greece,	 as	 returns	 to	 those	 countries	 continue	under	 the	Dublin	Regulation.	 In	
addition,	the	criteria	of	eligibility	for	relocation	mean	that	Italy	and	Greece	are	left	with	those	applicants	
who	are	less	likely	to	receive	status,	i.e.	mostly	the	more	complex	cases.	
	
The	 hotspot	 approach	 was	 designed	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 providing	
operational	support	to	countries	under	pressure	and	to	support	the	relocation	and	return	processes.	A	
major	criticism	of	the	hotspots	seems	to	be	that	hotspots	do	not	offer	a	new	approach	of	relieving	the	
front	line	states	other	than	with	registering	as	many	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	as	possible	and	thus	
making	 the	 frontline	 states	 fully	 responsible	 for	 all	 who	 arrive.	 Additionally,	 the	 speed	 of	 registering	
applications	 that	 is	 part	 of	 the	 hotspot	 approach	 is	 not	 typically	 synonymous	 with	 due	 care	 and	
increases	 the	risk	of	standardised	and	poorly	motivated	decisions	once	the	applications	are	processed	
on	the	mainland.	Finally,	reception	conditions	in	hotspots	are	reported	to	be	inadequate	and	below	the	
standards	laid	down	in	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive.	
	
Determination	of	the	responsibility	for	asylum	claims	
Criticism	on	the	design	of	the	Dublin	system	focuses	on	its	lack	of	a	burden-sharing	rationale,	its	failure	
to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 differences	 between	 Member	 States	 in	 terms	 of	 size,	 development	 and	
reception	 conditions	 and	 its	 disregard	 of	 the	 preferences	 or	 personal	 interests	 of	 the	 asylum	 seeker.	
These	 shortcomings	 lead	 to	 a	 disproportionate	 burden	 for	 border	 Member	 States	 and	 may	 lead	 to	
secondary	movements	that	undermine	the	system’s	aim	of	swift	access	to	the	asylum	procedure.	
	
According	to	many	commentators,	obtaining	an	accurate	picture	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Dublin	
system	is	hampered	by	the	limited	availability	of	data	on	the	operation	of	the	system.	This	gives	rise	to	
concerns	 on	 the	 overall	 transparency	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Dublin	 procedure	 and	 entails	 that	 an	
evaluation	of	the	operation	of	the	Dublin	system	can	only	be	indicative.	On	the	basis	of	the	information	
that	is	available,	commentators	describe	great	variations	in	the	way	the	Dublin	criteria	are	interpreted	
and	applied	by	Member	States.		
	
The	effectiveness	of	the	Dublin	system	is	considered	to	be	hampered	by	the	lack	of	a	level	playing	field	
in	terms	of	the	consideration	and	treatment	of	asylum	seekers	across	Member	States.	This	may	result	in	
secondary	movements	 and	 avoidance	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 as	 asylum	 seekers	 will	 try	 to	 reach	 their	
desired	 destination,	 thus	 undermining	 one	 of	 Dublin’s	 goals	 to	 determine	 rapidly	 the	 responsible	
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Member	State	and	guarantee	effective	access	to	the	asylum	procedure.	The	Dublin	system	also	does	not	
seem	to	be	effective	in	terms	of	realising	the	transfer	of	protection	seekers	from	one	Member	State	to	
another.	Throughout	the	years,	the	number	of	effected	Dublin	transfers	is	consistently	low	compared	to	
the	number	of	Dublin	requests	issued.	
	
Commentators	have	also	considered	 the	efficiency	of	 the	Dublin	system.	The	exact	costs	of	operating	
the	Dublin	system	are	difficult	to	ascertain.	In	general,	Dublin	can	be	considered	inefficient	in	the	sense	
that	 the	 system	only	establishes	 the	 responsibility	of	 a	Member	 State	 for	processing	an	asylum	claim	
without	 addressing	 the	merits	of	 the	 claim	 itself.	 The	overall	 efficiency	 is	 also	 reduced	by	 the	 limited	
amount	of	actual	transfers	and	the	length	of	Dublin	procedures.	
	
Regarding	the	respect	for	fundamental	rights,	concerns	are	voiced	about	the	limited	use	that	seems	to	
be	made	of	 the	 family	 criteria	 for	determining	 state	 responsibility,	 the	non	 refoulement	principle	and	
the	seemingly	widespread	use	of	detention	for	the	purpose	of	Dublin	transfers.	
	
The	Commission’s	proposal	 for	a	Dublin	 IV	Regulation	 is	not	considered	to	 fundamentally	 rethink	the	
current	system	for	allocating	responsibility	for	asylum	claims.	Applicants	on	the	whole	face	stricter	rules	
that	 are	 unfair	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 asylum	 seekers.	 Distribution	 inequalities	 for	 Member	 States	
would	 be	 increased	 due	 to	 the	 requirement	 for	 countries	 of	 first	 entry	 to	 conduct	 admissibility	 and	
merit-related	assessments	before	applying	 the	Regulation.	The	envisaged	corrective	mechanism	 is	not	
considered	to	be	a	solution	to	distribution	inequalities:	it	is	much	too	narrow	in	scope	and	can	only	be	
applied	when	the	Member	States	 face	situations	of	a	disproportionate	number	of	asylum	applications	
for	which	they	are	responsible.	
	
Determination	of	asylum	claims	
Access	to	protection	seems	to	be	an	important	theme	in	the	discussions	about	the	Asylum	Procedures	
Directive.	Many	Member	States	seem	to	obstruct	the	attempts	of	asylum	seekers	to	gain	access	to	the	
territory.	Such	actions	go	against	the	provisions	of	the	Directive	and	could	also	entail	a	violation	of	the	
principle	of	non-refoulement.	Access	to	the	procedure	can	be	challenging	for	asylum	seekers	due	to	the	
combination	 of	 rising	 numbers	 of	 asylum	 applications	 and	 continuing	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 asylum	
procedure.	 The	 widespread	 use	 of	 special	 procedures,	 such	 as	 accelerated,	 admissibility	 or	 border	
procedures,	 is	 reason	 for	 concern	as	 these	procedures	are	often	characterised	by	 reduced	procedural	
safeguards.	 Furthermore,	 the	 current	 fragmentation	 of	 asylum	 procedures	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 in	
contrast	with	the	goal	of	establishing	common	asylum	procedures.	Finally,	access	to	an	effective	remedy	
seems	 far	 from	guaranteed	as	 the	Directive	only	 contains	an	obligation	 to	ensure	access	 to	 free	 legal	
assistance	 at	 the	 appeal	 stage.	 In	 addition,	 merits	 testing	 and	 low	 remuneration	 of	 lawyers	 under	
national	legal	aid	schemes	may	obstruct	access	to	an	effective	remedy	in	practice.	
	
The	safe	country	of	origin	concept	and	the	safe	third	country	concept	are	also	prominently	discussed.	
Comments	 on	 the	 first	 concept	 revolve	 around	 the	 divergent	 policies	 of	Member	 States	 as	 to	 which	
countries	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 safe	 and	 questions	 are	 raised	 regarding	 the	 compatibility	 of	 this	
concept	with	the	key	focus	of	human	rights	and	refugee	law	on	the	individual	assessment	of	each	case	
and	the	personal	circumstances	of	the	applicant.	A	widely	discussed	example	of	the	application	of	the	
safe	third	country	concept	is	the	EU-Turkey	Statement.	The	concept	of	safe	third	country	is	said	to	have	
in	itself	no	clear	basis	in	international	refugee	and	human	rights	law	and	the	application	of	the	concept	
to	Turkey	is	considered	to	be	highly	questionable.		
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The	Commission’s	proposal	for	an	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation	is	welcomed	for	its	effort	to	advance	
the	harmonisation	of	asylum	procedures.	Concerns	are	expressed	about	the	proposal’s	removal	of	the	
suspensive	effect	of	appeals	against	first	instance	decisions	made	in	the	context	of	the	safe	third	country	
concept.	 The	 establishment	 of	 a	 provision	 for	 a	 common	 European	 list	 of	 safe	 countries	 of	 origin	 is	
considered	to	be	a	positive	development,	but	it	is	also	noted	that	the	Regulation	does	not	address	the	
shortcomings	of	the	safe	country	of	origin	and	safe	third	country	concept.	
	
When	it	comes	to	the	eligibility	criteria	for	and	content	of	international	protection,	striking	differences	
are	 signaled	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection	 with	 respect	 to	 residence	
permits,	 access	 to	 social	 welfare	 and	 the	 grounds	 for	 withdrawing	 the	 status.	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	
different	applications	of	the	definitions	of	refugee	protection	versus	subsidiary	protection	could	warrant	
the	 distinctions	 contained	 in	 the	Qualification	 Directive.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 the	 Directive	 deals	 with	
international	protection	needs	arising	sur	place	is	considered	highly	problematic	as	it	seems	to	be	based	
on	the	suspicion	that	convictions	allegedly	developed	sur	place	are	faked.	This	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	
the	Refugee	Convention.	 The	 lack	of	mutual	 recognition	of	 positive	 asylum	decisions	 among	Member	
States	is	considered	to	be	incongruous	in	view	of	the	rights	that	EU	citizens	have	and	is	also	regarded	as	
a	missed	opportunity	for	preventing	secondary	movements.	
	
Concerns	on	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Directive	mostly	 relate	 to	 the	divergence	 in	 recognition	 rates	
and	 the	 type	 of	 protection	 status	 granted	 to	 applicants	 originating	 from	 the	 same	 country	 of	 origin,	
evidencing	a	 lack	of	harmonisation	 in	practice.	 It	 is	 also	noted	 that	 the	 integration	of	beneficiaries	of	
international	protection	is	a	field	that	almost	completely	remains	outside	the	scope	of	the	CEAS.		
	
The	Commission’s	proposal	for	a	Qualification	Regulation	is	aimed	at	achieving	further	harmonisation.	
It	 is	 questioned	 whether	 harmonisation,	 without	 sufficient	 practical	 cooperation	 and	 guidelines,	 will	
actually	lead	to	uniform	decision	making	in	asylum	claims.	Moreover,	harmonisation	as	proposed	by	the	
Commission	 seems	 to	 promote	 ‘harmonisation	 downwards’	 in	 the	 form	 of	 undermining	 access	 to	
protection	and	creating	greater	possibilities	for	exclusion.	The	proposal	fails	to	address	the	divergence	in	
the	duration	of	 residence	permits	awarded	 to	 refugees	and	subsidiary	protection	beneficiaries.	 It	also	
does	 not	 adopt	 a	 different	 approach	 compared	 to	 the	 current	 policy	 regarding	 the	 protection	 needs	
arising	 sur	 place	 and	 the	 proposed	 mandatory	 assessment	 of	 the	 internal	 protection	 alternative	 is	
considered	to	go	against	the	Refugee	Convention.	
	
Reception	of	asylum	seekers	
Regarding	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	comments	are	made	on	the	lack	of	a	clear	definition	of	
‘reception’.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 considerable	 variations	 exist	 among	Member	 States	 in	 terms	 of	 what	
constitutes	first-line	and	second-line	reception	and	who	is	responsible	for	it.	It	is	considered	contrary	to	
human	 rights	 obligations	 that	 the	 Directive	 allows	 Member	 States	 to	 reduce	 or	 withdraw	 reception	
conditions	or	otherwise	sanction	asylum	seekers	who	do	not	comply	with	procedural	or	other	rules.	The	
Directive	does	not	specify	what	system	should	be	used	for	the	identification	of	vulnerable	persons	(nor	
does	the	Asylum	Procedures	Directive).	As	a	result,	the	identification	of	vulnerability	becomes	arbitrary.	
Compared	to	the	first	phase	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	the	circumstances	under	which	detention	
of	 asylum	 seekers	 is	 permitted	 have	 been	 clarified.	 This	 is	 considered	 a	 certain	 improvement	 in	 the	
rights	of	asylum	seekers.	At	the	same	time,	detention	as	a	concept	raises	questions	of	compatibility	with	
fundamental	rights.	
	
Limited	data	 are	 available	on	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	Directive.	Nevertheless,	 it	 has	become	 clear	
that	 substantial	discrepancies	exist	 in	 the	 level	of	harmonisation	of	 reception	conditions	between	 the	
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different	Member	 States,	which	 is	 deemed	 to	 have	 negative	 repercussions	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	
CEAS	as	a	whole.	 Immigration	detention	remains	an	area	of	great	concern	as	 it	has	become	a	routine,	
rather	 than	 exceptional	 response	 to	 the	 irregular	 entry	 or	 stay	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	migrants	 in	 a	
number	of	countries.	
	
Though	 the	Commission	 identifies	 the	main	challenge	of	 the	Reception	Conditions	Directive	as	one	of	
poor	implementation	of	existing	standards,	it	proposes	a	recast	of	the	Directive	as	opposed	to	a	directly	
applicable	Reception	Regulation.	It	is	questioned	whether	this	is	the	right	choice	of	instrument	in	view	of	
the	 diverging	 reception	 conditions	 and	 the	 disparate	 recognition	 rates	 among	 Member	 States.	 The	
proposal	 contains	 improvements	 regarding	 the	assessment	of	 special	 reception	needs	 as	 it	 lays	down	
more	detailed	and	clear	obligations	for	national	authorities	with	a	view	to	ensuring	better	identification	
of	 vulnerabilities	 from	 the	 first	 contact	 with	 newly	 arriving	 persons.	 The	 lowering	 of	 the	 maximum	
waiting	period	 for	access	 to	 the	 labour	market	 from	nine	 to	 six	months	 is	 considered	 to	be	a	positive	
development	from	the	perspective	of	the	asylum	seeker.	Another	welcome	measure	is	the	introduction	
of	a	contingency	planning	obligation	with	a	view	to	ensuring	adequate	reception	needs	in	situations	of	
disproportionate	pressure.		
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INTRODUCTION	
This	 study	was	 carried	out	by	Hans	Van	Oort	 (junior-researcher	Amsterdam	Centre	 for	Migration	 and	
Refugee	Law	(ACMRL),	Vrije	Universiteit	Amsterdam)	as	a	part	of	the	CEASEVAL	project,	which	is	an	EU	
funded	 Horizon	 2020	 project	 evaluating	 the	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System.1	 The	 research	 was	
guided	by	objective	2.1	of	 the	project:	 ‘to	summarise	 the	studies,	evaluations	and	academic	works	on	
the	 functioning	 of	 the	 CEAS,	 its	 latest	 proposals	 and	measures	 taken	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 European	
Agenda	on	Migration’	 and	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 supervision	of	Hemme	Battjes	 and	 Evelien	Brouwer,	
professor	respectively	senior-researcher	at	the	ACMRL.	
	
This	report	proceeds	in	parts.	Part	I	contains	an	introduction	to	the	CEAS,	including	an	overview	of	the	
legal	instruments	that	together	form	the	EU	acquis	on	asylum.	Part	II	deals	with	the	currently	applicable	
Dublin	 Regulation,	 the	 Commission	 proposal	 for	 a	 Dublin	 IV	 Regulation	 and	 the	 Council	 Decisions	 on	
relocation.	The	determination	of	asylum	claims	is	the	subject	of	Part	III.	This	part	first	deals	with	reviews	
of	 the	 recast	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive	 and	 the	 Commission	 proposal	 for	 an	 Asylum	 Procedures	
Regulation.	It	subsequently	focuses	on	the	Hotspot	approach,	the	recast	Qualification	Directive	and	the	
Commission	proposal	 for	 a	Qualification	Regulation.	 The	 reception	of	 asylum	 seekers	 is	 the	 theme	of	
Part	IV,	in	which	an	overview	is	given	of	the	comments	on	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	and	
the	Commission	proposal	for	a	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive.	
	
METHODOLOGY	
This	study	was	conducted	through	the	use	of	desk	research	which,	generally,	involved	legal	publications	
dated	 between	 1	 January	 2014	 and	 1	 November	 2017	 (the	 starting	 date	 of	 the	 research	 project).	 A	
comprehensive	 range	 of	 publications	 has	 been	 included,	 consisting	 of	 policy	 documents,	 research	
conducted	by	academic	experts,		views	of	NGO’s	and	reports	of	EU	Agencies.	Specific	attention	has	been	
paid	to	the	distinction	between	deficiencies	 in	the	 legal	design	of	the	CEAS	and	 in	 its	 implementation.	
The	research	is	presented	in	the	form	of	a	baseline	study,	which	means	that	the	contents	of	this	report	
merely	 represent	 the	 content	 of	 the	 publications	 studied.	 The	 authors	 and	 supervisors	 of	 this	 report	
have	withheld	 their	personal	views	entirely,	 confining	 their	 contribution	 to	 selecting	and	summarising	
the	publications	 studied	and	presenting	 the	 research	according	 to	a	 thematic	outline.	 Footnotes	have	
been	used	abundantly	to	ensure	that	all	views	can	be	traced	back	to	the	original	author.	
	
For	reasons	of	legibility,	the	choice	has	been	made	to	refer	to	‘Member	States’	throughout	the	report,	
irrespective	 of	 the	 type	 of	 legal	 instrument	 discussed.	 Therefore,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 term	
‘Member	States’	refers	to	only	those	states	taking	part	in	the	legal	instrument	and	not	necessarily	to	EU	
Member	States.		
	
	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
1	 Also	see	the	dedicated	website:	http://ceaseval.eu/.		
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PART	I.	THE	COMMON	EUROPEAN	ASYLUM	SYSTEM	
	
1.	Historical	development	and	legal	instruments	
EU	cooperation	on	asylum	first	took	shape	at	an	intergovernmental	level	between	1985	and	1990	on	the	
basis	of	the	Schengen	Agreement	which	aimed	to	abolish	internal	borders.2	Policymakers	feared	that	the	
abolishment	 of	 border	 controls	would	 put	 incentives	 in	 place	 for	 asylum	 seekers	 to	 shop	 for	 asylum.	
Additional	measures	aimed	at	controlling	the	movement	of	asylum	seekers	on	European	territory	were	
therefore	 deemed	 indispensable.3	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 mechanism	 to	 determine	
which	 state	was	 responsible	 for	 processing	 asylum	applications,	 first	 laid	 down	 in	 the	1990	 Schengen	
Implementation	 Convention.4	 It	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 concurring	 mechanism	 in	 the	 1990	 Dublin	
Convention,5	which	entered	into	force	in	1997	and	was	signed	by	Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	
Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	The	Netherlands,	Portugal,	Spain	and	the	United	Kingdom.6		
	
The	 intergovernmental	 approach	 remained	 unchanged	 by	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty	 of	 7	 February	 1992.7	
The	Treaty	on	 the	European	Union	acknowledged	asylum	as	 a	 ‘matter	of	 common	 interest’	within	 its	
Third	 Pillar	 devoted	 to	 the	 field	 of	 Justice	 and	Home	Affairs.8	 A	major	 change	was	 introduced	 by	 the	
1997	Treaty	of	Amsterdam,9	shifting	asylum	from	the	third	pillar	(Inter-governmental)	to	the	first	pillar	
(Community).	Asylum	was	thus	brought	within	the	competence	of	the	European	Community,	prompting	
the	development	of	the	harmonisation	process.10	 	The	very	notion	of	the	CEAS	was	only	 introduced	 in	
October	1999	by	the	European	Council	in	its	Tampere	Conclusions.11	These	Conclusions	thus	constitute	
the	founding	act	of	the	CEAS.12	
	
The	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 CEAS	 consisted	 of	 setting	 minimum	 standards,13	 the	 only	
exception	being	the	rules	governing	the	determination	of	the	Member	State	responsible	for	examining	
an	 asylum	 request.14	 	 Between	 1999	 and	 2004,	 four	 Directives	 and	 two	 Regulations	 were	 adopted.	
Among	 these	 was	 the	 2003	 Dublin	 II	 Regulation,	 replacing	 the	 1990	 Dublin	 Convention.15	 The	
accompanying	 Eurodac	 Regulation16	 established	 a	 database	 for	 recording	 fingerprint	 data	 of	 asylum	
applicants	to	aid	implementation	of	the	Dublin	system.	The	Dublin	mechanism	was	further	backed	up	by	
the	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive,17	 the	 Qualification	 Directive18	 and	 the	 Asylum	 Procedures	
Directive.19	 The	 instruments	 of	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 CEAS	 were	 criticised	 for	 their	 failure	 to	 achieve	
																																								 																				
2		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014)	European	Migration	Law.	Mortsel:	Intersentia.	2nd	edition,	246-247.	
3		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014),	247.	
4		 Convention	Implementing	the	Schengen	Agreement	of	14	June	1985	on	the	gradual	abolition	of	checks	at	the	common	borders	(Schengen		
	 Implementing	Convention),	19	June	1990	[2000]	OJEU	L	239/19.	
5		 Convention	determining	the	State	responsible	for	examining	applications	for	asylum	lodged	in	one	of	the	Member	States	of	the	European		
	 Communities	(Dublin	Convention)	[1997]	OJEU	C254/1.	
6		 Fratzke	S	(2015)	Not	Adding	Up.	The	Fading	Promise	of	Europe’s	Dublin	System.	Migration	Policy	Institute	Europe,	3;	Hailbronner	K	and		
Thym	D	(2016)	Legal	Framework	for	EU	Asylum	Policy.	In:	Hailbronner	K	and	Thym	D	(eds.)	EU	Immigration	and	Asylum	Law.	A		
Commentary.	München:	C.H.	Beck,	1024.	
7		 Treaty	of	Maastricht	on	European	Union,	7	February	1992	[2000]	OJEU	C	191.	
8		 Treaty	of	Maastricht	,	see	Title	VI	on	cooperation	in	the	field	of	Justice	and	Home	Affairs.	
9		 Treaty	of	Amsterdam,	2	October	1997	[1997]	OJEU	C	340.	
10		 Chetail	V	(2016)	The	Common	European	Asylum	System:	Bric-à-brac	or	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.)	Reforming		
	 the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	NV,	9-10.	
11		 Council	of	the	European	Union	(1999)	Presidency	Conclusions.	Tampere	European	Council.	15-16	October	1999.		
12		 Chetail	V	(2016)	The	Common	European	Asylum	System:	Bric-à-brac	or	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	10-11.		
13		 Article	63	TEC.	
14		 Chetail	V	(2016)	The	Common	European	Asylum	System:	Bric-à-brac	or	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	11-12.	
15	 Regulation	(EC)	343/2003.	
16	 Regulation	(EC)	2725/2000,	replaced	by	Regulation	(EU)	603/2013.	
17		 Directive	2003/9/EC.	
18		 Directive	2004/83/EC.	
19		 Directive	2005/85/EC.	
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common	standards	across	Member	States,	which	was	addressed	 in	 the	second	development	phase	of	
the	CEAS.20	
	
The	new	development	step	was	already	scheduled	by	the	1999	Tampere	Conclusions.	The	first	package	
of	asylum	legislation	was	meant	as	an	initial	phase	which	in	the	longer	term	should	lead	to	a	common	
procedure	 and	 status.21	 This	 objective	 of	 ensuring	 a	 genuine	 common	 asylum	 policy	 was	 explicitly	
underscored	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 in	 its	 2004	 Hague	 Programme22	 and	 the	 2009	 Stockholm	
Programme.23	Concrete	and	important	steps	in	the	development	of	the	CEAS	were	taken	with	the	Treaty	
of	Lisbon,	which	was	signed	 in	December	2007	and	entered	 into	 force	on	1	December	2009.	The	very	
notion	of	a	Common	European	Asylum	System	was	laid	down	in	Article	78	TFEU.	As	a	result,	establishing	
such	 a	 common	 system	 moved	 from	 being	 a	 general	 policy	 objective	 to	 being	 a	 specific	 legal	 duty	
binding	 upon	 all	Member	 States	 and	 EU	 institutions.	 The	 key	 components	 of	 the	 CEAS	 have	 become	
primary	law	objectives	and	set	no	longer	‘minimum’	but	‘common’	or	‘uniform’	standards.24	Article	6(1)	
TFEU	as	amended	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty	has	established	the	European	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	7	
December	2000	with	 the	same	 legal	value	as	 the	EU	constitutive	 treaties,	which	 is	considered	to	be	a	
welcome	 development	 for	 anchoring	 refugee	 rights	 within	 human	 rights	 law.25	 The	 second	 phase	 of	
harmonisation	resulted	in	a	recast	of	the	Qualification	Directive,26	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,27	
the	Asylum	Procedures	Directive,28	the	Dublin	Regulation29	and	the	Eurodac	Regulation.30	
	
2.	Policy	responses	
On	13	May	2015,	the	European	Commission	presented	its	European	Agenda	on	Migration,31	setting	out	
a	 comprehensive	approach	 for	 improving	 the	management	of	migration	 in	all	 its	aspects.	The	Agenda	
had	been	planned	before,	but	 got	 influenced	by	 incidents	 in	 the	Mediterranean	where	1,700	persons	
drowned	 while	 crossing	 the	 sea	 in	 2015.32	 Based	 on	 this	 initiative	 of	 the	 Commission,	 the	 Council	
adopted	 two	 decisions33	 on	 relocation	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 Greece	 and	 Italy.	 While	 these	 are	
temporary	 solutions,	 the	 Commission	 also	 envisages	 a	 lasting	 solution	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 emergency	
response	 system	 under	 Article	 78(3)	 TFEU.34	 The	 second	 implementation	 package	 of	 the	 European	
Agenda	on	Migration	thus	also	contains	a	proposal	or	amending	the	Dublin	Regulation	by	introducing	a	
permanent	crisis	relocation	system,	which	may	be	triggered	by	delegated	acts	by	the	EC	if	an	EU	MS	is	
confronted	with	a	crisis	situation	jeopardising	the	application	of	the	Dublin	system.	
	
On	6	April	2016,	 the	European	Commission	presented	a	communication	outlining	 its	approach	 for	 the	
reform	 of	 the	 CEAS.35	 According	 to	 the	 Commission,	 ‘there	 are	 significant	 structural	 weaknesses	 and	
shortcomings	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	European	asylum	and	migration	policy’.36		
																																								 																				
20		 Chetail	V	(2016)	The	Common	European	Asylum	System:	Bric-à-brac	or	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	14-16.	
21		 Ibid.,	17.	
22		 The	Hague	Programme:	strengthening	freedom,	security	and	justice	in	the	European	Union	[2005]	OJEU	C	53/1.		
23		 Stockholm	Programme:	an	open	and	secure	Europe	serving	and	protecting	citizens	[2010]	OJEU	C	115/1.	
24		 Article	78(2)	TFEU.	
25		 Chetail	V	(2016)	The	Common	European	Asylum	System:	Bric-à-brac	or	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	21	
26			 Directive	2011/95/EU.	
27		 Directive	2013/33/EU.	
28		 Directive	2013/32/EU.	
29		 Regulation	(EU)	604/2013.	
30		 Regulation	(EU)	603/2013.	
31		 European	Commission	(2015)	A	European	Agenda	on	Migration.	COM(2015)	240,	13	May	2015.	Brussels.	
32		 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016)	The	Implementation	of	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	European	Parliament,	Directorate-
	 General	for	Internal	Policies,	Policy	Department	C:	Citizen’s	Rights	and	Constitutional	Affairs.	PE	556.953,	31.		
33		 Council	Decisions	(EU)	2015/1523	and	(EU)	2015/1601.	
34		 European	Commission	(2015)	COM	2015(240),	4.	
35		 European	Commission	(2016)	Towards	a	Reform	of	the	Common	European	Asylum	System	and	Enhancing	Legal	Avenues	to	Europe.		
COM(2016)	197,	6	April	2016.	Brussels.	
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According	to	the	Agenda,	the	weaknesses	and	shortcomings	of	the	CEAS	should	be	addressed	by:37	
-	 reforming	 the	 Dublin	 system	 by	 either	 supplementing	 the	 system	 with	 a	 ‘corrective	 fairness	
mechanism’	or	by	replacing	it	with	a	new	system	for	allocating	asylum	applications	across	EU	Member	
States	based	on	a	distribution	key;	
-	 reinforcing	 the	 Eurodac	 system	 expanding	 its	 purpose	 beyond	 assisting	 in	 determining	 the	Member	
State	responsible	for	examining	an	asylum	application;	
-	 further	 harmonising	 the	 CEAS	 rules	 through	 replacing	 the	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive	 and	 the	
Qualification	 Directive	 by	 regulations	 and	 further	 modifications	 of	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	
Directive.	
-	taking	measures	to	prevent	secondary	movements	of	asylum	seekers;	
-	 extending	 the	 mandate	 for	 EASO,	 meaning	 a	 more	 dominant	 role	 for	 this	 organisation	 in	 policy	
implementation	and	a	strengthened	operational	role.		
	
	
	 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
36		 European	Commission	(2016)	COM(2016)197,	2.	
37		 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	35.	
	
	
13	
	
PART	II.	DETERMINATION	OF	THE	RESPONSIBILITY	FOR	ASYLUM	CLAIMS	
	
1.	Introduction	
Within	 the	 context	 of	 this	 report,	 the	 subject	 of	 responsibility	 determination	 covers	 the	 Dublin	 III	
Regulation	 (Chapter	 2)	 and	 the	 Council	 Decisions	 on	 relocation	 (Chapter	 3).	 An	 overview	 of	 the	
comments	on	the	Commission	proposal	for	a	Dublin	IV	Regulation	is	provided	in	Chapter	4.	
	
2.	Dublin	III	Regulation	(604/2013/EU)	
	
2.1	The	main	objectives	of	the	Dublin	system	
The	 currently	 applicable	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation38	 came	 into	 effect	 in	 January	 2014.	 The	 countries	
participating	 in	 the	Dublin	 system	consist	of	 all	 EU	Member	 States39	 as	well	 as	 Iceland,	 Liechtenstein,	
Norway	and	Switzerland.	In	essence,	the	Dublin	system	serves	to	allocate	responsibility	among	Member	
States	for	the	examination	of	asylum	claims.	The	rules	of	the	Dublin	system	aim	to	ensure	quick	access	
to	 the	 asylum	 procedure	 and	 the	 examination	 of	 an	 application	 in	 substance	 by	 a	 single,	 clearly	
determined	Member	State.40		
	
In	more	detail,	the	Dublin	arrangements	aim	to:	
-	 prevent	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 being	 shuffled	 between	 states	 (‘refugees	 in	 orbit’)	 by	 applying	 clear	
criteria	for	the	determination	of	responsibility	of	an	EU	Member	State;	
-	prevent	multiple	asylum	applications	by	making	one	country	responsible	for	an	asylum	application;	
-	prevent	 ‘asylum-shopping’	by	providing	clear	 indications	of	which	country	 is	responsible,	 irrespective	
of	the	asylum	seeker’s	preference.41	
	
2.2	Reviewing	the	Dublin	system		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 evaluating	 the	 Dublin	 system,	 it	 seems	 safe	 to	 echo	 the	 words	 of	 the	 European	
Commission	 in	 stating	 that	 the	 system	 is	 “not	 working	 as	 it	 should”.42	 In	 2011,	 the	 case	 of	M.S.S.	 v.	
Belgium	 and	 Greece43	 demonstrated	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 in	 terms	 of	 respecting	
fundamental	 rights.	A	 few	years	 later,	 the	 large-scale	uncontrolled	arrival	of	asylum	seekers,	 refugees	
and	migrants	 in	 2015	 confirmed	 the	 structural	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	
Dublin	system.44	In	the	vast	amount	of	literature	and	reports	that	has	been	written	on	the	functioning	of	
the	Dublin	system,	a	number	of	themes	recur.	This	section	is	structured	along	the	lines	of	those	themes.	
A	 distinction	 can	 be	 made	 between	 flaws	 that	 directly	 relate	 to	 the	 design	 of	 the	 system	 and	
shortcomings	in	the	way	it	operates,	although	the	two	inevitably	overlap.		
	
2.2.1	Design	
As	will	 be	 seen,	 some	 elements	 in	 the	 blueprint	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 are	 not	 beneficial	 to,	 or	 even	
undermine,	 achieving	 specific	 objectives	 of	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 elements	 that	
would	contribute	to	achieving	the	Dublin	objectives	seem	to	be	missing	from	the	system.		
																																								 																				
38	 Regulation	(EU)		604/2013.	
39	 Denmark	joined	via	a	bilateral	agreement.	
40	 European	Commission	(2016)	The	Dublin	System.	Factsheet,	1.	
41	 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	45;	Battjes	H	et	al.	(2016)	The	Crisis	of	European	Refugee	Law:	Lessons	from	Lake	Success.		
Preadvies	CJV,	8;	European	Commission	(2016)	Evaluation	of	the	Implementation	of	the	Dublin	III	Regulation.	18	March	2016,	5.	See	for	a	
critique	of	the	term	‘	asylum	shopping’:	Mouzourakis	M	(2014)	We	Need	to	Talk	about	Dublin.	Responsibility	under	the	Dublin	System	as	a	
blockage	to	asylum	burden-sharing	in	the	European	Union.	University	of	Oxford,	Refugee	Studies	Centre.	Working	Paper	Series	No.	105,	20.	
42	 European	Commission	(2015)	COM(2015)	240,	13.	
43	 ECtHR	M.S.S.	v.	Belgium	and	Greece	(30696/09).	
44	 Di	Filippo	M	(2016)	From	Dublin	to	Athens:	A	Plea	for	Radical	Rethinking	of	the	Allocation	of	Jurisdiction	in	Asylum	Procedures.	International		
Institute	of	Humanitarian	Law.	Policy	Brief,	1.	
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The	development	of	a	system	that	allocates	responsibility	for	considering	asylum	applications,	is	based	
on	Article	78(2)(e)	of	 the	Treaty	on	 the	Functioning	of	 the	European	Union	 (TFEU).	 This	 article	 leaves	
room	for	 several	allocation	systems,	provided	 they	are	 in	 line	with	 the	protection	principles	of	Article	
78(1)	TFEU	and	with	 the	principle	of	solidarity	and	a	 fair	 sharing	of	 responsibility	of	Article	80	TFEU.45	
Yet,	the	Dublin	system	lacks	a	burden-sharing	rationale	and	was	not	designed	to	sustainably	share	the	
responsibility	 for	 asylum	 applicants	 across	 the	 EU.46	 Some	 authors	 even	 point	 to	 the	 contrary	 and	
consider	that	the	Dublin	criterion	of	assigning	responsibility	on	the	basis	of	irregular	entry	seems	to	be	a	
disciplinary	measure	and	punishment.	 The	Member	States	 that	 facilitate	 the	 individual’s	 arrival	 in	 the	
Union	will	be	responsible	for	determining	their	asylum	claims,	which	points	to	a	degree	of	fault	on	the	
part	of	the	responsible	Member	State.47	 In	addition,	this	criterion	of	the	Member	State	through	which	
first	entry	into	the	EU	occurred,	is	the	most	frequently	used	criterion	for	allocating	responsibility,	even	
though	 it	 is	 hierarchically	 subordinate	 to	 the	 other	 Dublin	 criteria	 of	 determining	 the	 responsible	
Member	State.48	As	a	consequence,	the	responsibility	for	the	vast	majority	of	asylum	seekers	is	placed	
on	a	 limited	number	of	 individual	Member	States:	 through	Greece	alone,	 in	excess	of	800,000	people	
reached	 the	EU	 in	2015,49	 accounting	 for	80%	of	 the	people	arriving	 irregularly	 in	 Europe	by	 sea	 that	
year.50	In	particular	the	border	Member	States	carry	a	disproportional	burden	with	regard	to	the	arrival	
of	 asylum	 seekers,51	 although	 their	 de	 facto	 burden	 arguably	 also	 has	 to	 do	with	 their	 reception	 and	
absorption	capacities,	and	not	only	with	the	design	of	the	Dublin	system.52		
	
Assigning	 responsibility	based	on	where	 the	asylum	seeker	 first	entered	 the	 territory	of	 the	European	
Union,	 is	 facilitated	by	 the	Eurodac	database.53	 This	database	 complements	 the	Dublin	 system.	 It	was	
established	as	a	technical	support	for	the	determination	of	responsibility	and	stores	the	fingerprints	of	
asylum	 seekers	 and	 irregular	migrants	 taken	during	 initial	 registration	 in	 a	Member	 State.	 The	 stored	
fingerprints	 serve	 as	 evidence	 of	 whether	 the	 person	 in	 question	 has	 already	 lodged	 an	 asylum	
application	in	another	EU	country.54		
	
Through	the	years,	the	set	of	countries	that	participate	in	the	Dublin	system	have	become	increasingly	
diverse.	 The	 initial	 12	 participating	 countries	 were	 far	 more	 homogeneous	 in	 terms	 of	 for	 instance	
economic	and	social	conditions	than	can	be	said	of	the	32	countries	that	currently	participate.55	Still,	the	
Dublin	 criteria	 fail	 to	 reflect	 in	 any	way	 the	 respective	 size,	 development	 or	 resources	 in	 the	 asylum	
																																								 																				
45		 Maiani	F	(2016)	The	Dublin	III	Regulation:	A	New	Legal	Framework	for	a	More	Humane	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	
	 (eds.)	Reforming	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	NV,	102-103.	
46		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015)	Evaluation	of	the	Dublin	III	Regulation.	Study	prepared	by	ICF	International		 for	the	European	Commission,	4;	European		
Commission	(2016)	The	Dublin	System.	Factsheet,	1;	Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin		System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De		
Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.)	Reforming	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	
NV,	164.	
47		 Mouzourakis	M	(2014),	10-11;	Guild	E	et	al.	(2015)	New	Approaches,	Alternative	Avenues	and	Means	of	Access	to	Asylum	Procedures	for		
Persons	Seeking	International	Protection.	Centre	for	European	Policy	Studies.	Paper	No.	77,	17-18.	
48		 Guild	E	et	al.	(2015c),	17-18;	European	Commission	(2016)	Towards	a	Reform	of	the	Common	European	Asylum	System	and	Enhancing		
Legal	Avenues	to	Europe.	COM(2016)	197,	6	April	2016,	4.;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	5;	UNHCR	(2017a)	Left	in	Limbo:	UNHCR	Study	on	the		
Implementation	of	the	Dublin	III	Regulation,	90;	Battjes	H	et	al.	(2016),	9.	See	UNHCR	(2017a),	86-90	for	an	overview	of	the	possible	reasons	
for	the	way	in	which	the	responsibility	criteria	seem	to	be	used	in	practice.	
49		 Wagner	M	and	Kraler	A	(2016)	International	Refugee	Protection	and	European	Responses.	International	Centre	for	Migration	Policy	
	 Development.	Working	Paper	12,	8.	
50		 UNHCR	(2015)	Over	one	million	sea	arrivals	reach	Europe	in	2015.	Available	at:		
http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html.		
51	 Battjes	H	et	al.	(2016),	9;	Carrera	S	et	al.	(2015)	The	EU’s	Response	to	the	Refugee	Crisis.	Taking	Stock	and	Setting	Policy	Priorities.	Centre	for		
European	Policy	Studies.	Essay	no.	20,	13;	Brekke	JP	and	Brochmann	G	(2014)	Stuck	in	Transit:	Secondary	Migration	of	Asylum	Seekers	in		
Europe,	National	Differences,	and	the	Dublin	Regulation.	Journal	of	Refugee	Studies	28(2):	148.	
52	 Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin	System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	.165.	
53		 Established	on	the	basis	of	Regulation	(EU)	603/2013.	
54	 Wagner	M	and	Kraler	A	(2016),	7-8	.	More	elaborately	on	EURODAC	and	an	analysis	of	EURODAC	data,	see	Guild	E	et	al.	(2015c).	
55	 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	46.	
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system	 and	 reception	 systems	 of	 the	 Member	 States.56	 Instead,	 the	 Dublin	 system	 works	 on	 the	
underlying	assumption	that	asylum	seekers	will	 receive	the	same	 level	of	protection	 in	every	Member	
State	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 qualifying	 for	 international	 protection,	 the	 asylum	 procedure	 and	 reception	
conditions.57	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case:	 despite	 the	 standards	 contained	 in	 the	 different	 directives58	 of	 the	
CEAS,	 the	 length	 of	 asylum	 procedures,	 the	 reception	 conditions	 and	 rates	 of	 recognition	 for	
international	 protection	 vary	 across	 Member	 States.59	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 differences,	 protection	
seekers	may	prefer	 to	move	elsewhere	 in	 the	EU.60	These	secondary	movements	challenge	the	Dublin	
system’s	aim	of	quick	access	to	the	asylum	procedure.	This	connection	between	the	level	of	reception	
conditions	and	secondary	movements	 is	however	not	undisputed.	Other	 researchers	 suggest	 that	pull	
factors	 such	as	 social	 ties,	 the	 reputation	of	other	 countries	or	 job	opportunities	may	be	 regarded	as	
more	important	by	asylum	seekers	when	making	the	choice	for	a	certain	country.61	
	
The	 Dublin	 criteria	 on	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 responsible	 state,	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	
preference	or	personal	 interests	of	the	asylum	seeker.62	This	could	not	only	hamper	the	 integration	of	
asylum	seekers,	but	also	results	in	a	rather	bureaucratic,	discretionary	distribution	of	asylum	seekers	in	
Europe.63	It	can	also	lead	to	secondary	movements	and	multiple	applications	as	many	protection	seekers	
travel	back	or	travel	onto	their	preferred	destination,	once	transferred.64	This	development	in	turn	has	
led	several	Member	States	to	reintroduce	internal	border	controls	to	manage	the	influx.65		
	
2.2.2	Implementation,	effectiveness	and	efficiency	
This	section	 looks	at	how	the	Dublin	system	has	been	 implemented	by	Member	States	and	provides	a	
largely	analytical	perspective	on	the	extent	to	which	Dublin	can	be	described	as	effective	and	efficient.	
Effectiveness	and	efficiency	in	part	result	from	the	degree	of	implementation,	but	are	also	influenced	by	
other	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 wider	 EU	 acquis	 on	 asylum.	 It	 follows	 from	 the	
literature	 reviewed	 that	 effectiveness	 stands	 for	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 Dublin	 system	 achieves	 its	
objectives	as	set	out	in	paragraph	2.1	above.	Efficiency	in	turn	relates	to	the	costs	involved	with	running	
the	Dublin	system	in	terms	of	time,	money	and	human	costs.		
	
Availability	of	data	
Statistical	 data	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 have	 always	 been	 incomplete66	 and	 should	
therefore	be	 interpreted	with	caution.	EU	sources	such	as	Eurostat	and	the	European	Asylum	Support	
Office	 (EASO)	encounter	difficulties	 in	gathering	and	 releasing	up-to-date	 information,	as	participating	
countries	 fail	 to	provide	detailed	and	up-to-date	Dublin	statistics,	despite	a	clear	obligation	under	 the	
																																								 																				
56		 Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin	System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	165.	
57		 Battjes	H	et	al.	(2016),	9.	
58		 Asylum	Procedures	Directive,	Qualification	Directive,	Reception	Conditions	Directive.	
59		 European	Commission	(2016)	COM(2016)	197,	4-5;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	16,	
60		 Costello	C	and	Mouzourakis	M	(2014)	Reflections	on	reading	Tarakhel:	Is	‘How	Bad	is	Bad	Enough’	Good	Enough?	Asiel&Migrantenrecht	10,			
411;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	15.	
61		 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	82;	Wagner	M	and	Kraler	A	(2016),	12.	
62		 Battjes	H	et	al.	(2016),	10;	Di	Filippo	M	(2016b),	3;	Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin	System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De		
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Migration	 Statistics	 Regulation.67	 For	 the	 2016	 Asylum	 Information	 Database	 (AIDA)	 report,	 full	
information	 is	 only	 available	 for	 nine	 countries.68	 Eurostat	 data	 on	 Dublin	 statistics	 have	 been	
incomplete	every	year	since	2010	and	are	consistently	released	late.69	On	a	more	specific	level,	limited	
statistical	 information	is	available	about	the	responsibility	criteria	on	which	Dublin	requests	are	based.	
Eurostat	and	EASO	only	specify	the	applicable	criterion	for	the	“take	charge”	requests	and	not	for	“take	
back”	requests,	even	though	the	latter	category	is	far	more	applied.70	In	addition,	most	Member	States	
fail	 to	provide	 statistics	on	 the	use	of	 asylum	detention71	 and	 it	 should	be	noted	here	 that	detention	
(and	 other	 elements	 of	 the	 CEAS)	 are	 not	 covered	 by	 the	 Migration	 Statistics	 Regulation.72	
Consequently,	an	accurate	and	comprehensive	statistical	picture	of	the	Dublin	system	does	not	seem	to	
exist.73	This	is	in	itself	problematic:	an	analytical	evaluation	of	the	Dublin	system	can	only	be	indicative	
and	 the	 lack	of	data	gives	 rise	 to	concerns	on	 the	overall	 transparency	of	 the	operation	of	 the	Dublin	
procedure.	Improvements	in	this	area	can	be	made	by	reviewing	the	cooperation	between	different	EU	
entities	 such	 as	 EASO,	 the	 European	Migration	 Network	 (EMN)	 and	 The	 Fundamental	 Rights	 Agency	
(FRA).	 More	 clearly	 demarcated	 areas	 of	 information	 collection	 for	 these	 organisations	 can	 prevent	
duplication	of	efforts	and	excessive	workload	on	national	administrations.74	
	
Implementation	and	harmonisation	
In	 practice,	 considerable	 variety	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Member	 States	 determine	
responsibility	for	an	asylum	claim.75	Most	of	the	Member	States	at	times	work	outside	the	Dublin	system	
by	assuming	responsibility	without	undertaking	any	formal	Dublin	evaluation,	even	if	evidence	obtained	
during	registration	or	initial	processing	suggests	another	Member	State	may	be	responsible.	The	reasons	
for	 not	 undertaking	 a	 formal	 Dublin	 examination	 varied	 from	 humanitarian	 to	 efficiency	
considerations.76	 Several	Member	 States	 reported	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 on	 having	 to	 assume	
responsibility	 because	 no	 other	 Member	 State	 could	 be	 designated	 under	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 criteria.	
Although	 this	 practice	 would	 be	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 Dublin	 procedure	 (i.e.	 Article	 3(2)	 of	 the	
Regulation),	 the	 underlying	 absence	 of	 conclusive	 evidence	 for	 the	 responsibility	 of	 another	Member	
State	could	also	point	to	shortcomings	in	the	implementation	of	the	Eurodac	Regulation.77	According	to	
several	 Member	 States,	 gaps	 (increasingly)	 exist	 in	 registration	 and	 fingerprint	 procedures	 in	 other	
Member	States,78	although	the	eu-LISA	report	on	the	2016	activities	of	the	Eurodac	system	states	that	
the	number	of	fingerprint	datasets	stored	in	the	system	increased	by	25%	in	2016.79	
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When	Member	States	do	apply	the	Dublin	criteria	for	determining	responsibility,	important	differences	
seem	to	exist	 in	how	the	criteria	are	 interpreted	and	applied.	Some	Member	States	 implement	Dublin	
‘by	 the	 book’,	 while	 others	 show	 greater	 flexibility,	 namely	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 family	 unity	
criteria.80	As	described	 in	paragraph	2.2.1	the	hierarchically	most	 important	Dublin	criteria	are	not	the	
ones	that	are	applied	the	most,	although	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	Member	States	are	(solely)	
responsible	for	this.81	When	it	comes	to	interpretation	of	the	criteria,	a	lack	of	consensus	seems	to	exist	
between	 Member	 States	 on	 determination	 of	 responsibility,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 considerable	
amount	of	rejected	requests.82		
	
Large	scale	arrivals	(often	referred	to	as	the	‘refugee	crisis’)	also	had	their	effect	by	putting	a	strain	on	
national	 asylum	 systems.83	 The	 high	 influx	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 has	 led	 to	 delays	 in	 the	 processing	 of	
applications.	 EU	 Member	 States	 who	 were	 most	 affected	 by	 the	 large-scale	 influx	 started	 to	 widely	
ignore	 the	 Dublin	 system	 by	 letting	 through	 persons	 who	 did	 not	 explicitly	 request	 asylum	 on	 their	
territory.84	 Transfers	 have	 also	 been	 affected	 by	 the	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 arriving	 asylum	
seekers.	Perhaps	in	an	attempt	to	meet	the	time	limits	for	submitting	a	request,	Member	States	submit	
transfer	 requests	without	 providing	 proper	 documentation	 to	motivate	 the	 request,	which	 has	 led	 to	
further	administrative	delays	and	even	a	higher	 rejection	 rate	of	 these	 requests	by	 receiving	Member	
States.85		
	
Discrepancies	 also	 exist86	 in	 the	 national	 practices	 of	 Member	 States	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 the	
discretionary	 clauses	 of	 Article	 17	 of	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation.	 Article	 17(1)	 allows	 Member	 States	 to	
examine	an	application	for	international	protection,	even	if	this	is	not	its	responsibility	under	the	criteria	
laid	 down	 in	 the	 Regulation.87	 According	 to	 Article	 17(2),	 a	Member	 State	may	 also	 request	 another	
Member	State	to	take	charge	of	an	applicant	based	on	other	grounds	than	the	normally	used	criteria	for	
determining	 responsibility.	 In	 Switzerland,	 Article	 17(1)	 can	 only	 be	 relied	 upon	 in	 conjunction	 with	
another	legal	provision,	whereas	in	Austria	asylum	seekers	may	directly	request	authorities	to	consider	
the	 application	 of	 this	 clause.	 In	 the	 UK,	 the	 asylum	 applicant	 is	 not	 informed	 during	 the	 screening	
interview	about	the	possibility	of	relying	on	the	discretionary	clauses.	Instead,	this	option	is	only	likely	to	
be	raised	if	the	applicant	considers	legally	challenging	a	Dublin	decision.	It	should	however	be	noted	that	
these	discrepancies	only	affect	a	limited	number	of	cases,	as	the	discretionary	clauses	are	rarely	used.88		
	
Effectiveness		
When	 considering	 the	 effectiveness	 of	Dublin,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	wider	 EU	acquis	 on	 asylum	
must	 also	be	 taken	 into	 account	 as	 underlying	 the	Dublin	 system	 is	 the	 core	 assumption	 that	 asylum	
applicants	will	 receive	 equivalent	 consideration	 and	 treatment	 in	whatever	Member	 State	 they	 lodge	
their	claim.89	Reality	shows	that	differences	persist.	To	start	with,	seven	out	of	32	Dublin	Member	States	
are	 not	 fully	 bound	 by	 the	 EU	acquis	 on	 asylum.90	 In	 addition,	 four	 of	 these	 countries	 are	 not	 an	 EU	
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Member	State	and	are	therefore	not	bound	by	general	EU	principles.91	Among	the	states	that	are	bound	
by	 the	 EU	 asylum	 acquis,	 differences	 remain	 in	 the	 application	 of	 EU	 asylum	 standards,	 integration	
capacity	 and	 comprehensive	 observance	 of	 fundamental	 rights.92	 Some	 even	 doubt	 whether	 a	 truly	
common	asylum	system	exists.93	
	
These	 differences	 in	 standards	 can	 have	 far-reaching	 consequences	 on	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	
Dublin	system,	as	for	instance	demonstrated	by	the	suspension	of	Dublin	transfers	to	Greece	in	2011.94	
The	lack	of	a	level	playing	field	also	encourages	secondary	movements	(see	paragraph	2.2.1	above).	 In	
doing	 so,	 asylum	 seekers	may	 try	 to	 avoid	 registration	 at	 designated	 reception	 facilities	 by	 using	 the	
services	of	smugglers,	or	take	riskier	routes	to	pass	‘under	the	radar’	to	reach	their	desired	destination.95	
This	 widespread	 avoidance	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 ends	 up	 undermining	 the	 central	 policy	 goal	 of	
providing	swift	access	to	status	determination.	Applicants	may	seriously	undermine	their	own	claim	to	
protection	in	their	attempts	to	escape	the	system.		
	
Dublin’s	 claim	 to	 provide	 swift	 access	 to	 asylum	procedures	 is	 undermined	by	 the	 length	 of	 the	 time	
frames	within	 the	Dublin	Regulation.	 Even	when	authorities	 closely	 comply	with	 stipulated	deadlines,	
applicants	may	 still	 wait	 up	 to	 10	months	 (take	 back	 requests)	 or	 11	months	 (take	 charge	 requests)	
before	 the	 procedure	 for	 examining	 the	 claim	 for	 international	 protection	 starts.96	 Furthermore,	
statistics	 show	 that	 Member	 States	 regularly	 fail	 to	 respect	 the	 time	 limits	 prescribed	 by	 the	
regulation.97	 For	 as	 long	 as	 a	 decisions	 has	 not	 been	made,	 asylum	 seekers	 are	 kept	 in	 limbo.98	After	
acceptance	 of	 the	 transfer	 request	 by	 another	 Member	 State,	 applicants	 reportedly	 are	 transferred	
within	the	time	limit	of	six	months	(Article	29	Dublin	Regulation),	but	the	time	taken	varies	widely.99	All	
in	all,	Dublin	seems	to	be	failing	to	quickly	 identify	a	responsible	Member	State	so	that	applicants	can	
access	an	asylum	procedure	in	a	timely	manner.100		
	
The	Dublin	system	does	not	seem	to	be	effective	in	terms	of	realising	the	transfer	of	protection	seekers	
from	one	Member	 State	 to	 another.	 In	 the	 limited	 number	 of	Member	 States	 on	which	 statistics	 are	
available,	 the	 number	 of	 effected	 Dublin	 transfers	 is	 consistently	 low	 compared	 to	 the	 number	 of	
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requests	issued.	In	2015101	and	2016,102	the	percentage	of	actual	transfers	compared	to	the	total	issued	
requests	stood	at	11%,	rising	to	18%	for	the	first	half	of	2017.103	A	similar	picture	arises	when	looking	at	
the	 actual	 transfers	 as	 a	 percentage	of	 accepted	 requests:	 in	 2013,	 28	per	 cent	 of	 accepted	 requests	
resulted	 in	actual	 transfers.104	 	 It	 should	be	noted	here	 that	 the	current	 rules	provide	an	 incentive	 for	
asylum	seekers	to	try	and	prevent	being	transferred.	Responsibility	 for	handling	an	asylum	application	
shifts	 between	Member	 States	 after	 a	 given	 time.	 So,	 if	 an	 applicant	 absconds	 for	 long	 enough	 in	 a	
Member	 State	 without	 being	 effectively	 transferred,	 this	 Member	 State	 will	 eventually	 become	
responsible.105		
	
In	terms	of	an	even	distribution	of	applicants	among	Member	States,	the	results	of	operating	the	Dublin	
system	are	 also	 limited.	Data	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 some	 redistributive	effect,	 but	 for	most	Member	
States	 the	net	 transfers	are	 close	 to	 zero.106	 This	means	 that	 these	 states	 receive	and	 transfer	 similar	
numbers	 of	 applicants	 to	 other	Member	 States,	 so	 that	 their	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 requests	 cancel	
each	other	out.		
	
Efficiency		
An	evaluation	of	the	efficiency	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	is	hampered	by	the	difficulty	that	seems	to	exist	
in	 ascertaining	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system.107	 The	 following	 picture	 arises	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
information	 that	 is	 available,	 which	 must	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 illustration	 rather	 than	 a	 sound	
determination	of	the	costs	of	the	Dublin	system.	
	
A	 distinction	 can	 be	made	 between	 direct	 and	 indirect	 financial	 costs.	 The	 direct	 costs	 comprise	 for	
instance	 the	 staff	 costs	 of	 the	 specialized	Dublin	 units	within	 national	 asylum	 authorities,	 the	 cost	 of	
operating	 IT	 systems	 such	 as	 Eurodac,	 overheads	 and	 the	 costs	 surrounding	 the	 transfer	 of	 Dublin	
applicants	 (including	 the	 cost	 of	 detention).108	 Direct	 costs	 also	 refer	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 appeals	 against	
Dublin	 decisions.	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 in	 2014,	 based	 on	 an	 average	 appeal	 rate	 of	 54%,	 these	 costs	
amounted	 to	 28	million	 euros,	 not	 including	 the	 cost	 of	 legal	 aid.109	 Indirect	 costs	 refer	 to	 reception	
costs,	return	and	readmission	costs	of	failed	Dublin	applicants	and	the	irregular	migration	costs	of	failed	
Dublin	applicants	that	are	not	returned.110	The	direct	and	 indirect	costs	of	 the	Dublin	system	together	
amounted	 to	 approximately	 1	 billion	 euros	 in	 2014	 across	 the	 EU.111	 Member	 States	 themselves	
generally	 find	 the	 cost	of	 implementing	 the	Dublin	Regulation	proportionate	 in	 view	of	 the	outcomes	
generated.112	
	
																																								 																				
101	 ECRE	(2017)	The	Dublin	system	in	2016.	Key	figures	from	selected	European	countries,	4.	Statistics	were	only	available	for:	Germany,		
	 Switzerland,	Italy,	Sweden,	Hungary,	Greece,	Poland	and	Bulgaria.	
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103	 ECRE	(2017)	The	Dublin	system	in	the	first	half	of	2017.	Key	figures	from	selected	European	countries,	5-6.	Statistics	were	only	available	for:		
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107		 Williams	R	(2015)	Beyond	Dublin.	A	Discussion	Paper	for	the	Greens	/	EFA	in	the	European	Parliament,	10;	Mouzourakis	M	(2014),	25;	
	 Fratzke	S	(2015),	15;	Maiani	F	(2016)	The	Dublin	III	Regulation:	A	New	Legal	Framework	for	a	More	Humane	System?	In:	Chetail	V,	De		
	 Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	107.	
108		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	11;	Mouzourakis	M	(2014),	25;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	15-16.	
109		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	27-28.	Concerning	the	reliability	of	these	data,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	rate	of	appeal	was	assumed	to	be	50%		
	 unless	data	for	a	Member	State	were	provided	by	Member	States’	administrations.		
110		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	11;	Mouzourakis	M	(2014),	25;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	15-16.	
111		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	11.	
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The	cost	effectiveness	of	the	Dublin	system	is	affected	by	a	number	of	variables.	First,	the	efficiency	in	
processing	Dublin	applications	influences	cost	effectiveness	in	the	sense	that	shorter	procedures	make	
the	system	less	costly.	Second,	the	efficiency	in	effecting	the	transfer	decisions	in	other	Member	States	
plays	 a	 role:	 more	 actual	 transfers	 leads	 to	 a	 less	 costly	 system.	 Third,	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 system	 is	
influenced	 by	 the	 efficiency	 in	 returning	 asylum	 applicants	 whose	 claims	 are	 unfounded:	 the	 system	
becomes	less	costly	if	more	failed	applicants	are	returned.113	
	
In	 general,	 the	 Dublin	 system	 can	 be	 considered	 inefficient	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 only	 establishes	 the	
responsibility	of	a	Member	State	 for	processing	an	asylum	claim	without	addressing	 the	merits	of	 the	
claim	 itself.114	More	 specifically,	Dublin	 procedures	 are	 lengthy,	 time	 limits	 are	 regularly	 exceeded	by	
Member	States	and	actual	transfers	only	take	place	in	a	minority	of	the	cases	where	transfer	requests	
are	 accepted	 as	 pointed	 out	 above	 when	 considering	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system.	 Some	
Member	 States	 transfer	 back	 and	 forth	 an	 equal	 number	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 with	 the	 same	Member	
States	and	several	Member	States	have	net	Dublin	transfers	of	 less	than	100	Dublin	applicants.115	This	
reduces	the	overall	efficiency116	of	the	Dublin	system	and	increases	reception	and	return	or	readmission	
costs.117	
	
When	it	comes	to	the	number	of	rejected	asylum	seekers	not	transferred	and/or	not	returned	to	their	
country	 of	 origin,	 high	 social	 costs	 linked	 to	 irregular	migration	 will	 be	 generated.118	 In	 2015,	 it	 was	
estimated	 that	 a	 maximum	 of	 42%	 of	 the	 Dublin	 applicants	 not	 effectively	 transferred	 may	 still	 be	
staying	as	irregular	migrants	either	in	the	hosting	Member	State	or	in	the	EU.119		
	
The	human	costs	of	waiting	 for	 the	 individual	 asylum	seeker	 should	be	added	 to	 the	aforementioned	
financial	and	social	costs.120	The	longer	the	Dublin	procedure	takes,	the	longer	the	integration	of	asylum	
seekers	will	be	postponed	and	thus	their	chance	to	effectively	contribute	to	society.121	In	addition,	the	
human	costs	of	the	Dublin	system	are	increased	by	the	fact	that	applicant	preferences	are	not	taken	into	
account,	 as	 indicated	 in	 paragraph	 2.2.1	 of	 Part	 II.	 The	 prolonged	 state	 of	 anxiety,	 separation	 from	
relatives,	poor	living	conditions	and	possible	detention	should	also	be	taken	into	account.122	
	
2.2.3	Fundamental	rights	
Case	 law	of	both	the	CJEU	and	the	ECtHR	demonstrates	that	 the	 interpretation	and	application	of	 the	
Dublin	Regulation	must	comply	with	fundamental	rights.123	This	paragraph	will	touch	on	commentaries	
regarding	the	respect	for	fundamental	rights	in	the	context	of	the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	
Dublin	 III	 regulation	 by	 Member	 States.	 In	 general,	 the	 CEAS	 is	 viewed	 as	 geared	 towards	 the	
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121		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	15.	
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securitisation	of	borders	 rather	 than	 the	protection	of	 individuals124	which	 in	practice	 is	 reinforced	by	
the	 absence	 of	 repercussions	 for	Member	 States	 in	 the	 event	 of	 manifest	 violations	 of	 fundamental	
rights.125	On	a	more	specific	level,	the	Dublin	system	and	its	application	give	rise	concern	in	the	following	
areas.	
	
Eurodac	Regulation	
The	 current	 Eurodac	 Regulation126	 has	 changed	 the	 nature	 and	 objective	 of	 the	 Eurodac	 database	 as	
compared	 to	 the	 first	 Eurodac	 Regulation.127	 National	 law	 enforcement	 authorities	 and	 Europol	 may	
since	July	2015	under	conditions	have	access	to	the	database	for	the	purposes	of	preventing,	detecting	
or	 investigating	terrorist	offences	or	other	serious	crimes.128	This	can	be	considered	a	strong	deviation	
from	Eurodac’s	original	purpose	of	facilitating	the	determination	responsible	for	an	asylum	claim	within	
the	context	of	the	Dublin	mechanism.	This	deviation	 is	 in	 itself	considered	as	an	 interference	with	the	
right	to	data	protection	as	protected	in	Article	8	of	the	EU	Charter	for	Fundamental	Rights	(CFR)	and	the	
access	 by	 national	 law	 enforcement	 authorities	 to	 such	 data	 forms	 a	 further	 interference	 with	 the	
fundamental	 right	 of	 private	 life	 under	 Article	 7	 CFR	 and	 Article	 8	 ECHR.129	 A	 further	 concern	 is	 the	
reported	use	of	force	or	coercion	by	authorities	when	collecting	fingerprints.130		
	
Family	and	children	
Paragraphs	 2.2.1	 and	 2.2.2	 have	 described	 that	Member	 States	 do	 not	 apply	 the	 Dublin	 hierarchy	 of	
criteria	as	prescribed	by	the	Regulation	when	determining	the	responsible	Member	State.	This	forms	a	
risk	to	the	right	for	respect	of	family	life	(Article	8	ECHR):	although	family	criteria	are	clearly	at	the	top	of	
the	Dublin	hierarchy	(see	Articles	8-11	of	the	Dublin	Regulation),	the	criteria	involving	illegal	entry	into	
the	European	Union	are	most	used	in	practice.131		
	
When	it	comes	to	children,	recital	13	and	Article	6	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	state	that	the	best	interests	
of	 the	 child	 are	 a	 primary	 consideration	 in	 applying	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation.	 In	 practice,	 guidance	 and	
adequate	 training	 on	 conducting	 	 the	 best	 interest	 assessment	 generally	 appear	 to	 be	 lacking	 and	
specific	needs	of	unaccompanied	minors	are	frequently	neglected.132	A	lack	of	standardised	approach	in	
areas	 such	 as	 age	 assessment,	 representation	 and	 family	 tracing	 create	 significant	 delays	 in	 family	
reunion	 procedures	 concerning	 children,	 with	 inconsistent	 approaches	 across	 Member	 States.133	
Divergent	practices	exist	of	what	counts	as	proof	of	family	links.134	
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Transfers	
When	it	comes	to	the	principle	of	non-refoulement	the	Dublin	Regulation	is	based	on	the	premise	that	
all	 Member	 States	 respect	 this	 principle	 and	 thus	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 safe	 for	 third	 country	
nationals.135	 Practice	 however	 shows	 a	 lack	 of	 harmonisation	 with	 inconsistent	 interpretation	 of	 the	
refugee	definition	 contained	 in	Article	 1A	of	 the	Refugee	Convention	and	 /	or	 the	 risk	of	 inhuman	or	
degrading	treatment	in	violation	of	Article	3	ECHR	and	Article	4	of	the	EU	Charter.136	Case	law	has	shown	
that	 asylum	 and	 reception	 conditions	 vary	 greatly	 and	 therefore	 transfers	 between	Dublin	 states	 can	
amount	to	human	rights	violations.137	
	
Concerns	 have	 also	 been	 raised	 about	 the	 ability	 of	 protection	 seekers	 to	 access	 asylum	 procedures	
after	a	transfer	has	been	completed	to	outside	the	Dublin	area.	In	the	case	of	Greece,	reports	indicate	
that	some	transferees	may	have	been	returned	to	Turkey	before	their	applications	were	fully	evaluated,	
which	could	have	amounted	to	refoulement.138	
	
The	position	of	vulnerable	asylum	seekers	in	transfer	can	be	even	more		precarious.	Research	has	raised	
questions	 as	 to	whether	 authorities	 provide	 all	 necessary	medical	 information,	 or	 whether	 there	 are	
appropriate	assurances	that	the	necessary	medical	facilities	will	be	available	after	an	applicant	has	been		
transferred.139	
	
Detention	
Freedom	from	arbitrary	detention	is	enshrined	in	the	right	to	liberty	and	security	of	the	person	as	laid	
down	in	Article	5	ECHR	and	Article	6	of	the	EU	Charter.	Although	limited	data	are	available,140	detention	
seems	to	be	used	in	a	majority	of	cases	by	many	Member	States.141	
	
Detention	 in	the	context	of	the	Dublin	system	is	governed	by	Article	28	of	the	Regulation,	from	which	
follows	 that	 Member	 States	 may	 detain	 the	 person	 concerned	 when	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 risk	 of	
absconding.	In	addition,	as	follows	from	the	same	article,	detention	may	only	take	place	if	less	coercive	
measure	 cannot	be	 applied	effectively	 and	must	be	 for	 as	 short	 a	period	 as	possible.	Whilst	 practical	
duration	of	detention	to	secure	transfers	under	the	Dublin	Regulation	varies,	time	 limits	 for	detention	
appear	to	be	respected	in	practice.142	Evidence	suggest	that	applicants	placed	in	detention	are	less	well	
informed	about	Dublin	procedures	or	their	rights	to	appeal.143	Concerns	also	exist	when	it	comes	to	the	
assessment	 of	 the	 necessity	 and	 proportionality	 of	 detention,	 which	 does	 not	 always	 seem	 to	 take	
place.144	 The	 definition	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 absconding	 varies	 between	 different	 countries	 and	 tends	 to	 be	
widely	construed	by	reference	to	numerous	criteria.145		
	
	
	
																																								 																				
135		 Recital	3	of	Regulation	(EU)	604/2013.	The	principle	of	non-refoulement	is	also	laid	down	in	article	33(1)	Refugee	Convention.	
136		 UNHCR	(2017a),	17.	
137		 Maas	S	et	al.	(2015),	16.	ECtHR	M.S.S.	v.	Belgium	and	Greece	(30696/09);	ECtHR	Tarakhel	v.	Switzerland	(29217/12);	Joined	cases	CJEU	N.S.		
v.	Secretary		 for	the	Home	Department	(C-411/10)	and	CJEU	M.E.	and	others	v.	Refugee	Applications	Commissioner	and	Minister	for	Justice,		
Equality	and		Law	Reform	(C-493/10).	
138		 Fratzke	S	(2015),	19.	
139		 Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin	System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	182.	
140		 Fratzke	S	(2015),	19.	
141		 Garlick	MV	(2016)	The	Dublin	System,	Solidarity	and	Individual	Rights.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	177-179.	
142		 UNHCR	(2017a),	171.	
143	 UNHCR	(2017a),	171;	Fratzke	S	(2015),	19.	
144	 UNHCR	(2017a),	171.	
145		 ECRE	(2015)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2014/2015,	85-86.	
	
	
23	
	
2.2.4	Other	observations	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 discretionary	 clauses	 in	 Article	 17,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 Regulation	 does	 not	
provide	clarity	in	the	boundaries	between	the	two	clauses	which	leads	to	a	non-transparent	application	
of	the	provisions	in	practice.146	In	addition,	there	is	a	lack	of	public	information	about	the	use	of	these	
clauses.147	
	
3.	Relocation	
In	September	2015,	two	Council	Decisions	took	effect	that	were	aimed	at	providing	temporary	relief	for	
Italy	and	Greece.148	The	decisions	are	a	temporary	derogation	from	the	Dublin	III	provisions	on	allocation	
of	 responsibility	 for	 reception	 and	 determining	 asylum	 applications.149	 The	 first	 Council	 Decision	
(2015/1523)	aims	at	relocation	of	40,000	asylum	seekers	and	is	voluntary,	whereas	the	second	Council	
Decision	 (2015/1601)	 accounts	 for	 120,000	 places	 and	 includes	 mandatory	 relocation	 quota.150	 The	
decisions	 are	 part	 of	 the	 ‘European	 Agenda	 on	Migration’151	 and	 introduced	 a	 scheme	 for	 relocation	
with	a	key	for	division	based	on	population	size,	gross	domestic	pro,	the	number	of	spontaneous	asylum	
applications	and	unemployment	rates.152	In	order	to	be	eligible	for	relocation,	the	asylum	seeker	has	to	
be	 in	clear	need	of	 international	protection	and	demonstrated	(according	to	the	Decisions)	by	being	a	
national	or	stateless	resident	of	a	country	for	which	the	EU-wide	recognition	rate	is	more	than	75%.153	
	
The	relocation	decisions	are	welcomed	for	allowing	the	disproportionately	burdened	states	of	Italy	and	
Greece	 to	derogate	 from	 the	Dublin	 criterion	of	 allocating	 competence	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 first	 entry	
principle.	In	theory	this	meant	that	some	of	the	pressure	that	these	countries	had	to	deal	with	would	be	
transferred	 to	 other	Member	 States.154	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 implementation	 and	 results	 however,	 the	
relocation	scheme	leaves	a	lot	to	be	desired.155		
	
In	terms	of	the	number	of	asylum	seekers	transferred,	the	initial	target	of	160,000	persons	was	reduced	
to	 106,000	 in	 September	 2016.156	 Even	 the	 reduced	 target	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	with	 reality:	 until	
now,	April	 2018,	around	35,000	asylum	seekers	have	been	 relocated.157	At	 the	very	best,	 some	argue	
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that	 Member	 States	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 lack	 of	 cooperation	 and	 responsibility	 sharing,158	 while	
Slovakia,	Hungary	and	Poland	even	refused	to	cooperate.159	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	relocation	
scheme	 runs	 parallel	 to	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation,	meaning	 that	 returns	 to	 Italy	 and	 Greece	 from	 other	
countries	could	continue.	The	effects	of	this	are	most	visible	 in	the	case	of	 Italy.	 In	2016,	according	to	
data	from	ECRE,	1,864	asylum	seekers	were	transferred	from	Italy	while	at	the	same	time	the	country	
received	 2,086	 asylum	 seekers.160	 Operation	 of	 the	 relocation	 system	 parallel	 to	 the	 working	 of	 the	
Dublin	system	for	Italy	thus	resulted	in	the	net	receipt	of	222	asylum	seekers,	evidencing	the	failure	to	
relieve	pressure	 for	 this	 country.161	This	 raises	questions	about	 the	effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	 the	
relocation	scheme,	especially	 in	view	of	 the	substantial	administrative	costs	 involved	with	running	the	
relocation	 programme.	 The	 eligibility	 criteria	 further	 reduce	 any	 benefits	 of	 relocation	 for	 Italy	 and	
Greece,	as	they	are	left	with	those	applicants	who	are	less	likely	to	receive	any	international	protection.	
These	 less	 straightforward	 cases	 are	 likely	 to	 put	 a	 considerable	 and	 long-term	 strain	 on	 already	
overburdened	reception	systems	and	resources	with	limited	prospects	of	return	to	the	country	of	origin	
if	they	turn	out	not	to	be	eligible	for	international	protection	status.162		
	
The	relocation	scheme	also	affects	the	asylum	seeker,	who	is	forcibly	transferred	within	Europe.163	Most	
crucially	the	eligibility	threshold	of	originating	from	a	country	with	a	recognition	rate	of	75%	has	been	
considered	arbitrary	and	was	not	useful	to	relief	the	pressure	in	overburdened	countries	(particularly	in	
Italy).164	The	relocation	scheme	has	also	led	to	the	exclusion	of	certain	profiles	following	the	opportunity	
that	Member	States	were	given	to	indicate	their	preferences.165	
	
4.	Proposal	for	a	Dublin	IV	Regulation	
In	 May	 2016,	 the	 European	 Commission	 presented	 its	 proposal166	 for	 a	 recast	 of	 Dublin	 III.167	 There	
seems	to	be	consensus	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 the	proposal	does	not	 fundamentally	 rethink	 the	current	
system	for	allocating	responsibility	for	asylum	claims.168		
	
Applicants	on	the	whole	face	stricter	and	disproportionate	rules.169	These	include	far-reaching	sanctions	
for	 secondary	 movements	 in	 the	 form	 of	 mandatory	 use	 of	 the	 accelerated	 procedure170	 and	 the	
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withdrawal	of	reception	conditions.171	The	proposal	also	imposes	limitations	on	an	applicant’s	right	to	an	
effective	remedy.	Wholesale	exclusion	from	this	right	takes	place	when	an	applicant	has	been	subject	to	
a	‘take	back’	Dublin	procedure172	and	the	scope	of	the	appeal	against	transfer	decisions173	is	limited	to	
the	 assessment	 of	 risks	 of	 inhuman	 or	 degrading	 treatment174	 or	 to	 infringements	 of	 the	 family	
provisions.175	 Finally,	 the	 possibility	 of	 transfer	 to	 third	 countries176	 entails	 a	 high	 likelihood	 for	
applicants	to	have	their	claim	rejected	before	ever	reaching	the	Dublin	system.	
	
On	the	side	of	the	Member	States,	distribution	inequalities	would	be	increased	due	to	the	requirement	
for	countries	of	 first	entry	 to	conduct	admissibility	and	merit-related	assessments	before	applying	 the	
Regulation.177	The	deletion	of	Articles	15(1)178,	 (2)179	and	19180	means	that	responsibility	can	no	 longer	
move	away	 from	the	countries	of	 first	entry.	 In	addition,	 they	will	have	no	means	of	 relief	 from	their	
obligation	to	take	back	or	take	charge	of	an	applicant	when	a	transferring	country	is	not	complying	with	
the	 time	 limits	 for	 transfer.181	 The	 envisaged	 corrective	 mechanism	 will	 not	 have	 a	 sufficiently	
redistributive	effect	 as	 it	 is	much	 too	narrow	 in	 scope182	 and	only	 kicks	 in	when	 the	 countries	of	 first	
entry	 face	 situations	 of	 a	 disproportionate	 number	 of	 asylum	 applications.183	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	
responsibility	for	processing	asylum	applications	as	well	as	the	reception	of	refugees	will	continue	to	be	
placed	disproportionately	upon	a	few	states	under	the	Dublin	IV	proposal.184		
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PART	III.	THE	DETERMINATION	OF	ASYLUM	CLAIMS	
	
1.	Introduction	
This	 part	 begins	 with	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 comments	 on	 the	 currently	 applicable	 Asylum	 Procedures	
Directive	 in	Chapter	2.	 The	 reviews	of	 the	Commission	proposal	 for	an	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation	
are	presented	in	Chapter	3	and	the	Hotspot	approach	is	the	subject	of	Chapter	4.	Chapters	5	and	6	deal	
with	 the	 recast	 Qualification	 Directive	 and	 the	 Commission	 proposal	 for	 a	 Qualification	 Regulation	
respectively.	Where	possible,	a	distinction	will	be	made	between	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	
instrument	concerned.	
	
2.	Recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	(2013/32/EU)	
	
2.1	The	main	objectives	of	the	recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	
The	 recast	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive185	 (hereinafter	 referred	 to	 as	 “Procedures	 Directive”	 or	
“Directive”)	 provides	 the	 procedural	 framework	 for	 granting	 and	 withdrawing	 the	 international	
protection	(both	refugee	and	subsidiary)	that	is	set	forth	in	the	Qualification	Directive.186	The	making	of	
an	application	activates	the	rights	for	asylum	seekers	as	provided	in	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive.	
The	currently	applicable	Procedures	Directive	took	effect	on	19	July	2013	and	had	to	be	transposed	by	
Member	States	no	later	than	20	July	2015.187	Denmark	does	not	take	part	in	the	Directive	and	neither	do	
Ireland	or	 the	UK.188	 The	 latter	 two	countries	did	however	participate	 in	 the	 first	phase	Directive	and	
therefore	remain	bound	by	that	first	Directive	even	though	it	has	been	repealed	for	the	other	Member	
States.189		
	
The	 Directive	 aims	 to	 ensure	 the	 application	 of	 common	 procedural	 standards	 for	 the	 processing	 of	
applications	 for	 international	protection:	 the	outcome	of	 the	application	 should	not	be	dependent	on	
the	 Member	 State	 that	 carried	 out	 the	 examination	 procedure.190	 More	 specifically,	 the	 Procedures	
Directive	requires	national	authorities	to	provide	all	applicants	with	effective	access191	to	legally	certain,	
efficient	and	effective	procedures.192	The	Directive	applies	to	all	applications	made	in	the	territory	of	the	
Member	States,	including	at	the	border,	in	the	territorial	waters	or	in	transit	zones.		When	acting	extra-
territorially,	 border	 control	 authorities	 must	 bring	 and	 disembark	 applicants	 on	 land	 so	 that	 asylum	
seekers	 may	 access	 the	 application	 and	 examination	 procedure	 on	 EU	 territory.	 Authorities	 must	
provide	 sufficient	 information	on	 the	 logistics	of	 lodging	an	application	at	 the	external	border,	 transit	
zones	 and	 territorial	 waters.193	 The	 procedural	 rules	 concern	 both	 procedures	 at	 first	 instance	 and	
procedures	in	appeal.	The	Directive	also	regulates	the	use	of	safe	country	concepts,	i.e.	the	concepts	of	
the	safe	country	of	origin,	the	safe	third	country	and	the	first	country	of	asylum.194		
	
The	Directive	explicitly	refers	to	the	full	and	inclusive	application	of	the	Refugee	Convention,	the	Charter	
on	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	EU	and	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	which	means	that	the	
Directive	should	be	interpreted	in	conformity	with	these	instruments.195	It	will	become	apparent	in	the	
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remainder	 of	 this	 section	 that	 the	 various	 evaluations	 of	 the	 Procedures	 Directive	 often	 include	
references	to	this	broader	legal	framework.	
	
2.2	Reviewing	the	recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	
The	recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	is	considered	by	some	to	be	the	most	complex	instrument	in	the	
CEAS.196	Over	the	years	EU	Member	States	have	developed	their	own	asylum	procedures	to	implement	
international	obligations	deriving	from	the	1951	Refugee	Convention.	These	procedures	are	embedded	
in	 specific	 national	 administrative	 procedural	 rules	 and	 legal	 traditions.	 Efforts	 to	 develop	 common	
standards	for	asylum	procedures	generally	had	to	take	into	account	these	national	differences	since	the	
political	 will	 for	 broad	 harmonisation	 was	 limited.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Directive	 gives	 Member	 States	
considerable	leeway	and	thus	only	partially	was	instrumental	to	contribute	to	harmonisation.		
	
This	is	further	illustrated	by	the	difficulties	surrounding	the	transposition	of	the	Procedures	Directive.197	
On	23	September	2015,	the	Commission	adopted	18	infringement	decisions	against	Member	States	for	
the	 failure	 to	 communicate	 the	 transposition	 of	 the	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive.198	 On	 10	 February	
2016,	 Reasoned	 Opinions	 were	 addressed	 to	 three	 Member	 States	 for	 the	 failure	 to	 notify	 the	
Commission	of	their	transposition	measures.199		
	
On	the	basis	of	the	literature	reviewed,	“access”	seems	to	be	a	key	feature	of	the	Procedures	Directive	–	
both	on	paper	and	in	practice.	A	distinction	is	made	here	between	access	to	the	territory	and	access	to	
the	 procedure.	 As	will	 be	 developed	 below,	 the	 safe	 country	 concepts	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Directive	 are	
extensively	 discussed	 and	 considered	 to	 be	 highly	 controversial.	 These	 concepts	 will	 therefore	 be	
reviewed	in	a	separate	paragraph.	
	
2.2.1	Access	to	the	territory	
The	 current	 underlaying	 presumption	 of	 the	 CEAS	 is	 that	 effective	 access	 to	 the	 asylum	 procedure	
cannot	be	decoupled	from	access	to	the	territory.200	This	presumption	is	also	considered	as	one	of	the	
crucial	deficiencies	of	the	CEAS	and	international	protection	scheme.	As	laid	out	above,	Recital	26	of	the	
Directive	 obliges	Member	 States’	 officials	 to	 bring	 and	 disembark	 applicants	 on	 land	where	 they	 are	
present	on	 the	member	 state’s	 territorial	waters	 so	 that	 they	may	effectively	 access	 the	examination	
procedure.201		
	
Responses	of	 the	authorities	 to	people	arriving	at	 the	EU’s	external	borders	have	been	varied.	On	the	
one	 hand,	 under	 the	 year-long	Mare	Nostrum	Operation	 launched	 by	 the	 Italian	 authorities	 in	 2013,	
Italian	 coast	 guards	 have	 rescued	 thousands	 of	migrants	 at	 sea,	 disembarking	 them	 on	 Italian	 soil.202	
These	rescue	actions	are	in	sharp	contrast	with	the	push-back	operation	to	Libya	that	were	carried	out	
by	Italy	at	its	external	borders	a	few	years	before	in	2009,	which	was	condemned	by	the	ECtHR	as	a	clear	
violation	of	the	principle	of	non-refoulement.203	Throughout	the	rest	of	Europe,	a	varied	use	of	barriers	
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can	be	spotted,	leading	to	de	facto	policies	of	non-entrée.204	These	policies	include	the	proliferation	of	
fences,	intensified	border	patrols	as	well	as	direct	refusal	of	entry,	not	only	at	the	EU	external	borders	
but	 also	 at	 the	borders	between	EU	Member	 States	 and	 continuously	on	 the	high	 seas	 (although	 the	
Procedures	Directive	does	not	apply	to	the	 latter).	This	approach	has	been	dubbed	“Fortress	Europe”-
policies.205	Examples	include	the	fences	on	the	border	between	Hungary	and	Serbia	and	between	Greece	
and	Turkey	as	well	as	Italy’s	repatriation	of	third	country	nationals	via	readmission	agreements	to	third	
countries	and	 to	Greece.206	 The	 securitisation	of	 the	border	between	France	and	 the	UK	at	Calais	has	
resulted	in	a	bottle-necking	of	persons	into	insalubrious	conditions	and	has	led	to	a	refusal	of	entry	into	
the	UK	for	persons	arguably	entitled	to	protection	in	the	country.207	Direct	refusal	of	entry	has	also	been	
particularly	 apparent	 in	 Bulgaria	 where	 the	Migration	 Directorate	 reported	 that	 in	 2014	 6.400	 third-
country	nationals	were	officially	 refused	 access	 to	 the	 territory	 and	 in	 2015	police	patrols	 dispatched	
along	 the	 Bulgarian-Turkish	 border	were	 replaced	 by	 army	 staff.208	 In	 Ceuta	 and	Melilla,	 the	 Spanish	
authorities	used	rubber	bullets	to	deter	migrants	from	entering	Spanish	territory,	leading	to	the	death	of	
12	people	in	February	2014.	Another	23	people	were	summarily	returned	to	Morocco,	in	conditions	that	
seem	to	be	in	violation	of	international	human	rights	law,	including	the	principle	of	non-refoulement.209		
	
Such	 actions	 of	 Member	 States	 go	 against	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive,	
furthermore	 a	 Member	 State	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 violating	 the	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement	 where	 entry	 is	
refused	or	a	border	 is	too	onerous	to	cross.210	 In	view	of	for	 instance	Spanish	 legislation211	that	allows	
for	rejection	at	the	border	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla	where	a	person	attempts	to	cross	without	authorisation,	
it	is	also	noted	that	the	Refugee	Convention	presupposes	that	refugees	will	enter	territories	irregularly	
and	thus	cannot	be	penalised	for	doing	so.212	
	
It	 is	argued	that	the	Procedures	Directive	does	not	address	the	most	serious	access	challenge,	namely	
the	 absence	 of	 safe	 routes	 to	 seek	 asylum	 from	 outside	 the	 EU.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 examples	 above,	
various	official	policies	such	as	visa	policies,	carrier	sanctions	and	various	forms	of	cooperation	between	
the	 EU	 and	 third	 countries	 preclude	 safe	 and	 legal	 access	 to	 asylum	 in	 the	 EU.213	 Several	 authors	
advocate	 an	alternative	 approach	of	 facilitating	 access	 to	protection	 in	 Europe	 for	people	 fleeing	war	
and	 persecution	 through	 protected	 entry	 procedures,	 resettlement,	 humanitarian	 visas	 and	 other	
means	to	facilitate	entry	into	the	EU	in	a	legal	and	safe	manner.214	
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2.2.2	Access	to	the	procedure	
Even	when	applicants	have	reached	the	territory,	access	to	the	procedure	can	be	challenging	due	to	the	
combination	 of	 rising	 numbers	 of	 asylum	 applications	 and	 procedural	 structures,	 including	 staff	 and	
resources	shortages.215	Additionally,	the	design	of	the	procedures	and	the	way	in	which	they	are	applied	
by	Member	States	also	have	an	effect	on	the	degree	to	which	the	procedures	are	accessible	for	seekers	
of	international	protection.	
	
When	it	comes	to	the	procedure	itself,	the	Directive	distinguishes	between	various	types:216	
-	a	regular	asylum	procedure	to	examine	protection	needs;217	
-	a	prioritised	procedure	to	examine	protection	needs	of	vulnerable	or	manifestly	well-founded	cases;218	
-	 an	 accelerated	 procedure	 to	 examine	 protection	 needs	 of	 ostensibly	 unfounded	 or	 security-related	
cases;219	
-	 an	 admissibility	 procedure	 for	 asylum	 seekers	who	may	 be	 the	 responsibility	 of	 another	 country	 or	
have	lodged	repetitive	claims’;220	
-	a	Dublin	procedure	 for	asylum	seekers	whose	claims	may	 fall	under	 the	responsibility	of	another	EU	
Member	State;221	
-	 a	 border	 procedure	 to	 speedily	 conduct	 admissibility	 or	 examine	 the	 merits	 under	 an	 accelerated	
procedure	at	borders	or	in	transit	zones.222	
	
The	 above	 distinction	 between	 different	 procedures	 has	 been	 characterised	 as	 the	 fragmentation	 of	
asylum	 procedures,	 which	 in	 itself	 is	 in	 contrast	 with	 the	 goal223	 of	 establishing	 common	 asylum	
procedures.224	 The	 multitude	 of	 procedures	 also	 leads	 to	 rudimentary	 categorisations	 of	 different	
asylum	seekers	and	is	said	to	serve	as	a	means	towards	an	overall	objective	of	deflection.225		
	
2.2.3	Special	procedures	
The	use	of	special	procedures,	such	as	accelerated,	admissibility	or	border	procedures,	is	widespread	in	
the	EU	and	these	procedures	are	often	characterized	by	reduced	procedural	safeguards,	such	as	the	lack	
of	an	automatic	suspensive	effect	of	the	appeal	and	reduced	time	limits.226	This	paragraph	provides	an	
overview	of	the	particularities	and	challenges	related	to	a	number	of	these	procedures.	The	concepts	of	
safe	 country	 of	 origin	 and	 safe	 third	 country	 also	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 the	 application	 of	 a	 special	
procedure	 (the	 accelerated	 and	 admissibility	 procedure	 respectively).	 However,	 as	 explained	 in	
paragraph	2.1,	the	safe	country	concepts	will	be	discussed	in	a	separate	paragraph.	
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Border	procedures	
Member	 States	 may	 provide	 for	 procedures	 at	 the	 border	 or	 transit	 zones	 for	 deciding	 on	 the	
admissibility227	 of	 an	 applicant	 or	 the	 substance228	 of	 an	 application	 in	 a	 procedure	 where	 the	
circumstances	 exist	 for	 using	 an	 accelerated	 procedure.229	 These	 procedures	 can	 take	 place	 at	 the	
border	and	a	first	instance	decision	should	be	issued	within	four	weeks	in	accordance	with	43	(2)	APD	by	
a	 responsible	 determining	 authority	 which	 is	 obliged	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 appropriate	 examination	 of	 the	
asylum	 claim.	 The	 authority	 must	 be	 provided	 with	 the	 appropriate	 means,	 sufficient	 competent	
personnel	and	relevant	training.230	Even	though	Article	34(2)	of	 the	Directive	makes	 it	possible	 for	the	
admissibility	 interview	(which	appears	to	be	undertaken	frequently	at	 the	border)	 to	be	conducted	by	
personnel	 of	 authorities	 other	 than	 the	 determining	 authority,	 this	 does	 not	 exempt	 such	 personnel	
from	complying	with	 the	 training	conditions	under	Article	4.231	Border	guards	 should	also	observe	 the	
language,	legal	and	procedural	information	guarantees	under	Articles	12	and	19.	
	
In	spite	of	these	constraints	on	paper,	it	follows	from	reports	dealing	with	practices	at	the	borders	that	
there	are	risks	attached	to	allowing	border	officials	to	(preliminary	or	substantively)	examine	claims.232	
According	 to	UNHCR	reports,	applicants	must	expressly	use	 the	word	 ‘asylum’	before	Estonian	border	
guards	 will	 process	 their	 claim.233	 Such	 requirements	 disregard	 much	 of	 the	 Procedures	 Directive’s	
guarantees234	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 effective	 access	 to	 protection.	 Even	 when	 an	 explicit	 demand	 for	
asylum	 is	 made,	 there	 have	 been	 reports	 of	 Estonian	 border	 guards	 carrying	 out	 returns	 to	 Russia,	
before	 a	 full	 examination	 has	 been	 carried	 out.235	 According	 to	 the	 European	 Union	 Agency	 for	
Fundamental	 Rights	 (FRA),	 a	 large	proportion	of	 border	 guards	 in	 Spain,	Hungary,	 Poland	and	Greece	
would	 not	 initiate	 an	 asylum	 procedure	 if	 a	 person	 expressly	 requested	 asylum	 or	 if	 the	 guards	
understood	 the	 individual’s	 life	 was	 at	 risk.236	 These	 cases	 raise	 evident	 issues	 of	 non-refoulement,	
demonstrating	clearly	the	dangers	of	allocating	asylum	responsibilities	to	a	border	authority.237	
	
Aside	 from	 the	 aforementioned	 risks	 related	 to	 border	 guard	 competences,	 the	 use	 of	 border	
procedures	in	itself	has	significant	ramifications	on	effective	access	to	the	asylum	procedure.	According	
to	 Article	 31(8)	 of	 the	 Procedures	 Directive,	 limited	 grounds	 exist	 for	 the	 application	 of	 border	
procedures.	Nevertheless,	Member	States	have	made	full	use	of	Article	43	of	the	Procedures	Directive;	
immediately	refusing	further	entry	to	the	territory,	undertaking	de	facto	admissibility	procedures	as	well	
as	imposing	accelerated	time	limits	and	detention.238	As	a	matter	of	policy,	where	a	person	arrives	at	a	
border	post	in	the	Netherlands,	Belgium,	France,	Germany	and	Austria,	entry	can	be	refused	on	grounds	
of	a	lack	of	documentation	and	the	individual	is	immediately	detained.239	This	systemic	policy	is	in	not	in	
line	with	recital	21	and	in	breach	of	Article	26	of	the	Procedures	Directive.240		
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Accelerated	and	prioritised	procedures	
The	Procedures	Directive	enables	 the	application	of	 special	procedures	 to	deal	with	specific	caseloads	
which	may	warrant	swifter	decisions.	Prioritised	procedures	entail	a	more	rapid	examination	of	claims	
without	 derogating	 from	 normally	 applicable	 procedural	 time	 limits,	 principles	 and	 guarantees.241	
Accelerated	procedures	differ	from	regular	procedural	rules	by	introducing	shorter,	but	reasonable	time	
limits	for	certain	procedural	steps.242		
A	 number	 of	 risks	 are	 attached	 to	 the	 application	 of	 accelerated	 procedures.	 Accelerated	 procedures	
involve	appeals	subject	to	shorter	time-limits	and	which	often	have	no	automatic	suspensive	effect	over	
removal	 decisions,	 thereby	 exposing	 asylum	 seekers	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 deportation	 before	 their	 appeal	 is	
decided.243	This	 in	 turn	entails	 the	risk	of	Member	States	violating	an	 individual’s	 right	 to	seek	asylum	
and	to	non-refoulement.244	Nevertheless,	reduced	safeguards	can	be	applied	in	a	considerable	number	
of	 cases,	 due	 to	 the	wide	 scope	 for	Member	 States	 to	 apply	 accelerated	 procedures	 in	 practice:	 the	
Directive	provides	ten	grounds	for	acceleration	of	the	procedure.245	In	addition,	the	legal	status	of	these	
procedures	 of	 expediency	 is	 not	 always	 defined	 with	 precision	 in	 domestic	 asylum	 systems,	 creating	
risks	 of	 legal	 uncertainty	 and	 arbitrariness	 in	 practice.246	 It	 is	 also	 observed	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	
accelerated	and	prioritised	procedures	showcases	a	normative	distinction	within	the	Directive.	Member	
States	are	encouraged	to	 favourably	prioritise	applications	 from	persons	with	manifestly	well-founded	
claims	or	vulnerabilities	warranting	special	protection	while	on	the	other	hand,	unfounded	or	manifestly	
unfounded	 applications	 can	 be	 accelerated	 under	 a	 less	 protective	 procedural	 regime,	 on	 the	
assumption	that	they	will	most	likely	be	rejected.247		
	
2.2.4	Special	procedural	guarantees	
The	recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	provides	special	procedural	guarantees	to	certain	applicants.248	
Beyond	unaccompanied	children,249	 the	Procedures	Directive	only	defines	 these	applicants	 in	 terms	of	
their	reduced	ability	to	benefit	from	the	rights	and	comply	with	the	obligations	under	the	Directive	due	
to	 individual	 circumstances.250	 The	 Directive	 does	 not	 include	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 asylum	 seekers	
presumed	to	be	in	need	of	special	procedural	guarantees.	Instead,	it	indicatively	refers	to	need	of	such	
guarantees	related	to	age,	gender,	sexual	orientation,	gender	identity,	disability,	serious	illness,	mental	
disorders,	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 torture,	 rape	 or	 other	 serious	 forms	 of	 psychological,	 physical	 or	 sexual	
violence.251		
	
Concerns	in	this	area	mainly	relate	to	inconsistencies	in	the	conceptualisation	of	vulnerability	in	EU	law	
and	the	fact	that	the	APD	guarantee	of	exemption	from	special	procedures	is	marginally	implemented	in	
practice.252	Some	of	these	concerns	will	be	discussed	in	section	2.2	of	Part	IV,	when	reviewing	the	recast	
Reception	Conditions	Directive.	
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2.2.5	Safe	country	concepts	
The	Procedures	Directive	distinguishes	between	four	safe	country	concepts:	the	first	country	of	asylum	
(Article	35),	the	safe	country	of	origin	(Article	36	and	annex	II),	the	safe	third	country	(Article	38)	and	the	
European	 safe	 third	 country	 (Article	 39).	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 safe	 country	 concepts,	 national	
authorities	may	presume	the	admissibility	and	/	or	well-foundedness	of	an	applicant’s	claim	before	ever	
interviewing	 him	 or	 her.253	 The	 Procedures	 Directive	 also	 leaves	 room	 for	 a	 system	 whereby	 the	
suspensive	effect	of	the	appeal	 is	not	automatic,	but	must	be	requested	by	the	applicant	and	decided	
upon	separately	by	the	Court	or	Tribunal.254	This	system	can	be	applied	in	all		 circumstances	where	the	
Directive	allows	for	the	application	of	one	of	the	four	safe	country	concepts.	This	increases	the	risk	that	
for	practical	reasons	the	applicant	fails	to	request,	because	he	has	not	been	sufficiently	informed	about	
this	requirement,	or	where	the	applicant	did	not	have	timely	access	to	legal	assistance.255	
	
Out	of	all	safe	country	concepts,	the	concepts	of	the	safe	country	of	origin	and	the	safe	third	country	are	
most	prominently	discussed	in	the	literature	reviewed.	Hence,	only	those	concepts	will	be	discussed	in	
more	 depth	 in	 this	 report.	 Member	 States	 use	 the	 safe	 country	 of	 origin	 concept	 to	 accelerate	 the	
examination	 of	 asylum	 claims	 where	 the	 applicant	 has	 not	 submitted	 any	 serious	 grounds	 for	
considering	the	country	not	to	be	a	safe	country	of	origin	in	his	or	her	particular	circumstances.256	The	
application	 of	 the	 safe	 third	 country	 mechanism	 provides	 the	 ground	 for	 Member	 States	 to	 declare	
asylum	applications	inadmissible	presuming	that	the	applicant	already	could	have	accessed	protection	in	
another	country	with	which	he	or	she	has	a	connection.	Among	other	the	applicant	must	have	had	the	
possibility	 to	 request	 refugee	 status	 and	 receive	 protection	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 1951	 Refugee	
Convention	in	that	third	state.	
	
Safe	country	of	origin	concept	
Under	 Articles	 36-37	 of	 the	 Procedures	 Directive,	Member	 States	may	 designate	 a	 country	 as	 a	 safe	
country	of	origin	where	its	nationals	are	generally	and	consistently	at	no	risk	of	persecution	or	serious	
harm	on	the	basis	of	the	law,	political	situation	and	general	circumstances.257	The	safe	country	of	origin	
concept	may	be	used	as	a	basis	 for	accelerated	procedures.258	Concerns	regarding	the	safe	country	of	
origin	concept	relate	to	its	implementation	and	its	(in)compatibility	with	human	rights.	
	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 implementation	of	 the	safe	countries	of	origin	concept,	 considerable	variations	
exist	between	Member	States.	According	 to	 the	Commission,	22	Member	States	have	 implemented	 it	
into	 their	 domestic	 legislation,	 15	 Member	 States	 apply	 it	 in	 practice,	 ten	 Member	 States	 have	
designated	safe	countries	of	origin	and	five	Member	States	apply	the	safe	country	of	origin	concept	on	a	
case-by-case	 basis.259	 Among	 the	 Member	 States	 that	 do	 apply	 the	 safe	 country	 of	 origin	 concept,	
different	 practices	 are	 identified,	 resulting	 in	 a	 ‘confusing	 patchwork’	 of	 lists	 of	 safe	 countries.260	
Member	States	have	divergent	policies	as	to	which	countries	should	be	considered	as	safe	countries	for	
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the	purpose	of	the	examination	of	an	asylum	application.261	The	draft	EU	list	of	safe	countries	of	origin	is	
very	limited,	as	it	only	includes	seven	non-EU	countries.262	When	it	comes	to	withdrawing	countries	from	
the	national	 lists	with	 safe	 countries	 of	 origin,	 similar	 differences	 exist	 in	 law	and	practice	 among	EU	
Member	 States.263	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 above,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 safe	 country	 of	 origin	 concept	 seems	 to	
undermine	rather	than	to	contribute	to	the	objective	of	convergence	of	decision-making	within	the	EU.	
This	is	considered	to	be	at	odds	with	the	objective	of	the	CEAS	to	treat	similar	cases	alike	and	to	ensure	
the	same	outcome	regardless	of	the	EU	Member	State	in	which	the	application	is	lodged.264		
	
The	safe	country	of	origin	concept	raises	a	number	of	questions	when	it	comes	to	compatibility	with	the	
key	focus	of	human	rights	and	refugee	law	on	the	individual	assessment	of	each	case	and	the	personal	
circumstances	of	the	applicant.265	An	asylum	claim	can	only	be	expedited	as	ostensibly	unfounded	if	the	
country	of	origin	is	listed	as	safe	and	the	asylum	seeker	has	not	submitted	any	serious	grounds	rebutting	
this	 presumption,	 based	 on	 his	 or	 her	 particular	 circumstances.266	 In	 a	 country	 that	 is	 generally	
considered	safe,	certain	minorities	can	still	find	themselves	exposed	to	ill-treatment.	In	their	efforts	to	
prove	this,	nationals	of	listed	countries	have	to	discharge	a	higher	burden	of	proof	as	opposed	to	other	
asylum	 seekers,	 who	 need	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 shared	 burden	 of	 proof	 normally	 applicable	 in	 asylum	
procedures.267	This	extended	burden	of	proof	for	nationals	of	listed	countries	must	often	be	discharged	
within	 the	 highly	 demanding	 time-limits	 and	 reduced	 procedural	 safeguards	 of	 the	 accelerated	
procedure.268	To	rebut	the	presumption,	 the	asylum	seeker	 is	expected	to	have	access	 to	quality	 legal	
assistance	so	as	to	provide	convincing	reasons	for	not	applying	the	concept	in	his	or	her	particular	case.	
Given	 the	extremely	 short	 time	 frames	within	which	 this	needs	 to	be	done	effective	access	 to	quality	
legal	assistance	is	essential	but	in	practice	often	absent.	In	addition,	presumptions	of	safety	are	not	an	
easy	 hurdle	 to	 overcome.	 In	 practice,	 the	 chance	 that	 international	 protection	will	 be	 provided	 after	
application	of	the	safe	country	of	origin	concept	and	the	resulting	accelerated	procedure	 is	worryingly	
low.	According	to	data	from	EASO,	89,3%	of	applications	examined	under	the	accelerated	procedure	in	
the	EU	between	March	and	December	2014	 led	to	a	negative	decision.269	Therefore,	 it	 is	 in	respect	of	
those	categories	of	refugees	from	safe	countries,	to	which	the	Convention	extends	 its	protection,	that	
the	‘safe	country	of	origin’	concept	creates	high	risks	of	unfairness.270	In	addition,	it	has	been	said	to	be	
a	 clear	 violation	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 itself	 to	 raise	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 for	 particular	
nationalities,	 as	Article	 3	of	 the	Refugee	Convention	prohibits	 discrimination	 in	 the	 application	of	 the	
Convention	on	grounds	of	race,	religion	or	country	of	origin.271	
	
Safe	third	country:	the	EU-Turkey	statement	
The	 safe	 third	 country	 concept272	 operates	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 presumption	 that	 an	 applicant	 for	
international	 protection	 could	 have	 obtained	 this	 protection	 in	 another	 country	 and	 therefore	 the	
receiving	 state	 is	 entitled	 to	 reject	 responsibility	 for	 the	protection	 claim	by	declaring	 the	 application	
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inadmissible	 and	 barring	 applicants	 from	 a	 full	 examination	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 their	 claim.273	 Central	
conditions	of	the	safe	third	country	concept	concern	the	necessary	connection	between	the	 individual	
asylum	seeker	and	the	third	country	as	well	as	access	to	the	asylum	procedure	and	a	requisite	level	of	
protection	in	the	third	country.274		
	
A	 widely	 discussed	 example	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 safe	 third	 country	 concept	 is	 the	 EU-Turkey	
statement.275	The	idea	behind	this	statement	is	that	asylum	applications	can	be	declared	inadmissible	by	
Greece	because	Turkey	 can	be	 considered	a	 safe	 third	 country	within	 the	meaning	of	 the	Procedures	
Directive.276	The	statement	entails	the	engagement	of	Turkey	to	take	back	all	irregular	migrants	entering	
the	Greek	islands.	In	addition,	among	other	measures,	a	1:1	scheme	is	included	on	the	basis	of	which	for	
each	Syrian	asylum	seeker	who	has	been	readmitted	by	Turkey	from	Greece,	a	Syrian	would	be	resettled	
rom	Turkey	to	one	of	the	EU	Member	States.277	
	
The	concept	of	 safe	 third	country	 in	 itself	has	no	clear	 legal	basis	 in	 international	 refugee	and	human	
rights	 law.278	 According	 to	 2017	 reports	 from	 ECRE,	 experience	 in	 Greece	 shows	 that	 systematic	
application	of	 the	 safe	 third	 country	 concept	 in	 truncated	border	procedures	does	not	 result	 in	more	
efficient	 or	 shorter	 procedures	 and	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 serious	 human	 rights	 violations,	 including	
refoulement.279	 A	 similar	 practice	 in	 Hungary	 has	 already	 been	 judged	 unlawful	 by	 the	 ECtHR.280	 In	
addition,	applying	this	concept	to	Turkey	is	considered	to	be	highly	questionable	as	Turkey	is	not	bound	
by	EU	asylum	law	and	according	to	various	reports	Turkey	has	violated	the	human	rights	of	refugees	and	
asylum	seekers,	including	by	detaining	them	and	forcibly	returning	them	to	the	country	of	origin.281	It	is	
also	 to	 be	 noted	 that	 Turkey	 is	 the	 only	 country	 applying	 a	 geographical	 limitation	 to	 the	 Refugee	
Convention:	the	Refugee	Convention	is	only	applied	to	European	refugees.282	An	exception	is	made	for	
Syrian	nationals	readmitted	from	Greece,	who	‘may	have	their	protection	status	installed	upon	arrival’,	
however	they	are	not	being	granted	a	refugee	status.283		
	
On	a	more	practical	level,	the	value	of	the	EU-Turkey	agreement	can	also	be	questioned	as	it	is	unlikely	
to	limit	spontaneous	arrivals.284	Also,	a	specialised	border	procedure	is	required	as	art.	4	protocol	4	to	
the	ECHR	prohibits	collective	expulsion	of	aliens.	Greece	thus	needs	to	conduct	an	individual	assessment	
irrespective	of	whether	Turkey	is	considered	a	safe	third	country	or	not,	an	obligation	also	enshrined	in	
the	Asylum	Procedures	Directive.	Consequently,	the	agreement	causes	an	increased	case	load,	although	
the	Greek	asylum	system	lacks	the	necessary	capacity	to	process	the	claims.285		
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2.2.6	Access	to	an	effective	remedy	
The	rigorous	scrutiny	of	a	 first	 instance	decision	by	an	 independent	appeal	body	 is	considered	to	be	a	
key	 procedural	 safeguard	 in	 the	 context	 of	 asylum	 procedures.286	 Examining	 a	 person’s	well-founded	
fear	of	persecution	or	risk	of	serious	harm	is	a	complex	and	challenging	task	and	the	outcome	may	be	
the	difference	between	 life	 and	death	 for	 the	 individuals	 concerned,	making	 the	 right	 to	 an	 effective	
remedy	a	crucially	 important	right.287	 In	order	for	asylum	seekers	to	assert	this	right,	access	to	quality	
free	 legal	assistance	 is	considered	to	be	essential	as	asylum	seekers	by	definition	 find	themselves	 in	a	
disadvantaged	 position	 in	 a	 procedure	 which	 is	 conducted	 in	 most	 cases	 in	 a	 language	 they	 do	 not	
understand	and	in	a	legal	framework	with	which	they	are	not	familiar.288	
	
Article	19	to	23	of	the	Procedures	Directive	are	the	main	norms	relating	to	 legal	aid	 for	applicants	 for	
international	protection.289	The	provisions	on	legal	aid	leave	states	a	lot	of	discretion	in	introducing	their	
own	modalities,	exemptions	and	limits.290	Also,	states	only	have	an	obligation	to	ensure	access	to	free	
legal	assistance	and	representation	at	the	appeal	stage.291	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	access	to	free	legal	
assistance	and	representation	during	the	first	instance	of	the	regular	procedure292	varies	considerably	in	
practice.293	In	some	countries,	asylum	seekers	have	access	to	free	legal	assistance,	whereas	in	others	no	
free	legal	assistance	is	required	under	the	law	or	asylum	seekers	experience	difficulties	in	accessing	free	
legal	assistance	at	the	first	instance	in	practice.294	The	benefit	of	quality	legal	assistance	starting	at	the	
first	instance	of	the	asylum	procedure	would	be	its	contribution	to	frontloading,	the	policy	of	investing	
sufficient	 resources	 in	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 asylum	procedure	 so	 as	 to	 increase	 the	 chance	 that	 first	
instance	decisions	are	correct.295	When	it	comes	to	accessing	free	 legal	assistance	at	the	appeal	stage,	
obstacles	may	also	exist.	For	instance,	low	remuneration	of	lawyers	under	the	legal	aid	scheme	makes	it	
less	attractive	for	lawyers	to	engage	in	asylum	and	immigration	cases	which	continues	to	be	a	problem	
in	Malta,	 Italy,	 the	Netherlands,	 Belgium,	 France	 and	 Sweden.296	 In	 addition,	merits	 testing	 applies	 in	
several	countries,	whereby	free	legal	assistance	is	made	dependent	on	the	likelihood	of	the	appeal	being	
successful.297		
	
3.	Proposal	for	an	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation	
On	 13	 July	 2016,	 the	 Commission	 put	 forward	 a	 proposal	 for	 an	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Regulation.298	
According	to	Article	288	TFEU,	a	regulation	is	binding	in	its	entirety	and	directly	applicable	in	all	Member	
States.	No	higher	 standards	 can	be	 set	 in	 national	 law	 and	 the	 choice	 to	 replace	 the	directive	with	 a	
regulation	therefore	is	 in	itself	an	effort	to	advance	the	harmonisation	of	European	asylum	systems.299	
																																								 																				
286		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	57.	Fore	a	more	recent	report,	see:	ECRE	and	ELENA	(2017)	ECRE/ELENA	Legal	Note	on	Access		
to	Legal	Aid	in	Europe.	
287		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	57.	
288		 Ibid.,	57.	
289		 Mikolajczyk	B	(2016)	Legal	Aid	for	Applicants	for	International	Protection.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.)	Reforming	the		
	 Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	NV,	465.	
290			 Mikolajczyk	B	(2016)	Legal	Aid	for	Applicants	for	International	Protection.	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.),	467.	
291		 Article	20	APD.	
292		 I.e.	not	special	procedures,	such	as	border,	admissibility,	accelerated	and	Dublin	procedures.	
293		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	57;	EASO	(2017)	Annual	Report	on	the	Situation	of	Asylum	in	the	European	Union	2016,	91-93.	
294		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	57.	
295	 Ibid.,	59.	
296		 Ibid.,	58.	
297		 Ibid.,	58.	
298		 European	Commission	(2016)	Proposal	for	[an	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation].	COM(2016)	467,	13	July	2016.	Brussels.	
299		 European	Commission	(2016)	Proposal	for	[an	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation],	7.	
	
	
36	
	
The	 aim	 of	 harmonisation	 also	 follows	 from	 the	 prescriptive	 approach	 that	 the	 proposal	 takes	 with	
regard	to	many	details	of	the	procedure.300	
	
Judicial	protection	
The	extension	of	the	obligation	to	provide	free	legal	assistance	and	representation	to	the	administrative	
stage	of	the	procedure	is	an	important	contribution	to	the	overall	fairness	and	efficiency	of	the	CEAS.301	
The	provision	however	still	has	its	limitations:	Article	15(3)-(5)	leave	extensive	scope	for	Member	States	
to	deprive	applicants	of	the	right	to	free	legal	assistance,	in	particular	through	a	broad	application	of	the	
so-called	‘merits	test’.302	
	
The	 lack	 of	 suspensive	 effect	 of	 appeals	 that	 applies	 under	 the	 Directive	 against	 decisions	 that	 have	
been	made	in	the	accelerated	procedure	or	the	admissibility	procedure	(also	see	paragraph	2.2.3	above)	
is	extended	under	the	proposed	Regulation	to	also	include	first	instance	decisions	in	the	context	of	the	
safe	third	country	concept.303	The	lack	of	suspensive	effect	of	appeals	 is	highly	problematic:	protective	
measures	 are	 only	 determined	 after	 an	 expulsion	 and	 thus	 risk	 violating	 the	 principle	 of	 non-
refoulement.304		
	
Safe	country	concepts	
The	 proposed	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Regulation	 makes	 provision	 for	 a	 common	 European	 list	 of	 safe	
countries	of	origin.305	While	this	would	address	the	concerns	relating	to	the	divergent	implementation	of	
the	concept	among	Member	States,	it	does	not	deal	with	the	shortcomings	of	the	concept	itself306	(also	
see	 paragraph	 2.2.5	 above).	 	 The	 application	 of	 a	 safe	 country	 of	 origin	 concept	 inter	 alia	 leads	 to	
discrimination	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 nationality	 and	 generates	 prejudice	 against	
asylum-seekers	from	countries	designated	as	‘safe’,	when	the	need	for	international	protection	must	be	
determined	on	the	basis	of	individual	circumstances.307	
	
The	proposal	also	makes	changes	to	another	safe	country	concept,	i.e.	the	first	country	of	asylum.	It	is	
currently	optional	for	Member	States	to	examine	whether	or	not	there	is	a	first	country	of	asylum	and	
the	Regulation	would	make	this	assessment	mandatory.308	As	a	consequence,	Member		States		will	 	be	
required	not	to	examine	an	application	on	the	merits	if	a	person	is	deemed	to	come	from	a	first	country	
of	 asylum.309	 The	 proposed	 mandatory	 nature	 results	 in	 an	 overall	 lowering	 of	 protection	 standards	
within	the	EU310	and	it	is	also	questioned	whether	the	European	Commission	is	best	placed	to	decide	for	
all	Member	States	 that	and	how	they	should	apply	 the	 first	country	of	asylum	concept.311	The	change	
also	risks	having	important	adverse	effects	on	access	to	the	asylum	procedure	as	it	will	require	a	number	
of	Member	 States	 to	 reject	 applications	 as	 inadmissible	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 concept	which	 is	 currently	
unknown	 in	 their	 practice.312	 Regarding	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 first	 country	 of	 asylum	 concept,	 the	
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proposal	sets	a	lower	threshold	with	respect	to	the	status	the	applicant	must	have	received	in	the	first	
country	 of	 asylum	 for	 that	 country	 to	 be	 considered	 safe,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 current	 recast	 Asylum	
Procedures	Directive.	Whereas	the	latter	requires	that	the	applicant	has	been	recognised	as	a	refugee	in	
the	 country	 concerned,	 according	 to	 Article	 44(1)(a)	 of	 the	 Commission	 proposal	 the	 applicant	must	
have	enjoyed	‘protection	in	accordance	with	the	Geneva	Convention’,	which	leaves	more	ambiguity	as	
to	 the	 status	 the	 applicant	 should	 have	 obtained.313Alternatively,	 according	 to	 Article	 44(1)(b)	 of	 the	
Proposal	a	third	country	can	also	be	considered	a	first	country	of	asylum	if	the	applicant	‘otherwise	has	
enjoyed	sufficient	protection	in	that	country’.	The	notion	of	sufficient	protection	also	applies	to	the	safe	
third	 country	 concept314	 and	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 recast	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive,	 the	 proposal	
does	 try	 define	 more	 precisely	 what	 ‘sufficient	 protection’	 means.315	 This	 clarification	 is	 in	 itself	 a	
welcome	 development,	 but	 an	 extensive	 interpretation	 is	 still	 possible	 as	 the	 definition	 does	 not	
guarantee	that	protection	must	be	effective	and	available	in	practice.316	Finally,	the	concept	also	applies	
to	unaccompanied	minors.317	It	is	debated	whether	the	accelerated	procedure	that	comes	with	the	safe	
country	concepts	is	suited	to	take	into	account	a	child’s	particular	vulnerability.318	
	
The	 proposal	 also	 envisages	 the	 mandatory	 application	 of	 the	 safe	 third	 country	 concept319	 by	 all	
Member	States.	The	application	of	this	concept,	if	not	rebutted,	leads	to	an	asylum	claim	being	rejected	
as	inadmissible	without	an	examination	of	the	application	on	its	merits.320	The	Regulation	does	not	seem	
to	address	the	concerns	associated	with	the	safe	third	country	concept	(also	see	paragraph	2.2.5	above).	
In	 practice,	 there	 is	 the	danger	 that	 criteria	 for	 the	determination	of	 a	 ‘safe	 third	 country’	 are	 either	
implemented	wrongly	or	without	sufficient	rigour	and	asylum	seekers	are	returned	to	countries	outside	
the	EU	which	do	not	offer	them	effective	protection.321	This	could	be	a	violation	of	their	human	right	to	
seek	asylum	and	could	 lead	to	direct	and	 indirect	refoulement.	A	number	of	other	concerns	exist	with	
regard	to	the	application	of	the	safe	third	country	concept.	First	of	all,	Article	45(3)(a)	of	the	proposed	
Asylum	 Procedures	 Regulation	 establishes	 that	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 connection	 between	 	 the	
asylum	 seeker	 and	 the	 third	 country	 can	 be	 assumed	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 ‘the	 applicant	 has	 transited	
through	 that	 third	 country	 which	 is	 geographically	 close	 to	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 of	 the	 applicant’.	
However,	 transit	 through	a	country	 is	 in	 itself	not	sufficient	to	establish	a	sufficient	connection	with	a	
country.322	Secondly,	the	concept	no	longer	requires	the	possibility	to	be	recognised	as	a	refugee	in	the	
third	 country	 for	 this	 country	 to	 be	 considered	 safe.	 Instead,	 the	 proposal	 refers	 to	 the	 possibility	 to	
‘receive	protection	in	accordance	with	the	substantive	standards	of	the	Refugee	Convention	or	sufficient	
protection		as	referred	to	 in	[the	first	country	of	asylum	concept],	as	appropriate’.323	What	constitutes	
the	 substantive	 standards	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 remains	 undefined	 and	 therefore	 open	 to	 very	
broad	 and	 divergent	 interpretation.324	 It	 also	 seems	 to	 imply	 that	 protection	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Refugee	 Convention	 can	 be	 granted	 to	 a	 person	 without	 necessarily	 recognising	 him	 or	 her	 as	 a	
refugee.325	Finally,	the	Regulation	does	not	rule	out	the	application	of	the	safe	third	country	concept	to	
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unaccompanied	 minors.326	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 same	 concern	 applies	 as	 mentioned	 above:	 special	
procedures	do	not	seem	to	be	suitable	for	properly	dealing	with	a	child’s	vulnerability.327	
	
4.	Hotspots	
	
4.1	Objectives	
The	 set-up	 of	 the	 hotspot	 approach	 was	 announced	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 in	 its	 May	 2015	
Agenda	on	Migration.328	Hotspots	are	facilities	for	the	first	reception,	registration	and	initial	processing	
of	migrants,	 located	at	key	arrival	points	 in	 frontline	Member	States.329	The	hotspot	approach	aims	to	
improve	 cooperation	 between	 the	 European	 Asylum	 Support	 Office,	 Frontex,	 Europol,	 Eurojust	 and	
Member	States	in	dealing	with	the	immediate	challenge	of	the	large-scale	arrivals	of	migrants.330		
	
The	 precise	 objectives	 of	 the	 hotspot	 approach	 remain	 somewhat	 unclear,	 as	 no	 specific	 legal	
framework	has	been	established	for	hotspots.331	They	should	serve	the	following	purposes:332	
-	to	provide	operational	support	to	countries	under	pressure;	
-	to	conduct	swift	identification,	registration	and	fingerprinting	of	arriving	migrants;	
-	to	function	as	a	filter	mechanism	to	determine	protection	needs	among	mixed	migrations	flows;	
-	to	support	the	relocation	and	return	process.	
	
The	 policy	 link	 between	 relocation	 and	 hotspot	 approach	 is	 made	 explicit	 in	 Articles	 7	 and	 8	 of	 the	
relocation	Decisions:	 relocation	 is	 to	be	accompanied	by	 “increased	operational	 support”	and	may	be	
suspended	should	the	beneficiary	state	fail	to	comply	with	its	“hotspot	roadmap”.	Support	of	the	return	
process	 is	 achieved	by	 the	 enhanced	 law	enforcement	 analysis	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 hotspots	 entail.333	
Finally,	hotspots	also	have	a	security	role.	 In	this	respect,	 the	Commission	has	stated	that	the	hotspot	
approach	helps	to	‘identify	any	individuals	posing	a	threat	to	EU	security	and	separate	them	from	those	
who	need	protection’.334		
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4.2	Design	
As	 briefly	 mentioned	 above,	 no	 specific	 legal	 framework	 has	 been	 established	 for	 hotspots	 as	 such.	
Rather,	 the	deployment	of	both	EASO	and	Frontex	 to	provide	operational	 support	 is	 regulated	by	 the	
respective	regulations	on	the	two	agencies.335	Hence,	operational	support	provided	 in	the	hotspots	by	
both	EASO	and	Frontex	is	explicitly	provided	for	in	existing	legislation.	This	however	does	not	answer	the	
question	as	 to	what	extent	EU	agencies	operating	on	 the	ground	 can	be	 considered	 liable	 for	 actions	
within	 hotspots.	 While	 executive	 powers	 may	 rest	 with	 Member	 States,	 the	 enhanced	 operational	
support	provided	by	EU	agencies	in	the	pressurised	environment	of	the	hotspots	calls	for	much	clearer	
accountability	and	liability	provisions,	ideally	laid	down	in	a	separate	legal	instrument.336		
	
The	 lack	 of	 a	 specific	 legal	 framework	 also	 leads	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 legal	 certainty	 and	 clarity	 as	 to	 the	
fundamental	objectives	of	the	hotspots337	and	to	the	interaction	of	EU	and	national	rules.338	The	national	
legal	basis	of	hot	spots	in	Greece	and	Italy	is	also	thin	and	lacks	transparency.339		
	
A	 major	 criticism	 of	 the	 hotspots	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 hotspots	 are	 no	 new	 solution,	 but	 facilitate	 the	
working	 of	 the	 current	 asylum	 system:	 frontline	 states	 are	 in	 fact	 assisted	 to	 better	 handle	 the	 full	
extent	 of	 their	 responsibilities	 under	 the	 existing	 Schengen	and	Dublin	 arrangements.340	Hotspots	 are	
clearly	 designed	 to	 shift	 back	 on	 frontline	 states	 all	 the	 responsibilities	 they	 carry	 under	 current	 EU	
legislation:	to	identify	migrants,	to	provide	first	reception,	to	identify	and	return	those	who	do	not	claim	
protection,	 and	 to	 channel	 those	who	do	 so	 towards	 asylum	procedures	 in	 the	 responsible	 state	–	 in	
most	 cases,	 none	 other	 than	 the	 frontline	 state	 itself.341	 The	 objective	 of	 fingerprinting	 all	 migrants	
exponentially	increases	the	responsibilities	of	frontline	Member	States	and	at	the	same	time	contribute	
to	making	the	disproportionate	share	of	asylum	applications	for	frontline	Member	States	inherent	in	the	
Dublin	 system	a	 reality	 (see	 also	 Part	 II).342	 The	 limited	number	 of	 relocations	 (see	 Part	 II,	 chapter	 3)	
does	 not	 begin	 to	 offset	 the	 greater	 responsibilities	 incurred	 through	 the	 “fingerprinting	 of	 all	
migrants”.343		
	
4.3	Implementation	in	Greece	and	Italy	
According	to	the	18	December	2017	Hotspot	State	of	Play	of	the	European	Commission344,	there	are	five	
active	hotspots	in	Italy345	and	five	in	Greece.346	The	Italian	hotspots	have	a	considerably	smaller	capacity	
than	the	Greek	centres.	In	spite	of	the	multi-agency	design	of	hotspots,	there	seems	to	be	a	clear	focus	
on	 Frontex-related	 tasks,347	 while	 the	 Fundamental	 Rights	 Agency	 is	 missing	 from	 the	 design	
altogether.348	When	it	comes	to	the	performance	of	the	hotspot	centres,	the	Commission	itself	has	been	
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keen	 to	 point	 to	 the	 significant	 increase	 in	 fingerprinting	 rates,	 ultimately	 reaching	 100%	 in	 both	 the	
Greek349and	Italian350	hotspots.351			
	
The	hotspot	approach	rests		on		the		assumption		that		national		authorities		and	assisting	EU	Agencies	
are	able	to	quickly	and	accurately	separate	those	who	are	in	need	of	international	protection	from	those	
who	ought	to	be	returned.352	Such	a	speed	of	processing	is	not	typically	synonymous	with	due	care,353	
but	 instead	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 standardised	 and	 poorly	motivated	 decisions,	 of	 refoulement354	 and	
could	result	in	large	numbers	of	people	being	returned	into	unsafe	or	unviable	situations	without	proper	
consideration	of	their	claims.355	In	Italy,	for	instance,	asylum	seekers	entering	hotspots	are	given	a	brief	
questionnaire	 and	 asked	 to	 tick	 between	 boxes	 entitled	 “occupation”,	 “to	 join	 relatives”,	 “escaping	
poverty”	or	“asylum”.	Officials	then	determine	whether		a		person		is		to		be		channeled		into		the		asylum		
procedure		or		to		be		returned		on		the	basis	of	this	questionnaire.356	In	addition,	Italian	authorities	are	
reported	to	use	coercion	in	order	to	conduct	fingerprinting.357	Another	‘hasty’	method	used	to	separate	
asylum	seekers	from	economic	migrants	is	taking	the	75%	threshold358	as	the	guiding	measurement	for	
assessment,	leading	to	blanket	denials	of	access	to	the	asylum	procedure	for	people	coming	from	non-
qualifying	countries	(such	as	Gambia,	Nigeria	and	Senegal).359	Such	a	practice	is	considered	to	be	in	clear	
violation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 asylum	 as	 outlined	 in	 Article	 18	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights.360	 In	
Greece,	Syrians	have	been	prioritised	over	all	other	nationalities	in	registration,	identification	and	access	
to	asylum.361		
	
The	 proper	 application	 of	 the	mentioned	 75%	 threshold	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 context	 of	 relocation:	
whether	 or	 not	 an	 international	 protection	 seeker	 qualifies	 for	 relocation	 depends	 on	 nationality.	 In	
spite	of	 the	objectives,	hotspots	generally	play	a	small	 role	 in	 implementing	the	emergency	relocation	
decisions,	due	to	the	slow	pace	of	processing	and	the	limited	number	of	eligible	applicants.362	This	also	
leaves	large	numbers	outside	the	scope	of	relocation	and	the	manner	in	which	they	are	dealt	with	in	the	
hotspot	context	appears	to	lack	clarity.363		
	
In	a	broader	context,	a	number	of	risks	for	the	protection	of	fundamental	rights	exist	in	both	Greek	and	
Italian	hotspots.364	For	 instance,	delays	 in	the	examination	of	asylum	claims	 in	Greek	hotspots	prevent	
effective	access	 to	asylum	procedures	and	 is	not	 in	 compliance	with	Article	18	CFR.365	 The	protection	
needs	of	unaccompanied	children	cannot	adequately	be	met	 in	the	hotspots,	and	delays	 in	processing	
their	applications	are	not	 line	with	Article	24	CFR	which	 requires	 to	give	primary	consideration	 to	 the	
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best	 interests	 of	 the	 child.366	 The	 inconsistent	 provision	of	 information	 to	 persons	 in	 the	hotspots	 on	
rights	and	procedures	applicable	to	them	goes	against	the	right	to	good	administration	under	Article	41	
CFR.	367	Regarding	reception	conditions	in	the	hotspots,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	Reception	Conditions	
Directive	 also	 includes	 those	 waiting	 to	 enter	 the	 regular	 asylum	 procedure	 or	 the	 admissibility	
procedure	 as	 soon	 as	 they	 have	 made	 an	 application	 for	 international	 protection.368	 In	 practice,	
reception	conditions	are	 inadequate	and	often	below	the	standards	 laid	down	in	the	Directive.	Transit	
sites	 are	 used	 for	 prolonged	 accommodation,	 whereas	 they	 should	 only	 be	 used	 for	 a	 few	 days.	
Reception	in	the	hotspots	does	not	cover	for	specialised	services	for	mental	health	and	other	specialised	
needs.369	 Detention	 is	 widely	 applied	 as	 standard	 practice,	 without	 an	 adequate	 individualised	
assessment	 and	 without	 key	 procedural	 safeguards	 to	 prevent	 arbitrary	 detention	 in	 place.370	 In	
addition,	 lawyers	 and	 NGOs	 do	 not	 always	 have	 access	 to	 asylum	 seekers	 in	 detention.	 Systematic	
detention	 in	 the	 context	 of	 border	 procedures	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 contrary	 to	 Article	 31(1)	 of	 the	
Refugee	Convention371	and	contrary	to	states’	human	rights	obligations	on	the	basis	of	Article	6	CFR	and	
Article	5	ECHR	to	use	detention	only	in	exceptional	circumstances.	Finally,	the	provision	of	information	
in	a	language	that	the	refugee	understands	and	at	all	stages	of	the	process	remains	problematic	in	the	
context	of	the	hotspots.372	
	
The	nature	of	the	hotspot	work	in	Greece	has	significantly	changed	after	the	adoption	of	the	EU-Turkey	
statement.	According	to	the	Commission:	“the	hotspots	on	the	islands	in	Greece	will	need	to	be	adapted	
–	with	the	current	focus	on	registration	and	screening	before	swift	transfer	to	the	mainland	replaced	by	
the	 objective	 of	 implementing	 returns	 to	 Turkey”.373	 In	 practice,	 the	 hotspots	 on	 Greek	 islands	 have	
been	 turned	 into	 closed	 centres	 in	which	migrants	were	effectively	detained	until	 2017.374	Relocation	
was	taken	entirely	out	of	the	equation.375	
	
5.	Recast	Qualification	Directive	(2011/95/EU)	
	
5.1	The	main	objectives	of	the	recast	Qualification	Directive	
The	 recast	 Qualification	 Directive376	 lays	 down	 the	 standards	 for	 the	 qualification	 of	 third-country	
nationals	 as	 beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection	 as	 well	 as	 the	 content	 of	 this	 international	
protection.377		
	
In	more	detail,	the	Qualification	Directive:378	
-	aims	to	ensure	that	Member	States	apply	common	criteria	for	the	identification	of	persons	genuinely	
in	need	of	international	protection	(either	refugee	status	or	subsidiary	protection);379	
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-	aims	to	ensure	that	a	minimum	level	of	benefits	is	available	for	those	persons	in	all	Member	States;		
-	stipulates	that	the	assessment	of	an	application	for	international	protection	is	to	be	carried	out	on	an	
individual	basis;	
-	 stipulates	 the	content	of	 international	protection	 for	 two	categories	of	beneficiaries	of	 international	
protection.	
	
Denmark,	the	United	Kingdom	and	Ireland	do	not	take	part	in	the	Directive.380	The	latter	two	countries	
did	 take	 part	 in	 Directive	 2004/83/EC	 and	 remain	 subject	 to	 their	 obligations	 under	 this	 former	
instrument.381	
			 	
5.2	Reviewing	the	recast	Qualification	Directive	
The	reviews	of	the	recast	Qualification	Directive	seem	to	be	mixed.382	As	will	be	developed	below,	some	
amendments	 to	 the	 recast	 Directive	 have	 achieved	 observance	 of	 international	 law	 and	 more	
harmonisation.	At	the	same	time,	commentators	have	argued	that	considerable	room	for	improvement	
still	exists	in	terms	of	compliance	with	international	law	and	further	harmonisation.	The	Directive	has	for	
instance	not	succeeded	in	providing	a	truly	harmonised	common	policy	on	qualification	for	international	
protection.383		
	
This	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	provisions	and	themes	from	the	Directive	that	seem	to	be	most	
prominently	 discussed.	 A	 distinction	 is	 made	 between	 design	 (paragraph	 5.2.1)	 and	 implementation	
(paragraph	5.2.2)	of	the	Directive.	
	
5.2.1	Design	
	
Harmonisation	
In	 terms	 of	 harmonisation,	 Article	 78(2)(a)	 and	 (b)	 TFEU	 call	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 ‘common	
procedure’	and	 ‘uniform	status	of	asylum,	valid	 throughout	 the	Union’	as	well	 as	a	 ‘uniform	status	of	
subsidiary	protection’.	The	Qualification	Directive	and	its	legislative	history,	including	documents	on	the	
negotiations	on	draft	proposals,	 are	however	ambiguous	as	 regards	 the	 level	of	harmonisation	aimed	
at.384	The	preamble	of	 the	2011	recast	Qualification	Directive	mentions	 in	Recital	10	 ‘a	higher	 level	of	
approximation’	of	rules	on	recognition	on	the	basis	of	‘higher	standards’	and	in	Recitals	12,	24	and	34	of	
‘common	criteria’.	It	follows	from	the	recast	Qualification	Directive’s	title	and	Article	1	that	the	Directive	
aims	 for	a	 ‘uniform	status’,	which	 should	be	distinguished	 from	qualification	and	 from	 the	 content	of	
protection.	What	this	status	refers	to	is	quite	unclear.385	Hence,	the	Directive	does	not	seem	to	aim	for	
uniform	standards	as	called	 for	by	Article	78(2)(a)	and	 (b)	TFEU.	 Instead,	 the	Directive	may	be	said	 to	
aim	at	a	higher	level	of	approximation	criteria.386	The	extent	to	which	harmonisation	has	been	achieved	
in	practice	will	be	dealt	with	in	paragraph	5.2.2	below.	
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Refugee	status	and	subsidiary	protection	
Since	 the	2004	Qualification	Directive,	 international	 protection	 in	 the	EU	 is	 of	 a	double	nature.	 It	 not	
only	relies	on	the	refugee	status	established	by	the	Refugee	Convention,387	but	also	entails	the	granting	
of	 subsidiary	 protection	 to	 asylum-seekers	 not	 qualifying	 as	 refugees	 but	 nonetheless	 in	 need	 of	
protection	because	of	 risks	of	serious	harm	 if	 sent	back	 to	 their	country	of	origin.388	The	two	types	of	
international	protection	were	not	conceived	on	an	equal	footing:	subsidiary	protection	conferred	lesser	
rights	than	refugee	status.389	The	Recast	Qualification	Directive	has	changed	this	considerably	and	places	
subsidiary	 protection	 beneficiaries	 on	 equal	 footing	with	 refugees	with	 regard	 to	most	 benefits,	 now	
including	the	right	to	family	unity,	 issuance	of	travel	documents,	access	to	employment,	to	healthcare	
and	to	integration	facilities.390	
	
However,	 striking	 differences391	 still	 exist	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 two	 types	 of	 beneficiaries	 of	
international	protection	with	respect	to	residence	permits392	and	access	to	social	welfare.393	First	of	all,	
beneficiaries	 of	 subsidiary	protection	 receive	 a	 residence	permit	which	must	be	 valid	 for	 at	 least	 one	
year	while	refugee	status	holders	receive	a	residence	permit	which	shall	be	valid	for	at	least	three	years.	
This	weakens	the	potential	of	beneficiaries	of	subsidiary	protection	for	integration	in	the	host	society394	
and	leads	to	extra	administrative	efforts	as	the	need	for	subsidiary	protection	has	to	be	re-assessed	at	
relatively	short	intervals.395	In	Member	States	where	authorities	have	not	opted	for	a	uniform	duration	
of	residence	for	both	statuses,	the	divergence	has	also	had	its	consequences	on	the	type	of	protection	
granted	 to	 key	 nationalities.	 In	Germany	 for	 instance,	which	 remains	 by	 far	 the	 largest	 host	 state	 for	
Syrian	nationals,	Syrians	were	overwhelmingly	granted	refugee	status	in	2015	(95,7%).396	In	the	first	nine	
months	of	2016,	this	had	shifted	to	65,4%	refugee	status	and	34,3%	subsidiary	protection,	which	could	
be	related	to	the	suspension	of	family	reunification	for	subsidiary	protection	holders	in	March	2016.	In	
addition,	as	many	as	17.000	appeals	against	erroneous	refusals	of	refugee	status	have	been	filed	before	
German	courts.397	Secondly,	Member	States	may	 limit	 the	social	assistance	granted	to	beneficiaries	of	
subsidiary	protection	status	 to	 ‘core	benefits’.398	This	 limitation,	of	which	actually	 few	Member	States	
have	made	use,	e.g.	Austria,	has	been	severely	criticised	by	observers,	to	the	point	that	Member	States	
were	 urged	 not	 to	 implement	 the	 provision.399	 In	 addition,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 less	 favourable	
provisions	 in	terms	of	both	the	residence	permit	and	the	access	to	social	welfare	seems	to	make	 it	all	
the	more	difficult	 for	beneficiaries	of	subsidiary	protection	to	become	eligible	 for	 long-term	residence	
status.	 The	 requirements	 for	 obtaining	 this	 status	 are	 continuous	 residence	 for	 a	 five-year	 period,	
economic	 self-sufficiency	 and	 sickness	 insurance,	 as	well	 as	 compliance	with	 integration	 conditions	 if	
requested	by	Member	States.400	The	 limited	benefits	 in	 terms	of	 residence	permits	and	social	welfare	
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might	 however	 preclude	 subsidiary	 protection	 beneficiaries	 to	 attain	 this	 necessary	 level	 of	
integration.401		
	
Further	inexplicable	differences	can	be	found	in	the	grounds	for	refusal	of	protection.402	Article	12(1)	QD	
requires	 exclusion	 from	 refugee	 status	 on	 grounds	 equivalent	 to	 Article	 1D	 or	 1E	 of	 the	 Refugee	
Convention,	while	 similar	provisions	are	 lacking	 in	 the	exclusionary	clause	 for	 subsidiary	protection.403	
The	 grounds	 for	 exclusion	 from	 refugee	 status	 thus	 seem	 wider	 than	 for	 exclusion	 from	 subsidiary	
protection.404	 Similar	 differences	 exist	 with	 regard	 to	 exclusion	 on	 public	 order	 grounds.405	 Exclusion	
from	 refugee	 status	on	public	 order	 grounds	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 grounds	mentioned	 in	 Article	 1F	of	 the	
Refugee	 Convention,406	 those	 for	 exclusion	 from	 subsidiary	 protection	 are	 considerably	 wider.407	 It	 is	
unclear	how	the	differences	 in	the	definitions	of	refugee	protection	versus	subsidiary	protection	could	
warrant	this	distinction.408		
	
The	 differences	 in	 procedural	 and	 substantial	 rights	 attached	 to	 both	 protection	 statuses	 leads	 to	
considerable	additional	administrative	effort	since	people	granted	subsidiary	protection	often	take	legal	
action	in	order	to	obtain	the	better	refugee	status.409		
	
Family	members	
The	 definition	 of	 family	 members410	 in	 the	 Directive	 has	 been	 extended	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	
Directive	and	is	now	in	 line	with	the	Family	Reunification	Directive.411	This	adds	to	the	coherence412	of	
the	European	asylum	legislation	and	it	better	secures	observance	of	the	right	to	respect	for	family	life	as	
enshrined	 in	 Articles	 7	 CFR	 and	 8	 ECHR	 and	 the	 	 rights	 of	 the	 child	 in	 Articles	 24(3)	 CFR	 and	 7(1)	
Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 (CRC).413	 There	 are	 however	 also	 differences	 between	 the	
definition	of	family	in	the	Qualification	Directive	and	the	Family	Reunification	Directive.414	The	category	
of	minor	adopted	children	of	 the	 spouse	of	 the	 refugee	 is	not	 included	 in	 the	 family	definition	of	 the	
Qualification	Directive.415	The	Qualification	Directive	also	states	a	number	of	additional	requirements	on	
eligibility	for	the	family	residence	permit,	among	them	that	the	family	already	existed	in	the	country	of	
origin,	 a	 limitation	 that	 is	not	 included	 in	 the	Family	Reunification	Directive.	 This	 approach	disregards	
the	fact	that	refugees	may	form	genuine	and	lasting	family	relationships	during	or	after	flight,	ties	that	
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are	also	protected	by	Article	8	ECHR.416	Also,	the	favourable	provisions	of	Articles	10(2)417	and	(3)(b)418	of	
the	 Family	 Reunification	 Directive	 have	 no	 counterpart	 in	 the	 Qualification	 Directive.	 There	 is	 no	
reasonable	 explanation	 for	 these	 differences,	 which	 have	 the	 following	 consequences.419	 The	 family	
members	that	fall	within	the	aforementioned	favourable	provisions	of	the	Family	Reunification	Directive	
are	not	entitled	to	the	status	of	dependent	family	member	under	the	Qualification	Directive,	and	hence	
can	be	required	to	leave	the	Member	State	in	order	to	apply	for	family	reunification	in	their	country	of	
origin.	By	maintaining	these	differences	the	Qualification	Directive	does	not	increase	coherence	as	much	
as	 it	 could	have	done,	 and	 to	 the	 same	extent	does	not	 secure	 the	observance	of	 the	 instruments	of	
international	law	mentioned	above.420		
	
Applying	for	international	protection	
From	 a	 perspective	 of	 international	 law,421	 criticism	 is	 expressed	 on	 Article	 5	 QD	 which	 deals	 with	
international	 protection	 needs	 arising	 sur	 place	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 host	 country).422	 Article	 5	 (3)	 QD423	 is	
considered	 a	 highly	 problematic	 provision	 as	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 based	 on	 the	 suspicion	 that	 convictions	
allegedly	developed	sur	place	are	faked,	in	order	to	obtain	by	fraud	refugee	status.424	Indeed	in	certain	
cases	 the	 stated	 fear	of	 persecution	may	be	 fake,	 but	 if	 the	 third	 country	national	 does	demonstrate	
well-founded	fear	of	being	persecuted	due	to	circumstances	created	by	his	decision	after	entering	the	
host	 country,	 there	 seems	 to	be	no	 ground	 in	 the	Refugee	Convention	or	 elsewhere	 to	deny	 refugee	
status.425	 Hence,	 this	 provision	 introduces	 a	 ground	 for	 refusal	 which	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 Refugee	
Convention.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 Article	 4(3)(d)	 QD,426	 which	 imposes	 the	 obligation	 to	 assess	 the	
purpose	 of	 sur	 place	 activities.	 Again,	 there	 is	 no	 basis	 in	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 for	 such	 an	
obligation.427	
	
Article	 7	 of	 the	 Directive	 provides	 that	 protection	 against	 persecution	 or	 serious	 harm	 can	 only	 be	
provided	by	the	State	and	‘parties	or	organisations,	including	international	organisations,	controlling	the	
State	 	or	a	substantial	part	of	 the	territory	of	 the	State’.	The	Refugee	Convention428	however	requires	
protection	 to	 come	 from	 a	 State	 and	 therefore	 this	 provision	 in	 the	 Directive	 seems	 to	 ignore	 the	
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Refugee	Convention.429	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Article	also	has	 clarified	protection	as	 compared	 to	 the	
first	 Qualification	 Directive.	 The	 first	 paragraph	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 list	 of	 actors	 that	 can	 provide	
protection	 is	 exhaustive.	 This	 better	 secures	 compliance	 with	 international	 law	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	
clarifies	 that	 not	 any	 actor	 can	 offer	 relevant	 protection.430	 Another	 valuable	 clarification	 is	 the	
requirement	in	Article	7(2)	that	protection	against	persecution	or	serious	harm	must	be	effective	and	of	
a	non-temporary	nature.431	
	
Qualification	for	being	a	refugee	
Article	9	of	the	Directive	defines	‘acts	of	persecution’.	Only	the	third	paragraph	of	this	article	has	been	
changed	by	the	2011	recast.	Its	previous	wording	required	a	link	between	reasons	for	persecution	under	
Article	 10	 of	 the	 Directive	 and	 the	 acts	 of	 persecution.	 The	 text	 has	 been	 amended	 to	 cover	 also	 a	
connection	 between	 reasons	 for	 persecution	 and	 the	 failure	 to	 protect,	 reflecting	 the	 prevailing	
understanding	of	Article	1A	of	the	Refugee	Convention.432	This	change	has	thus	increased	compliance	of	
the	Directive	with	the	Refugee	Convention.433	
	
In	order	for	a	harmful	act	to	amount	to	persecution	in	the	sense	of	the	Refugee	Convention,	it	needs	to	
be	motivated	by	at	 least	one	of	 the	 five	 reasons	relevant	 to	 the	refugee	definition.434	When	assessing	
Convention	reasons	for	persecution,	Member	States	are	required	to	take	the	points	listed	in	Article	10	
into	account.	The	Directive	provides	guidance	 for	 the	 interpretation	of	protected	grounds.	Among	the	
points	listed,	is	the	identification	of	‘a	particular	social	group’	in	Article	10(1)(d).	This	term	is	considered	
the	 vaguest	 of	 the	 refugee	 definition.435	 The	 last	 indent	 of	 Article	 10(1)(d)	 provides	 guidance	 as	 to	
whether	people	of	a	particular	gender	or	sexual	orientation	may	constitute	a	particular	social	group.	The	
current	 text	 as	 amended	 by	 the	 2011	 recast	 states	 in	 more	 demanding	 terms	 that	 gender	 related	
aspects	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account,	 and	 indeed	 does	 not	 exclude	 the	 possibility	 that	 gender	 is	
sufficient	 for	defining	a	particular	 social	 group.	Thus,	 it	 adds	 to	 securing	 conformity	with	 the	Refugee	
Convention.436	 There	are	however	also	missed	opportunities	here.	 For	belonging	 to	a	particular	 social	
group,	Article	10(1)(d)	sets	two	cumulative	requirements:	the	applicants	must	have	a	characteristic	they	
cannot	change	or	cannot	be	asked	to	change,	and	the	group	must	be	recognisable	in	the	society	in	the	
country	of	origin.	It	however	follows	from	UNHCR	Guidelines	that	these	are	alternative	tests	and	should	
not	be	applied	 cumulatively.437	 The	Union	 legislator	missed	 the	opportunity	 to	 correct	 the	 cumulative	
reading	of	the	requirements	and	thus	secure	better	observance	of	the	Refugee	Convention.438		
	
There	 is	 an	 ambivalent	 structure	 in	 the	 Qualification	 Directive	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 non-
refoulement.439	On	14	July	2016,	a	Czech	Court	asked	the	CJEU	whether	Article	14(4)	QD,	which	allows	
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for	revoking,	ending	or	refusing	to	renew	refugee	status	for	reasons	of	criminal	behaviour	or	a	security	
risk,	is	invalid	in	light	of	the	principle	of	non	refoulement.440	At	the	time	of	concluding	the	research	for	
this	 report,	no	ruling	had	taken	place	 in	 this	case	but	 the	 following	comments	on	this	case	have	been	
made.	
	
The	EU	principle	of	non-refoulement	is	laid	down	in	Article	19(2)	CFR	and	Article	21	QD	deals	with	non-
refoulement	 directly.	 The	 first	 paragraph	 of	 the	 article	 states	 that	 Member	 States	 shall	 respect	 the	
principle	of	non-refoulement	‘in	accordance	with	their	international	obligations’.	At	the	same	time,	the	
second	paragraph	states	 that	 refoulement	of	a	 refugee	 is	nevertheless	allowed	 in	 some	cases,	 ‘where	
not	 prohibited	 by	 the	 international	 obligations’	 mentioned	 in	 the	 first	 paragraph.	 In	 suggesting	 that	
refoulement	would	nevertheless	be	allowed	under	certain	conditions,	Article	21(2)	QD	is	considered	to	
be	confusing.441		
	
Recognition	of	asylum	decisions	
In	case	a	refugee	is	recognised	by	a	certain	Member	State,	the	Qualification	Directive	currently	does	not	
provide	 for	 recognition	of	 this	positive	decision	on	 the	asylum	application	other	Member	States.442	At	
the	 same	 time,	mutual	 recognition	 of	 negative	 asylum	decisions	does	 apply	 under	 existing	 legislation	
and	practice.	Hence,	asylum-seekers	and	even	 recognised	 refugees	are	 in	 the	current	 situation	 legally	
stranded	in	one	Member	State.443	Even	if	that	state	is	in	breach	of	its	obligations	to	provide	entitlements	
associated	with	a	protection	status	under	 the	Qualification	Directive,	 the	 refugee	 is	not	 free	 to	move,	
unless	 and	 until	 she	 or	 he	 qualifies	 for	 long-term	 residence.444	 This	 situation	 is	 considered	 to	 be	
especially	incongruous	in	view	of	the	rights	that	EU	citizens	have:	Member	States	do	recognise	the	rights	
of	one	another’s	nationals	as	EU	citizens,	even	though	no	harmonisation	at	all	has	taken	place	regarding	
the	 conditions	 of	 naturalisation.445	 In	 addition,	 mutual	 recognition	 of	 protection	 awarded	 by	 other	
Member	States	has	been	described	as	an	important	step	in	the	further	development	of	the	CEAS446	and	
it	 implicitly	 follows	 from	 Article	 28	 and	 the	 related	 schedule	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention.447	 Mutual	
recognition	could	also	strengthen	a	common	European	protection	status	and	could	have	positive	effects	
on	the	prevention	of	secondary	migratory	movements	during	the	asylum	procedure.448		
	
5.2.2	Implementation	
When	it	comes	to	the	implementation	of	the	Recast	Qualification	Directive,	the	main	concern	seems	to	
be	 the	 divergence	 in	 recognition	 rates	 and	 the	 type	 of	 protection	 status	 granted	 (either	 refugee	 or	
subsidiary)	 to	 applicants	 originating	 from	 the	 same	 country	 of	 origin.449	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 common	
European	asylum	system	is	referred	to	as	a	‘lottery	of	protection’.450		
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According	to	2016	EASO	data	on	recognition	rates	reveal	substantial	disparities	between	countries:	the	
median	recognition	rate	for	applicants	with	Syrian	nationality	is	97%,	but	varies	between	countries	from	
10%	to	100%.451	A	similar	picture	applies	to	Eritrean	applicants	 for	whom	the	median	recognition	rate	
amounts	to	89%	and	varies	 from	47%	to	100%.	These	considerable	divergences	 in	refugee	recognition	
rates	can	hardly	be	explained	by	the	mere	peculiarities	of	 individual	cases.452	Variations	also	existed	in	
the	type	of	status	that	countries	granted	to	asylum	seekers.453	For	example,	in	2016	refugee	status	rates	
for	Syrians	have	varied	across	a	range	from	100%	in	Ireland	and	92%	in	the	UK	and	Italy	to	no	more	than	
0,9%	in	Spain,	the	latter	overwhelmingly	granting	subsidiary	protection.454		
	
Differences	 in	the	status	granted	have	a	direct	and	far-reaching	 impact	on	the	 lives	of	beneficiaries	of	
international	 protection	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 rights	 and	 integration	 prospects.455	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
differences	that	follow	directly	from	the	Directive	(see	paragraph	5.2.1	above),	many	countries	subject	
holders	of	subsidiary	protection	to	less	preferential	treatment	in	several	other	areas.456	The	distinction	
for	instance	concerns	residence	rights:	In	France	refugees	receive	a	residence	permit	valid	for	10	years,	
while	subsidiary	protection	beneficiaries	are	only	entitled	to	residence	for	1	year,	renewable	for	2-year	
periods.457		
	
Where	harmonisation	has	taken	place	in	practice,	it	seems	in	part	to	have	taken	the	form	of	a	‘race	to	
the	 bottom’.	 Member	 States	 were	 and	 are	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 different	 arrangements	 create	 a	 pull	
effect	 towards	 those	 states	 with	more	 favourable	 arrangements,	 an	 effect	 that	 became	more	 visible	
during	the	period	of	large	influx	of	refugees.	458		As	a	consequence,	some	countries	curtailed	the	rights	
associated	 with	 the	 respective	 status	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 their	 national	 asylum	
systems.459	 As	 an	 example,	 several	 countries	 (Austria,	 Belgium,	Denmark,	 Hungary	 and	 Sweden)	 have	
adapted	 their	 legislation	 by	 restricting	 the	 period	 of	 residence	 permit	 granted	 to	 beneficiaries	 of	
international	protection,	bringing	 it	more	 in	 line	with	 the	minimum	periods	provided	 for	 in	 Article	24	
QD,	even	though	the	Qualification	Directive	 leaves	 it	 to	 the	Member	States	 to	adopt	more	 favourable	
provisions.460	
	
Other	observations	
The	Qualification	Directive	provides	that	the	assessment	for	 international	protection	should	be	carried	
out	on	an	 individual	basis.	However,	 as	a	 result	of	 large	 scale	arrivals	and	due	 to	 the	high	number	of	
asylum	 claims,	 Member	 States	 have	 experienced	 a	 backlog	 in	 the	 processing	 of	 individual	 asylum	
applications.461	The	Temporary	Protection	Directive462	would	allow	states	to	grant	protection	status	to	a	
pre-defined	group	of	persons	in	need	of	international	protection	immediately,	thus	alleviating	pressure	
on	 the	 asylum	 procedures	 and	 make	 resources	 available	 for	 the	 processing	 of	 applications	 of	 other	
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nationalities.463	However,	so	far	the	Commission	never	has	submitted	a	proposal	for	a	Council	Decision	
triggering	the	application	of	the	Temporary	Protection	Directive.		
	
The	 interpretation	 of	 serious	 harm	 (Article	 15(c)	 QD)	 is	 subject	 to	 very	 divergent	 implementation	
practices.464	 Most	 Member	 States	 have	 not	 established	 guidelines	 to	 interpret	 the	 terms	 ‘real	 risk’,	
‘serious	 harm’	 or	 ‘armed	 conflict’.	 Varying	 interpretations	 by	 Member	 States	 have	 resulted	 in	
differences	in	transposition	of	the	Qualification	Directive.465	In	addition,	the	question	of	individualisation	
of	the	serious	threat	revealed	different	practices	between	Member	States.466		
	
Integration		
It	should	be	noted	that	the	integration	of	beneficiaries	of	international	protection	is	a	field	which	almost	
completely	 remains	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 CEAS:	 once	 a	 persons	 is	 recognised	 as	 being	 in	 need	 of	
international	protection	there	 is	often	very	 little	support	available	with	particular	difficulties	 in	 finding	
accommodation.467	Still,	in	order	to	facilitate	the	integration	of	beneficiaries	of	international	protection	
into	society,	a	number	of	countries	introduced	a	range	of	measures,	including	more	favourable	support	
rates	or	facilitated	access	to	services,	 longer	availability	of	 integration	programmes,	additional	support	
measures,	integration	courses	and	attendance	obligations.468		
	
In	 June	2016,	 the	Commission	adopted	an	Action	Plan	on	the	 integration	of	 third-country	nationals.469	
The	action	plan	provides	a	comprehensive	framework	to	support	Member	States’	efforts	in	developing	
and	 strengthening	 their	 integration	 policies,	 and	 describes	 concrete	 measures	 the	 Commission	 will	
implement	in	this	regard.470		
	
6.	Proposal	for	a	Qualification	Regulation	
On	the	same	date	as	the	proposal	for	a	Procedures	Regulation,	the	Commission	presented	its	proposal	
for	 a	 Qualification	 Regulation.471	 The	 choice	 for	 a	 Regulation	 demonstrates	 the	 Commission’s	
commitment	to	achieving	further	harmonisation	in	the	field	of	qualification	criteria	and	the	content	of	
protection.472		
	
Harmonisation	
In	 the	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 to	 the	 Regulation,	 the	 Commission	 acknowledges	 the	 currently	
existing	 differences	 in	 recognition	 rates	 and	 in	 the	 level	 of	 rights	 in	 the	 national	 asylum	 systems	
attached	 to	 the	 protection	 status	 concerned	 (also	 see	 paragraph	 5.2.2	 above).473	 The	 Commission’s	
response	is	one	of	 legislative	harmonisation,	which	it	considers	as	the	principal	tool	for	ensuring	more	
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convergence	in	outcomes	across	the	EU.474	This	approach	of	prescriptive	harmonisation	is	however	met	
with	criticism.	First	of	all,	it	is	questioned	whether	harmonisation	will	lead	to	uniform	decision	making	in	
asylum	claims.	Member	States	could	still	continue	to	reach	different	outcomes	under	the	same	rules,	in	
the	 absence	 of	 practical	 cooperation	 and	 guidelines.475	 Secondly,	 harmonisation	 as	 proposed	 by	 the	
Commission	 seems	 to	 promote	 ‘harmonisation	 downwards’,	 by	 	 means	 of	 undermining	 access	 to	
protection	and	creating	greater	possibilities	for	exclusion.476		This	is	particularly	visible	in	Article	14:	the	
optional	 grounds	 for	 revoking	 or	 refusing	 to	 renew	 refugee	 status	 under	 the	 Directive	 relating	 to	
persons	deemed	to	be	a	threat	to	public	order	or,	having	been	convicted	of	a	particular	serious	crime,	
constitute	a	danger	to	the	community,	are	now	rendered	mandatory	under	Article	14(1)(d)-(e).477	These	
provisions	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 as	 they	 fall	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 exclusion	
clauses	foreseen	in	the	Convention.478	Article	26(2)(c)	of	the	proposal	stipulates	that	a	residence	permit	
shall	not	be	renewed	or	shall	be	revoked	for	reasons	of	national	security	or	public	order,	and	no	longer	
for	 compelling	 reasons	 as	was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 Directive479.	 This	 broadens	 the	 ground	 for	 revoking	 or	
refusing	 to	 renew	 a	 residence	 permit	 issued	 to	 a	 beneficiary.480	 The	 deletion	 of	 this	 word	 seems	
unjustifiable,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 related	 explanation	 in	 the	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 or	 the	
Preamble	of	the	proposal.		
	
Refugee	status	and	subsidiary	protection	
The	proposal	fails	to	address	the	divergence	in	the	duration	of	residence	permits	awarded	to	refugees	
and	 subsidiary	 protection	 beneficiaries:	 the	 validity	 period	 still	 is	 three	 years	 for	 refugee	 residence	
permits481	and	one	year	for	subsidiary	protection	residence	permits.482	 In	addition,	these	provisions	no	
longer	leave	room	for	Member	States	to	opt	for	more	favourable	standards,	as	several	Member	States	
have	done	under	the	current	legal	regime	of	the	Qualification	Directive.483	Alignment	of	the	duration	of	
both	 residence	permits	would	 address	 the	practical	 shortcomings	 that	 currently	 are	 the	 result	 of	 this	
divergence	(see	paragraph	5.2.1	above).	Moreover,	there	seems	to	be	no	objective	reason	for	assuming	
subsidiary	protection	to	be	of	a	more	temporary	nature	than	refugee	status.484	
	
Other	observations	
Article	 5(3)	 of	 the	 current	 Qualification	 Directive	 deals	 with	 protection	 for	 applicants	 who	 file	 a	
subsequent	application.	This	provision	states	that	an	 international	protection	status	shall	normally	not	
be	granted	where	an	applicant	has	filed	a	subsequent	application	and	the	risk	of	persecution	or	serious	
harm	is	based	on	circumstances	that	the	applicant	has	created	by	his	or	her	own	decision	since	leaving	
the	country	of	origin.	This	seems	to	be	based	on	the	assumption	that	convictions	allegedly	developed	
sur	place	are	faked	(also	see	paragraph	5.2.1	above)	and	such	an	exclusion	opposes	the	standards	of	the	
Refugee	Convention.485	The	proposal	does	not	address	this	shortcoming,	but	 instead	turns	the	current	
provision	into	a	mandatory	rule	by	removing	the	discretion	that	the	Directive	left	to	Member	States.486	
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The	 proposal	 also	 maintains	 the	 contested	 cumulative	 test	 for	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘membership	 of	 a	
particular	social	group’	as	a	reason	for	persecution	 in	Article	10(1)(d)	 (also	see	paragraph	5.2.1	above,	
‘qualification	for	being	a	refugee’).487		
	
A	 far-reaching	reform	 is	proposed	to	 the	assessment	of	 the	 internal	protection	alternative,488	which	 is	
envisaged	to	become	mandatory	for	Member	States.	Even	though	considerable	improvements	are	made	
to	the	procedural	guarantees489	surrounding	this	assessment,	the	internal	protection	concept	itself	is	not	
line	with	the	Refugee	Convention	as	it	adds	an	additional	criterion	to	eligibility	for	refugee	status	beyond	
the	 criteria	 foreseen	 in	 Article	 1A	 of	 said	 Convention.490	 On	 a	 more	 practical	 level,	 the	 internal	
protection	check	increases	the	workload	of	the	determining	authority.491	
	
Concerns	exist	 that	 the	proposed	mandatory	 review	of	 status	 (Articles	15	and	21)	would	place	a	high	
administrative	 burden	 on	 Member	 States	 and	 undermine	 the	 protected	 person’s	 prospects	 of	
integration	in	host	communities.492	
	
The	 extension	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 family	members	 is	welcomed,	 as	 it	 now	 also	 includes	 families	 that	
were	 formed	 after	 leaving	 the	 country	 of	 origin,	 including	 while	 in	 transit,	 but	 before	 arrival	 on	 the	
territory	of	the	Member	State.493	Concern	however	also	exists	that	other	close	family	relations,	such	as	
dependent	adult	 children	or	 the	dependent	parents	of	 an	adult,	 as	well	 as	 same	 sex	 couples,	 are	not	
included	in	the	definition.494	
	
Finally,	it	is	observed	that	the	CJEU’s	ruling	in	El	Kott495	has	been	codified	in	Article	12(4)	of	the	proposal	
as	 further	 guidance	 is	 introduced	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 exclusion	 clause	 relating	 to	 Palestinian	
refugees	under	Article	1D	of	the	Refugee	Convention.496	
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PART	IV.	THE	RECEPTION	OF	ASYLUM	SEEKERS	
	
1.	Introduction	
This	part	includes	an	overview	of	the	comments	on	the	Recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	(Chapter	
2)	and	the	Commission	proposal	for	(another)	recast	of	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive	(Chapter	3).	
A	distinction	will	be	made	between	the	design	and	the	implementation	of	the	Directive.	
	
2.	Recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	(2013/33/EU)	
	
2.1	The	main	objectives	of	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	
The	 recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive497	 lays	down	 standards	 for	 the	 reception	of	 asylum	seekers	
within	the	Member	States.	These	standards	should	ensure	a	dignified	standard	of	living	and	comparable	
living	conditions	in	all	Member	States.498	A	key	aim	of	the	Directive	is	to	limit	secondary	movements	of	
asylum	applicants	within	the	EU	by	addressing	disparities	in	reception	conditions.499		
	
The	legal	basis	for	the	Directive	is	Article	78(2)(f)	TFEU.	The	Directive	covers	all	third-country	nationals	
and	stateless	persons	who	make	an	application	 for	 international	protection,	as	 long	as	 they	enjoy	 the	
status	of	applicant	in	a	Member	State.500	A	person	ceases	to	be	an	applicant	when	a	final	decision	on	his	
application	 is	 taken.501	 A	 ‘final	 decision’	 must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 decision	 that	 can	 no	 longer	 be	
challenged	under	national	law.502		
	
The	 United	 Kingdom,	 Ireland	 and	 Denmark	 do	 not	 take	 part	 in	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	
Directive.503	 The	 UK	 did	 however	 opt	 in	 to	 the	 first	 phase	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive,504	 which	
implies	that	 it	remains	bound	by	that	Directive.	 In	addition,	when	implementing	the	Dublin	Regulation	
the	United	Kingdom	and	Ireland	and	Denmark	and	the	non-EU	Dublin	states	are	bound	by	the	specific	
articles	of	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	that	deal	with	detention.	This	follows	from	Article	
28(4)	of	the	Dublin	 III	Regulation,505	which	 incorporates	the	specific	Articles	9,	10	and	11	of	the	recast	
Reception	Conditions	Directive	into	the	text	of	the	Dublin	Regulation.		
	
2.2	Reviewing	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	
	
2.2.1	Design	
In	 general,	 the	 level	 of	 protection	 granted	 by	 the	 Directive	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 observing	 the	 Refugee	
Convention,	in	so	far	as	the	Convention	provides	for	a	specific	set	of	rights	to	the	category	of	refugees	
who	 are	 physically	 present	 in	 a	 state’s	 territory,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 legal	 status.506	 The	 Reception	
Conditions	Directive	generally	complies	with	this	standard,	and	does,	in	fact,	grant	a	number	of	rights	to	
asylum	seekers	which	states	under	the	Refugee	Convention	are	only	obliged	to	grant	to	refugees	who	
have	expressly	been	permitted	residence.507	
	
																																								 																				
497		 Directive	2013/33/EU,	preceded	by	the	first	phase	Reception	Conditions	Directive	2003/9/EC.		
498		 Recital	5	RCD	and	Recital	11	RCD.	
499		 Recital	12	RCD;	Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	83.	
500		 Article	3(1)	RCD.	
501		 Article	2(c)	APD.	
502		 Article	2(e)	APD.	
503		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014),	268.	
504		 Directive	2003/9/EC.	
505		 Regulation	(EU)	604/2013.	
506		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014),	267.	See	in	particular	Articles	4,	13,	14,	22,	25	and	27	of	the	Refugee	Convention.	
507		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014),	267-268.	
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Reception		
The	Directive	does	not	provide	a	clear	definition	of	 ‘reception’.	 Instead,	reference	is	made	to	different	
forms	of	reception	conditions	made	available	to	asylum	seekers,	including	material	conditions	(housing,	
food,	clothing,	vouchers	and	financial	allowances),508	health	care,509	employment510	and	education.511	A	
clear	 conceptual	 definition	 of	 ‘reception’	 is	 lacking,	 which	 leads	 to	 different	 interpretations	 and	 thus	
legal	 effects	 in	 the	 Member	 States.512	 For	 instance,	 a	 number	 of	 states	 draw	 clear	 institutional	
distinctions	between	 the	 framework	of	 ‘first	 reception’	as	hosting	of	new	arrivals	and	 the	 second-line	
(longer-term)	 reception	 as	 accommodation	 of	 persons	 who	 have	 entered	 the	 asylum	 procedure,	
although	the	distinction	between	first-	and	second-line	reception	is	not	formally	drawn	in	the	EU	legal	
framework.513	As	a	consequence,	considerable	variations	exist	among	Member	States	in	terms	of	what	
constitutes	first-line	and	second-line	reception	and	who	is	responsible	for	it.514		
	
Harmonisation	
The	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	affords	a	higher	 level	of	harmonisation	than	the	previous515	
legislative	 instrument.	 Improvements	 in	 this	 respect	 include	 the	 detailed	 regulation	 of	 detention	
grounds	 and	 detention	 conditions	 for	 asylum	 seekers.516	 In	 addition,	 the	 recast	 Directive	 speaks	 of	
‘standards’	 for	 reception	 and	 thus	 no	 longer	 of	 ‘minimum	 standards’	 as	 the	 first	 phase	Directive	 did.	
Still,	the	recast	Directive	does	not	aim	at	fully	harmonising	reception	conditions	as	there	was	insufficient	
agreement	 among	 Member	 States	 on	 the	 question	 of	 where	 to	 draw	 the	 lines	 of	 such	 common	
standards.517	 Article	 4	 expressly	 allows	 Member	 States	 to	 retain	 or	 introduce	 more	 favourable	
standards.518	The	 last	 indent	of	 that	provision	stipulates	 that	such	national	 laws	with	more	 favourable	
provisions	can	be	 introduced	 ‘insofar	as	 [they]	are	compatible	with	this	Directive’.	Ultimately,	how	far	
Member	States	may	go	in	this	regard	will	have	to	be	established	by	the	Court	of	Justice.519		
	
Criticism	 has	 been	 expressed	 regarding	 the	 Directive’s	 objective	 to	 limit	 secondary	 movements	 of	
asylum	 seekers	 through	 harmonisation	 of	 reception	 conditions.	 The	 level	 of	 material	 reception	
conditions	 during	 the	 asylum	 procedure	 may	 only	 have	 limited	 impact	 on	 secondary	 movements	 of	
asylum	 seekers	 because	 other	 pull	 factors	 such	 as	 social	 ties,	 reputation	 of	 other	 countries	 or	 job	
opportunities	may	be	regarded	as	more	important	by	asylum	seekers.520	
	
Scope	
In	 comparison	 to	 the	 previous	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive,	 the	 recast	 has	 widened	 the	 scope	 of	
applicability	of	 the	Directive	 to	all	 applicants	 for	 international	protection,	 including	 those	 in	 territorial	
waters	or	in	transit	zones	of	a	Member	state,	and	subsidiary	protection.521	This	implies	that	the	Directive	
is	also	applicable	in	hotspots	(also	see	Part	III,	Chapter	4).522	
																																								 																				
508		 Article	2(g)	RCD.	
509		 Article	19	RCD.	
510		 Article	15	RCD.	
511		 Articles	14	and	16	RCD.	
512		 ECRE	(2017)	Principles	for	fair	and	sustainable	refugee	protection	in	Europe.	ECRE’s	vision	for	Europe’s	role	in	the	global	refugee	protection		
	 regime,	9;	ECRE	(2016)	Wrong	counts	and	closing	doors:	the	reception	of	asylum	seekers	in	Europe,	11.	
513		 ECRE	(2016)	Wrong	counts	and	closing	doors:	the	reception	of	asylum	seekers	in	Europe,	11.	
514		 Ibid.,	11-12.	
515		 Directive	2003/9/EC.	
516		 Tsourdi	E	(2016)	EU	Reception	Conditions:	A	Dignified	Standard	of	Living	for	Asylum	Seekers?	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.)		
	 (2016)	Reforming	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	NV,	310.	
517		 Boeles	P	et	al.	(2014),	269;	Peers	S	et	al.	(eds.)	(2015),	512;	Wagner	M	and	Kraler	A	(2016),	11.	
518		 Also	see	Recital	28	RCD.	
519		 Peers	S	et	al.	(eds.)	(2015),	505.	
520		 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	82;	Wagner	M	and	Kraler	A	(2016),	12.	
521		 Article	3(1)	RCD	read	together	with	Article	2(a)	RCD	and	see	Recital	13	RCD.	Tsourdi	E	(2016)	EU	Reception	Conditions:	A	Dignified	Standard		
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Material	reception	conditions	
Material	reception	conditions	are	defined	in	Article	2(g)	and	include	housing,	food,	clothing	and	a	daily	
expenses	 allowance.	 It	 is	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	Member	 States	 how	 these	material	 conditions	 are	
provided.	 Housing	 for	 instance	 could	 take	 the	 form	 of	 State-provided	 accommodation	 in	 reception	
centres	or	private	houses.523	
	
The	Directive	 states	 that	 these	material	 reception	conditions	must	be	available	 from	 the	moment	 the	
applicant	 submits	 his	 or	 her	 application	 for	 asylum.	According	 to	Article	 17(2),	Member	 States	 are	 to	
ensure	that:	‘material	reception	conditions	provide	an	adequate	standard	of	living	for	applicants,	which	
guarantees	 their	 subsistence	 and	 protects	 their	 physical	 and	 mental	 health’.	 Furthermore,	 Member	
States	must	ensure	that	this	standard	of	living	is	met	in	the	specific	situation	of	vulnerable	persons,	as	
well	 as	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 situation	of	persons	who	are	 in	detention.524	 In	order	 to	provide	 safeguards	
against	abuse,	the	recast	Directive	also	provides	that	Member	States	may	make	the	provision	of	all	or	
some	of	 the	material	 reception	conditions	and	health	care	subject	 to	 the	condition	 that	applicants	do	
not	 have	 their	 own	 sufficient	 means	 to	 ensure	 their	 subsistence.525	 If	 the	 applicants	 have	 sufficient	
resources,	 Member	 States	 may	 ask	 them	 to	 cover,	 or	 contribute	 to,	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 material	
reception.526	 Existing	 legal	 standards	 endorse	Member	 States	 to	 set	 exceptionally	 different	modalities	
for	 material	 reception	 conditions	 when	 material	 reception	 conditions	 are	 not	 available	 in	 certain	
geographical	areas527	or	when	housing	capacities	normally	available	are	temporarily	exhausted528	for	a	
‘reasonable	 period,	 which	 should	 be	 as	 short	 as	 possible’.529	 These	 exceptions	 raise	 concerns,	
particularly	 in	 view	 of	 the	 incapacity	 of	 some	 Member	 States	 to	 fulfill	 their	 obligations	 under	 this	
Directive	as	evidenced	by	 the	events	 in	 the	 case	of	M.S.S.	 v.	Belgium	and	Greece	 (also	 see	paragraph	
2.2.2).530	 The	 scope	of	Member	 State’s	discretionary	power	 regarding	housing	entitlements	of	 asylum	
seekers	under	the	Directive	has	been	significantly	reduced	by	criteria	formulated	by	the	CJEU	in	its	case	
law.531	
	
The	 level	 of	 the	 financial	 allowances	 provided	 to	 asylum	 applicants	 is	 largely	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	
Member	States.532	The	benchmark	of	financial	assistance	is	set	to	levels	established	by	Member	States,	
either	 by	 law	 or	 by	 practice,	 to	 ensure	 ‘adequate	 standards	 of	 living	 for	 nationals’.533	 It	 is	 however	
explicitly	 stated	 that	Member	 States	may	 grant	 less	 favourable	 treatment	 to	 applicants	 compared	 to	
nationals,	in	particular	where	material	support	is	partially	provided	in	kind,	or	where	the	level(s),	applied	
to	 nationals,	 aim	 to	 ensure	 a	 higher	 standard	 of	 living	 than	 that	 prescribed	 for	 applicants	 in	 the	
Reception	Conditions	Directive.534	As	 the	association	with	 the	amount	of	 social	 assistance	 received	by	
nationals	 can	 be	 easily	 departed	 from,	 this	 formulation	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 address	 sufficiently	 the	
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522		 Wagner	M,	Baumgartner	P	et	al.	(2016),	83.	
523		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	64.	
524		 Article	17(2)	RCD.	
525		 Article	17(3)	RCD.	
526		 Article	17(4)	RCD.	
527		 Recital	19	RCD.	
528		 Article	18(9)(b)	RCD.	
529		 ECRE	(2017)	Principles	for	fair	and	sustainable	refugee	protection	in	Europe.	ECRE’s	vision	for	Europe’s	role	in	the	global	refugee	protection		
	 regime,	10.	
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problematic	 situation	 that	 has	 occurred	 in	 several	 Member	 States	 with	 regard	 to	 divergences	 in	
standards.535		
	
The	 Directive	 permits	 Member	 States	 to	 sanction	 what	 is	 considered	 as	 deviant	 behaviour	 with	
reduction	or	even,	in	exceptional	cases,	withdrawal	of	reception	conditions	for	asylum	seekers	who	do	
not	 comply	with	procedural	or	other	 rules.536	The	compatibility	of	 this	provision	with	Member	States’	
human	rights	obligations	 is	questionable.537	Member	States	may	apply	sanctions	(other	than	reduction	
or	withdrawal	of	material	reception	conditions)538	in	the	event	of	(1)	serious	breaches	of	the	rules	of	the	
accommodation	centres	and	(2)	 in	case	of	seriously	violent	behaviour.539	The	first	term	remains	rather	
vague	as	the	rules	of	accommodation	centres	are	themselves	not	 in	any	way	part	of	the	Directive	and	
therefore	vary	considerably	among	the	accommodation	centres.540		
	
It	should	be	noted	here	that	Article	20	of	the	recast	Directive	only	allows	for	the	withdrawal	of	material	
reception	 conditions.541	 In	 addition,	 the	 Directive	 prescribes	 that	 Member	 States	 ‘shall	 under	 all	
circumstances	ensure	access	 to	health	care	 in	accordance	with	Article	19	and	shall	ensure	a	 ‘dignified	
standard	 of	 living	 for	 all	 applicants’.542	 Although	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear	 what	 constitutes	 a	 ‘dignified	
standard	of	 living’,	 these	provisions	 in	 the	Directive	seem	to	provide	 for	a	non-derogable	minimum	of	
material	reception	conditions.543	
	
The	concept	of	vulnerability	
The	 EU	asylum	acquis	 explicitly	 acknowledges	 that	 vulnerable	 applicants544	may	be	 in	 need	of	 special	
reception545	 (and	 procedural546)	 needs.547	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 section	 on	 the	 Asylum	 Procedures	
Directive	(see	paragraph	2.2.4	of	Part	 III),	 inconsistencies	exist	 in	the	conceptualisation	of	vulnerability	
within	EU	law.		
	
The	recast	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	defines	applicants	in	need	of	special	procedural	guarantees548	in	
terms	 of	 their	 reduced	 ability	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 rights	 and	 comply	 with	 the	 obligations	 under	 the	
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	 (eds.),	308.	
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	 asylum	procedures.	
545		 Recital	14	RCD.		
546		 Recital	29	RCD.	
547		 For	a	legal	analysis	with	regard	to	victims	of	human	trafficking,	see:	Stoyanova	V	(2015)	Victims	of	Human	Trafficking.	A	Legal	Analysis	of		
	 the	Guarantees	for	‘Vulnerable	Persons’	under	the	Second	Phase	of	the	EU	Asylum	Legislation.	In:	Bauloz	C	et	al.	(eds.)	Seeking	Asylum	in	
	 the	European	Union.	Selected	Protection	Issues	Raised	by	the	Second	Phase	of	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	Leiden:	Koninklijke		
	 Brill	NV,	58-108.	For	more	on	the	concept	of	vulnerability	in	the	context	of	second	generation	asylum	directives	and	regulations,	see:		
	 Jakuleviciene	L	(2016)	Vulnerable	Persons	as	a	New	Sub-Group	of	Asylum	Seekers?	In:	Chetail	V,	De	Bruycker	P	and	Maiani	F	(eds.)		
	 Reforming	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	The	New	European	Refugee	Law.	Leiden:	Koninklijke	Brill	NV,	353-373.	
548		 ECRE	(2017)	The	concept	of	vulnerability	in	European	asylum	procedures,	14.	
	
	
56	
	
Directive	due	to	individual	circumstances.549	The	Procedures	Directive	does	not	include	an	exhaustive	list	
of	 asylum	 seekers	 presumed	 to	 be	 in	 need	 of	 special	 procedural	 guarantees.	 Instead,	 it	 indicatively	
refers	to	need	of	such	guarantees	related	to	age,	gender,	sexual	orientation,	gender	identity,	disability,	
serious	illness,	mental	disorders,	or	as	a	result	of	torture,	rape	or	other	serious	forms	of	psychological,	
physical	 or	 sexual	 violence.550	 In	 comparison,	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive	 refers	 to	 the	
notion	of	‘vulnerable	persons’	through	a	non-exhaustive	list	of	such	persons551	and	Article	22(1)	of	this	
Directive	holds	the	obligation	for	Member	States	to	assess	whether	an	applicant	has	special	protection	
needs.	 The	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive	 also	 introduces	 the	 separate	 concept	 of	 ‘applicant	 with	
special	reception	needs’.552	Further	confusion	on	the	scope	of	the	notion	of	‘vulnerable	persons’	arises	
from	provisions	such	as	Article	11	which	refers	to	the	‘detention	of	vulnerable	persons	and	of	applicants	
with	special	reception	needs’.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	Directive	fails	to	recognise	in	accordance	
with	the	case-law	of	the	ECtHR553	that	asylum	seekers	constitute	a	vulnerable	group	per	se.554	
	
It	follows	from	the	above	that	the	different	pieces	of	legislation	do	not	adopt	a	consistent	and	principled	
understanding	 of	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 individuals	 undergoing	 the	 asylum	process.	 Instead,	 a	 variety	 of	
concepts	can	be	observed,	describing	the	asylum	seeker	as	“vulnerable”,	“in	need	of	special	procedural	
guarantees”	or	“with	special	 reception	needs”.555	There	 is	a	 risk	 that	 this	 inconsistency	 translates	 into	
ambiguity	 in	domestic	 legal	orders.556	 In	 fact,	 the	definition	of	vulnerable	groups	of	asylum	seekers	 in	
most	countries	follows	the	wording	of	the	2003	Reception	Conditions	Directive	and	its	recast	and	thus	
makes	 no	 reference	 to	 elements	 listed	 in	 the	 recast	 Asylum	 Procedures	 Directive	 such	 as	 sexual	
orientation	and	gender	identity.557	The	margin	of	discretion	left	to	European	countries	in	the	definition	
of	 vulnerability	 in	 the	asylum	process	has	 led	 to	disparities	 in	 the	 categories	of	 applicants	deemed	as	
vulnerable.	For	 instance,	 in	a	number	of	countries	covered	by	the	asylum	information	database,	AIDA,	
people	 with	 a	 serious	 illness	 or	 a	 mental	 disorder	 are	 not	 considered	 vulnerable,	 contrary	 to	 the	
standards	set	out	in	the	EU	asylum	acquis.558	
	
Even	 though	 it	 seems	a	missed	opportunity	 that	 the	definitions	 in	both	Directives	do	not	 converge,	 it		
should	be	 recognised	 that	also	 the	needs	of	 vulnerable	persons	 in	 the	context	of	both	directives	may	
differ.	 For	 instance,	 while	 an	 unaccompanied	 child	 asylum	 seekers	 will	 require	 special	 reception	
conditions	 and	 also	 special	 procedural	 guarantees	 to	 assist	 him/her	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 asylum	
procedure,	a	single	parent	with	minor	children	may	only	need	special	arrangements	for	children	in	order	
to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 asylum	 interview.	 Therefore,	 if	 the	mechanisms	 from	 both	 Directives	 were	 to	 be	
joined	 together,	 when	 implementing	 it	 clear	 distinction	 should	 be	 drawn	 between	 the	 two	
requirements,	leading	to	two	different	assessments.559	
	
When	it	comes	to	recognising	vulnerable	persons	in	practice,	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	
does	not	 specify	what	 the	system	of	 identification	shall	 look	 like	 (and	nor	does	 the	 recast	Procedures	
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Directive).560	Instead	the	content	of	Reception	Conditions	Directive	is	in	this	respect	limited	to	the	clear	
requirement	for	Member	States	to	establish	a	‘vulnerability	assessment’.561	This	void	does	not	seem	to	
have	been	filled	by	Member	States	themselves:	 few	have	 inducted	norms	for	vulnerability	assessment	
procedures	 into	 their	national	 legislation.	The	 lack	of	a	 regulatory	 framework	 in	national	 legislation	 in	
many	 Member	 States,	 in	 combination	 with	 high	 numbers	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 limited	 reception	
capacities	makes	the	identification	of	vulnerability	arbitrary	and	the	application	of	the	provisions	in	the	
recast	 Directive	 relating	 to	 asylum	 seekers	 with	 special	 reception	 needs	 in	 those	 countries	 very	
unlikely.562	
	
Access	to	the	labour	market	
Asylum	seekers’	access	to	the	labour	market	has	been	described	as	one	of	their	most	important	rights	
and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 one	 of	 their	most	 controversial	 entitlements.563	 Under	 the	 recast	 Reception	
Conditions	Directive,	access	to	the	labour	market	is	to	be	granted	‘no	later	than	9	months’	from	the	date	
of	the	application	for	international	protection.564	This	means	that,	compared	to	the	first	phase	Directive,	
the	waiting	 time	has	been	 reduced	 from	12	months	 to	9	months.565	 It	 should	however	be	noted	 that	
there	 is	no	obligation	to	ensure	access	 to	the	 labour	market	 if	a	 first-instance	decision	 is	 taken	within	
the	 waiting	 period	 of	 9	 months,	 or	 if	 the	 delay	 for	 taking	 such	 decision	 beyond	 9	 months	 can	 be	
attributed	to	the	applicant.	Hence,	the	possibility	still	exists	to	deny	asylum	seekers	access	to	the	labour	
market	throughout	the	entire	asylum	procedure.566	
	
Member	 States	 should	 decide	 on	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 access	 to	 the	 labour	 market	 is	 to	 be	
granted.	There	 is	consequently	no	right	 to	automatic	access	after	a	maximum	of	nine	months	but	 the	
individual	right	to	a	decision.567	The	provision	hence	does	not	refer	to	abstract	conditions	of	access	but	
to	a	decision	on	 the	 individual	 case.568	Once	 the	waiting	period,	where	applied,	has	expired,	Member	
States	can	 impose	a	general	restriction	on	access	to	the	 labour	market	 in	the	form	of	the	priority	rule	
mentioned	in	Article	15(2).569	This	legal	provision	enables	EU	Member	States	to	prioritise	EU	citizens	and	
legally	staying	third-country	nationals	over	asylum	seekers	‘for	reasons	of	labour	market	policies’	and	is	
not	in	conformity	with	Article	17	of	the	Refugee	Convention.570	
	
	
Detention	
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Articles	8	through	11	of	the	Directive	were	newly	inserted	in	the	recast	and	deal	with	the	controversial	
issue	of	detention	of	asylum	seekers.571	Compared	to	the	2003	version	of	the	Directive,	the	recast	has	
clarified	that	the	Directive	applies	in	detention	centres.572	Recital	8	now	states	that	the	Directive	applies	
‘in	 all	 locations	 and	 facilities	 hosting	 applicants’.	 The	 clarification	 of	 circumstances	 under	 which	
detention	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 is	 permitted	 is	 a	 key	 improvement573	 of	 the	 2013	 revision	 and	 the	 legal	
regime	of	detention	is	now	finally	in	line	with	human	rights	treaties.574	At	the	same	time,	detention	as	a	
concept	 raises	 questions	 of	 compatibility	 with	 the	 right	 to	 liberty	 of	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 EU	 Charter	 of	
Fundamental	Rights.575	
	
International	 law	 does	 not	 prohibit	 the	 detention	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 per	 se:	 Article	 31(2)	 Refugee	
Convention	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 restrict	 free	 movement	 of	 refugees	 on	 account	 of	 illegal	 entry	 or	
presence,	if	such	restriction	is	necessary,	and	until	their	status	is	regularised	or	they	have	been	admitted	
to	 another	 country.	 It	 is	 generally	 accepted	 that	 detention	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 under	 that	 provision	 is	
allowed	 to	 verify	 the	 identity	of	 the	asylum	seeker,	 in	particular,	 in	 the	 case	of	 loss	or	destruction	of	
travel	documents	and	to	prevent	him	from	absconding.576	More	contested	is	whether	that	provision	also	
allows	 for	 detention	 merely	 for	 conducting	 the	 actual	 asylum	 procedure.	 It	 follows	 from	 the	 term	
‘necessary’	in	Article	31(2)	that	detention	can	only	be	exceptionally	resorted	to	for	a	legitimate	purpose,	
and	that	detention	for	the	mere	convenience	of	the	authorities	is	not	permitted.577		
	
It	follows	from	Article	8(1)	and	(2)	of	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive	that	the	automatic	detention	of	
asylum	applicants	 is	prohibited:	detention	must	be	 ‘necessary’,	 be	based	on	an	 individual	 assessment	
and	may	only	occur	if	other	less	coercive	measures	are	unavailable.	This	wording	echoes	the	spirit	and	
legal	 obligations	 that	 are	 established	 in	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 that	 provides	 for	 protection	 against	
penalisation	for	refugees.578	Apart	from	these	general	requirements,	Article	8(3)	contains	an	exhaustive	
list	of	six	permissible	grounds	for	detention,579	which	 is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	main	advances	of	
the	recast.580	The	possibility	 to	detain	an	asylum	applicant	 in	order	 to	decide	on	his	 right	 to	enter	 the	
territory,	Article	8(3)(c),	is	rather	wide,	but	it	must	be	read	together	with	Articles	43,	31(8)	and	33	of	the	
Procedures	Directive,	from	which	it	follows	that	an	asylum	applicant	may	only	be	subjected	to	a	border	
procedure	in	order	to	decide	on	his	right	of	entry	under	prescribed	grounds,	which	relate	to	establishing	
the	admissibility	of	the	application	or	to	grounds	for	applying	the	accelerated	procedure.581	Although	the	
list	is	exhaustive,	the	grounds	are	vague	and	remain	open	to	interpretation.582	For	instance,	the	concepts	
of	public	order	or	national	security	as	referred	to	in	Article	8(3)(e)	of	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive	
have	not	been	defined,	 and	 therefore	 the	 threat	of	practices	of	quasi-automatic	detention	 cannot	be	
excluded.583	Article	9	contains	guarantees	for	detained	applicants,	including	the	right	of	judicial	review.	
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However,	the	Directive	authorises	Member	States	to	restrict	this	right	on	the	basis	of	multiple	grounds	
that	Article	9(7)	and	(8)	enumerate,	which	may	in	practice	obstruct	effective	access	to	a	judicial	remedy,	
contrary	 to	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 effective	 judicial	 protection	 and	Article	 47	 CFR.584	 Paragraph	 4	 of	
Article	 9	 enounces	 several	 obligations	 regarding	 information	 to	 be	 provided	 to	 the	 applicants	 in	 a	
language	 ‘which	 they	 understand	 or	 are	 reasonably	 supposed	 to	 understand’	 (emphasis	 added).	 This	
formulation	 raises	 concern	 as	 to	 its	 compatibility	 with	 Article	 5(2)	 ECHR,585	 which	 stipulates	 that	
information	 of	 the	 reasons	 of	 the	 arrest	 and	 of	 any	 charges	 against	 the	 individual,	 should	 be	
communicated	in	a	language	‘which	he	understands’.	
	
Article	10	provides	the	requisite	detention	conditions,	from	which	follows	the	possibility	of	resorting	to	
prison	accommodation	if	no	specialised	detention	facilities	are	available.586	The	possibility	of	detaining	
minors	is	provided	in	Article	11,	albeit	only	as	a	measure	of	 last	resort,	and	by	taking	into	account	the	
minor’s	best	interests	(Article	11(2)).		
	
The	 conditions	 and	 guarantees	 foreseen	 in	 Articles	 9	 to	 11	 of	 the	 Directive	 also	 govern	 Dublin	
detention.587	
	
Family	members	
Although	the	notion	of	‘family	members’	has	been	extended	to	the	parents	of	a	minor,	it	is	still	limited	
to	the	nuclear	family	which	already	existed	in	the	country	of	origin	and	whose	members	are	present	in	
the	same	Member	State	in	relation	to	the	application	for	international	protection.588	On	this	topic,	also	
see	the	review	of	the	recast	Qualification	Directive,	in	paragraph	5.2.1	of	Part	III.	
	
2.2.2	Implementation		
The	limited	availability	of	data	about	the	operation	of	the	CEAS	in	general	(also	see	paragraph	2.2.2	of	
Part	 II)	 also	 extends	 to	 information	 regarding	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	
Directive.	Member	 States	 are	 under	 no	duty	 to	 report	 statistics	 on	 reception	 capacity	 and	occupancy	
either	under	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive589	or	under	the	Migration	Statistics	Regulation.590	
The	opacity	and	complexity	of	several	countries’	reception	systems	pose	a	further	substantial	challenge	
to	any	meaningful	mapping	and	analysis	at	European	level.591		
	
Nevertheless,	 it	 has	 become	 quite	 clear	 that	 substantial	 discrepancies	 exist	 in	 the	 level	 of	 asylum	
harmonisation	 between	 the	 different	Member	 States,592	 for	 example	 the	 chronic	 reception	 ‘crises’	 in	
France	and	Italy,	leading	to	systematic	homelessness	and	destitution	of	asylum	seekers.	The	2011	ECtHR	
case	of	M.S.S.	v.	Belgium	and	Greece	is	an	early	and	prominent	example.	The	case	revolved	around	the	
removal	of	an	asylum	claimant	by	Belgium	to	Greece	under	the	Dublin	II	Regulation	.593	The	ECtHR	ruled	
not	only	that	the	detention	conditions	and	the	living	circumstances	of	the	claimant	in	Greece	amounted	
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to	a	breach	of	Article	3	ECHR	by	Greece,	but	also	that	Belgium	had	violated	this	right	by	transferring	the	
applicant	under	the	Dublin	Regulation	to	Greece.	This	judgment	put	an	end	to	the	notion	of	blind	trust,	
also	by	referring	to	the	lack	of	harmonised	practices	amongst	EU	Member	States	and	the	observation	of	
minimum	 standards	 of	 reception	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 as	 dictated	 by	 the	 Directives.	 Indeed,	 the	whole	
notion	 of	 ‘mutual	 trust’	 on	 which	 so	much	 of	 the	 CEAS	 depended,	 was	 clearly	 flawed.594	 The	M.S.S.	
judgment	was	 followed	 in	2011	by	a	 judgment	of	 the	CJEU	 in	 the	case	NS	and	ME,595	where	 the	CJEU	
underlined	 the	necessity	of	 ‘rebuttal	of	 trust’	 in	case	 	of	 ‘systemic	deficiency	 in	 the	asylum	procedure	
and	in	the	reception	conditions	of	asylum	seekers’	in	another	Member	State.596	The	Dublin	system	is	to	
be	 seen	 as	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 Member	 States	 can	 and	 should	 have	 confidence	 in	 each	
other’s	asylum	systems	in	the	wider	sense,	including	reception	conditions.597	This	was	officially	reflected	
in	 the	 Stockholm	 Programme’s	 proclamation	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 ‘a	 common	 area	 of	 protection	 and	
solidarity’598	 and	 has	 been	 reconfirmed	 by	 the	 CJEU.599	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	 dignified	 reception	
conditions	has	been	the	main	reason	for	national	and	European	Courts	to	suspend	transfers	of	asylum	
seekers	 to	 the	 responsible	Member	 State.600	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	
Directive	thus	directly	affects	other	legal	acts	of	the	CEAS,	such	as	the	Dublin	Regulation.601	
	
The	large-scale	and	uncontrolled	arrival	of	migrants	in	2015	further	highlighted	the	shortcomings	of	the	
CEAS,	 for	 instance	 the	 failure	 of	 asylum	 authorities	 to	 open	 up	 new	 reception	 spaces	 promptly.602	 It	
should	 be	 noted	 here	 that	 reception	 systems	 rarely	 operate	 in	 a	 stable	 context.	 The	 number	 of	
applicants	changes	from	month	to	month	and	is	difficult	to	forecast.	Moreover,	during	periods	of	lower	
numbers	 of	 applications,	 reception	 capacities	 come	 under	 the	 scrutiny	 of	 austerity	 measures.	 This	
dynamic	context	makes	the	efficient	management	of	reception	infrastructure	a	particularly	challenging	
task.603	
	
As	outlined	above	 in	paragraph	2.1,	 the	current	 legislative	 framework	 laid	out	 in	 the	recast	Reception	
Conditions	Directive	should	ensure	that	applicants	are	offered	an	equivalent	level	of	treatment	in	regard	
to	reception	conditions	in	all	Member	States.	The	current	Directive	however	still	 leaves	a	considerable	
degree	 of	 discretion	 to	 define	what	 constitutes	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living	 and	 how	 it	 should	 be	
achieved.	 In	 addition,	 the	 levels	 of	 investment	 injected	 into	 the	 regular	 reception	 systems	 are	
inadequate.604	 As	 a	 consequence,	 reception	 conditions	 continue	 to	 vary	 greatly	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 the	
reception	 system	 is	 organised	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 standard	 provided	 to	 asylum	 seekers.605	 When	 it	
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comes	 to	housing	 for	 instance,	 some	countries	accommodate	asylum	seekers	 in	different	centres	 (the	
Netherlands),	others	prefer	private	housing	solutions	(Sweden).606		
	
The	 continued	 and	 broad	 use	 of	 temporary	 forms	 of	 reception	 shows	 a	 lack	 of	 preparedness	 and	
limitations	 of	 contingency	 planning	 in	many	 countries.607	 Especially	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 a	 considerable	
increase	in	the	number	of	applications,	Member	States	have	severe	difficulties	meeting	their	obligations	
for	 reception	 conditions,	 in	 particular	 with	 providing	 accommodation	 which	 guarantees	 an	 adequate	
standard	of	 living.608	The	accommodation	of	vulnerable	persons	poses	particular	problems,	with	 them	
being	placed	in	highly	unsuitable	conditions	in	several	Member	States.609	Finally,	whilst	migrants	have	a	
right	to	shelter	regardless	of	their	legal	status,	eviction	and	destruction	of	their	living	spaces	has	taken	
place	in	various	areas	across	Europe.610	
	
In	some	countries,	access	to	work	remains	challenging	for	most	applicants	for	 international	protection	
with	 administrative	difficulties	 linked	 to	 recognition	of	 diplomas	 and	qualification	 as	well	 as	 language	
requirements.611	Considerable	variations	also	exist	in	the	duration	of	the	waiting	period	before	access	to	
employment	 is	 granted	 by	 the	 national	 authorities	 of	 the	Member	 States,	 from	 immediate	 access	 in	
some	 countries	 to	 a	 9-month	 waiting	 period	 in	 others.612	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 for	 instance	 Austria,	
Finland	and	Germany,	 initiatives	are	being	deployed	to	facilitate	the	 integration	of	the	beneficiaries	of	
international	protection	into	the	labour	market.613		
	
Assessment	of	special	reception	needs	
The	 implementation	 of	 the	 obligation	 to	 identify	 those	 in	 need	of	 special	 procedural	 guarantees	 (see	
paragraph	2.2.1,	‘the	concept	of	vulnerability’)	has	led	to	wide	disparities	among	European	countries	in	
the	mechanisms	through	which	the	identification	of	special	needs	is	conducted.614	The	unstable	nature	
of	 reception	 in	Europe	has	borne	down	heavily	on	the	ability	of	states	to	assess	special	 reception	and	
procedural	 needs,	 to	 the	 point	 that	 identification	 of	 vulnerability	 has	 ultimately	 been	 forgone	 by	 a	
significant	number	of	countries.	When	it	is	actually	carried	out,	the	identification	of	vulnerability	is	often	
done	in	a	very	superficial	manner	and	may	only	lead	to	identifying	self-evident	cases.615	
	
Concerns	were	voiced	by	the	civil	society	and	UNHCR	as	to	 inter	alia	the	age	determination	procedure	
(e.g.	 lack	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 assessment,	 overreliance	 on	 medical	 examination),	 vulnerability	 and	
referral	 mechanisms	 (e.g.	 lack	 of	 identification	 and	 referral	 mechanisms	 in	 place	 for	 persons	 with	
specific	 needs	 and	 lack	 of	 expertise	 among	 stakeholders	 making	 the	 necessary	 assessment)	 and	 the	
quality	 of	 services	 provided	 to	 vulnerable	 applicants	 (e.g.	 in	 terms	 of	 addressing	 mental	 and	
psychological	 and	 shelter	 needs).616	 Only	 few	 countries617	 have	 formal	 identification	 mechanisms	 in	
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place	 that	 systematically	 identify	 applicants	 with	 special	 needs	 in	 practice.618	 Even	 then,	 the	 formal	
procedures	 in	 these	 countries	 are	 not	 necessarily	 similar,	 thereby	 adding	 another	 layer	 of	 noticeable	
differences	 in	 the	way	 special	needs	are	assessed	within	 the	EU.619	 Informal	 arrangements	 to	 identify	
vulnerabilities	also	exist:	in	Austria	for	instance,	applicants	are	asked	in	a	brochure	to	raise	special	needs	
themselves	 upon	 arrival	 in	 the	 initial	 reception	 centre	 or	where	 an	 official	may	 classify	 applicants	 as	
victims	 of	 trafficking	 if	 this	 is	 suspected	 during	 the	 interview.620	 For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that	
vulnerabilities	often	go	unnoticed	on	the	Greek	islands,	due	to	the	extremely	short	duration	of	the	fast-
track	border	procedure	applied	since	the	EU-Turkey	statement.621		
	
Despite	 these	 shortcomings,	 improvements	 have	 been	made	by	Member	 States	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	
special	 reception	needs	of	 asylum	seekers.	 In	2016,	 several	 countries	have	 implemented	measures	 to	
streamline	support	to	people	with	special	reception	needs.622	These	include	special	registration	forms	in	
Belgium	 and	 Cyprus	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 ‘single	 desks’	 in	 France	 to	 ensure	 better	 coordination	
between	various	authorities.623	EASO	has	an	important	role	in	supporting	national	authorities’	efforts	to	
identify	vulnerable	asylum	seekers.	One	of	the	multiannual	objectives	of	the	EU	Agency	for	2017-2019	is	
to	 ‘contribute	 to	 the	better	 identification	of	and	adequate	 support	 to	vulnerable	applicants	 in	asylum	
processes’.624	To	this	end,	EASO	has	developed	particular	cooperation	with	specific	EU	countries	through	
the	creation	of	Operating	Plans	(Greece	and	Italy)	or	Support	Plans	(Cyprus	and	Bulgaria).625		
	
Detention	
As	 elaborated	 on	 in	 paragraph	 2.2.1	 above,	 the	 recast	 Reception	 Conditions	 Directive	 included	 the	
adoption	of	 asylum-specific	 rules	on	detention.	Understanding	 the	 scale	of	detention	practices	 across	
Member	 States	 hence	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	monitoring	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 EU	acquis	 and	 the	
absence	of	statistical	provision	by	Member	States	relating	to	the	use	of	asylum	detention	as	part	of	their	
reporting	obligations	under	the	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	is	therefore	highly	problematic.626		
	
Detention	 (and	other	elements	of	 the	CEAS)	are	not	covered	by	 the	Migration	Statistics	Regulation.627	
EASO	has	taken	steps	to	incorporate	detention	figures		in	the	statistical	information	collected	under	its	
Early	 Warning	 and	 Preparedness	 (EPS)	 system	 but	 such	 data	 has	 however	 not	 been	 made	 public	 to	
date.628		
	
Immigration	 detention	 remains	 an	 area	 of	 great	 concern	 as	 it	 has	 become	 a	 routine,	 rather	 than	
exceptional,	 response	 to	 the	 irregular	 entry	 or	 stay	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 migrants	 in	 a	 number	 of	
countries.629	Detention	upon	arrival	seems	to	be	structurally	embedded	in	several	reception	systems,	as	
exemplified	in	Bulgaria.630	In	the	case	of	Italy	and	Greece,	the	implementation	of	the	hotspot	approach	
																																								 																				
618		 ECRE	(2017)	The	concept	of	vulnerability	in	European	asylum	procedures,	22.	
619		 Ibid.,	22-24.	
620		 Ibid.,	24.	
621		 Ibid.,	24-25.	
622		 EASO	(2017)	Annual	Report	on	the	Situation	of	Asylum	in	the	European	Union	2016,	107.	
623		 Ibid.,	107.	Note	that	Belgium’s	new	law	(March	2018)	requires	the	applicant	to	state	whether	they	have	special	needs.	
624		 EASO	(2016)	EASO	Single	Programming	Document.	Multiannual	Programming	2017-2019,	13.	
625		 For	details	on	2016	activities,	see:	EASO	(2017)	Annual	Report	on	the	Situation	of	Asylum	in	the	European	Union	2016,	62-64.	
626		 ECRE	(2015)	Asylum	Statistics	in	the	European	Union:	A	Need	for	Numbers,	7;	Singleton	A	(2016)	Migration	and		
Asylum	Data	for	Policy-making	in	the	European	Union.	The	problem	with	numbers.	Centre	for	European	Policy	Studies.	Paper	No.	89,	6.	For		
a	more	general	note	on	the	availability	of	data	within	the	CEAS,	see	Part	II,	par.	2.2.2	of	this	baseline	study.	
627	 ECRE	(2018)	Making	Asylum	Numbers	Count.	ECRE’s	analysis	of	gaps	and	needs	for	reform	in	data	collection	on	the	Common	European		
Asylum	System.	Policy	Note	10,	2.	
628		 ECRE	(2015)	Asylum	Statistics	in	the	European	Union:	A	Need	for	Numbers,	7.	
629		 ECRE	(2014)	AIDA	Annual	Report	2013/2014,	67.	
630		 ECRE	(2017)	Principles	for	fair	and	sustainable	refugee	protection	in	Europe.	ECRE’s	vision	for	Europe’s	role	in	the	global	refugee	protection		
	
	
63	
	
(see	 Part	 III,	 Chapter	 4)	 has	 reinforced	 the	 policy	 of	 Member	 States	 to	 detain	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
migrants,	 contrary	 to	 states’	 human	 rights	 duties	 to	 only	 apply	 detention	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances.631	 A	 similar	 situation	 seems	 to	 exist	 in	 Hungary,	 where	 all	 asylum	 seekers	 are	
automatically	 detained	 as	 of	 2017.632	 For	 Bulgaria,	 UNHCR	 reported	 a	 practice	 of	 assigning	 some	
unaccompanied	children	to	random	adults	and	placing	them	in	detention	centres	(the	Bulgarian	Law	on	
Foreigners	prohibits	the	detention	of	un	accompanied	children	but	allows	the	detention	of	accompanied	
ones	for	up	to	3	months).633		
	
There	are	a	number	of	 general	human	 rights	 concerns	 relating	 to	 the	 impact	of	detention.	Prolonged	
detention	without	 a	 clear	 justification	has	 been	 shown	 to	have	 a	 devastating	 effect	 on	migrants’	 and	
asylum	 seekers’	mental	 health,	 for	 example	by	 contributing	 to	post-traumatic	 stress	 disorder,	 anxiety	
and	 depression.634	 This	 is	 frequently	 compounded	 by	 unacceptable	 detention	 conditions,	 such	 as	
unsanitary	 toilet	 and	 shower	 facilities	 and	 unhygienic	 kitchens.	 Plus,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 lack	 of	 effective	
access	 to	 healthcare,	 as	well	 as	 to	 physical	 and	 recreational	 activities.635	 Long	periods	 of	 immigration	
detention	can	also	lead	to	sustained	barriers	to	migrants	claiming	their	economic	and	social	rights,	even	
after	 having	 been	 released.	 UNHCR	 research	 suggests	 that	 detention	 disempowers	migrants	who	 are	
often	keen	to	work.	A	sustained	absence	from	the	labour	market	and	the	emotional	and	mental	toll	of	
detention	 can	 lead	 to	 migrants	 becoming	 unnecessarily	 dependent	 on	 state-provided	 support	 later	
on.636		
	
3.	Proposal	for	a	recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	
On	13	July	2016,	the	Commission	proposed	another	recast	of	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive.637	The	
Commission	 identifies	 the	main	challenge	of	 the	 recast	Reception	Conditions	Directive	as	one	of	poor	
implementation	 of	 existing	 standards.638	 Yet,	 contrary	 to	 legislative	 changes	 to	 the	 EU	 instruments	
governing	 qualification	 and	 asylum	 procedures,	 which	 would	 be	 transformed	 from	 Directives	 into	
Regulations	 (see	Part	 III	chapters	3	and	6),	 the	alignment	of	Member	States’	 reception	standards	 is	 to	
remain	governed	by	a	Directive.	It	is	questioned	whether	this	is	the	right	choice	of	instrument,	in	view	of	
the	diverging	 reception	conditions	and	disparate	 recognition	 rates	amongst	 the	EU	Member	States.639	
Regarding	 this	 choice	 of	 instrument,	 the	 Commission	 states	 that:	 ‘Considering	 the	 current	 significant	
differences	in	Member	States’	social	and	economic	conditions,	it	is	not	considered	feasible	or	desirable	
to	fully	harmonise	Member	States’	reception	conditions.’640		
	
Material	reception	conditions	
The	definition	of	material	 reception	conditions	 is	 clarified	 in	Article	2(7)	which	 includes	essential	non-
food	 items	 such	 as	 sanitary	 items.	 The	 proposal	 also	 strengthens	 the	 guarantees	 applicable	 in	 cases	
where	Member	 States	 exceptionally	 set	 different	 modalities	 for	 material	 reception	 conditions	 under	
Article	 17(9),	 in	particular	when	normal	housing	 capacities	 are	 temporarily	 exhausted.	 In	 these	 cases,	
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Member	States	must	guarantee	a	‘dignified	standard	of	living’	and	health	care,	as	opposed	to	a	coverage	
of	‘basic	needs’,	as	per	the	current	Directive	(also	see	‘Material	reception	conditions’	in	paragraph	2.2.1	
above).			
	
The	 proposed	 Directive	 contains	 the	 newly	 inserted	 provision	 of	 Article	 17a	 which	 excludes	 asylum	
seekers	 who	 are	 not	 in	 the	Member	 State	 designated	 as	 responsible	 by	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation	 from	
reception	 conditions.	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 with	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 CJEU	 in	 Cimade	 and	 Gisti641	 that	
reception	conditions	are	made	available	to	a	person	as	long	as	he	or	she	is	an	asylum	seeker	with	a	right	
to	remain	on	the	territory,	and	that	asylum	seekers	are	an	indivisible	class	of	persons.642	This	principle	
seems	to	be	maintained,	since	the	provisions	on	the	scope	of	the	Directive	remain	unchanged	in	Article	
3	of	the	proposal,	as	does	the	right	to	move	freely	within	the	territory	in	Article	7(1).	At	the	same	time,	
Article	9(1)	of	 the	proposed	Asylum	Procedures	Regulation	has	been	amended	 to	 restrict	 the	 right	 to	
remain	 to	 the	 Member	 State	 responsible.	 Still,	 the	 proposed	 provision	 also	 seems	 to	 contradict	 the	
overall	spirit	of	the	‘common	procedure	for	 international	protection	in	the	Union’	proposed	under	the	
Asylum	 Procedures	 Regulation,	 since	 it	 would	 fragment	 the	 individual’s	 legal	 status	 depending	 on	
whether	he	or	she	has	reached	the	Member	State	designated	as	responsible	by	the	Dublin	Regulation.	
The	Member	State	responsible	for	the	application	can	restrict	reception	conditions	under	Article	19.	This	
means	that	the	proposal	allows	double	penalisation	for	the	category	of	applicants	concerned	here:	both	
the	Member	State	conducting	a	Dublin	procedure	and	the	Member	State	responsible	for	the	application	
can	 impose	 sanctions,	 which	 would	 negatively	 affect	 the	 ability	 of	 applicants	 to	 present	 their	 claim	
effectively.643	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Article	 19(1)	 brings	 about	 a	 significant	 improvement:	 the	
amendments	indicate	that	material	reception	conditions	provided	in	kind	may	not	be	withdrawn	and	it	
is	 also	 clarified	 that	 health	 care	 may	 not	 be	 restricted	 or	 withdrawn.644	 According	 to	 Article	 17a(2),	
Member	States	shall	ensure	a	‘dignified	standard	of	 living’	for	all	persons	falling	under	Article	17a,	but	
based	 on	 past	 developments	 it	 is	 questioned	 whether	 this	 will	 be	 realised	 in	 practice	 for	 applicants	
deprived	of	reception	conditions.645		
	
Assessment	of	special	reception	needs	
The	 term	 ‘vulnerability’	 is	 replaced	 throughout	 the	 text	 by	 ‘special	 reception	 needs’,	which	 seems	 to	
ensure	more	 conceptual	 coherence	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 terminology	 in	 the	 current	 Recast	 Reception	
Conditions	 Directive	 (also	 see	 ‘The	 concept	 of	 vulnerability	 in	 paragraph	 2.2.1	 above).	 Other	
improvements	are	 included	 in	Article	21(1),	which	requires	 identification	to	be	carried	out	 ‘as	early	as	
possible’	 rather	 than	 ‘within	a	 reasonable	 time	 limit’.646	 The	proposal	 also	 requires	 the	assessment	of	
special	 reception	 needs	 to	 be	 conducted	 ‘systematically’.647	 Article	 21(2)	 contains	more	 detailed	 and	
clear	obligations	 for	national	authorities	with	a	view	to	ensuring	better	 identification	of	vulnerabilities	
from	the	first	contact	with	newly	arriving	persons.648	These	obligations	for	 instance	include	training	on	
detecting	 first	 signs	 of	 special	 reception	 needs	 and	 including	 information	 on	 special	 needs	 in	 the	
applicant’s	 file.	 The	 provision	 however	 continues	 to	 omit	 the	 applicant’s	 right	 to	 be	 heard	 in	 the	
assessment	 of	 special	 reception	 needs,	 which	 (despite	 the	 training	 of	 officials	 to	 detect	 signs	 of	
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vulnerability)	 may	 lead	 to	 neglecting	 important	 vulnerabilities	 and	 thus	 depriving	 asylum	 seekers	 of	
necessary	support.649	
	
	
	
Access	to	the	labour	market	
Article	15(1)	of	the	proposal	lowers	the	maximum	waiting	period	for	allowing	asylum	seekers	to	access	
the	 labour	 market	 from	 9	 to	 6	 months.	 Applicants	 channeled	 into	 an	 accelerated	 procedure	 are	
however,	under	certain	grounds,	excluded	from	labour	market	access	which	contravenes	the	principle	of	
non-discrimination	 of	 refugees	 laid	 down	 in	 Article	 3	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention.650	 Recital	 35	
encourages	 (but	 does	 not	 bind)	 Member	 States	 to	 lay	 down	 a	 time	 limit	 of	 3	 months	 for	 allowing	
applicants	with	claims	 ‘likely	to	be	well-founded’	to	 find	employment.	 651	Although	the	notion	of	 likely	
well-founded	 claims	 is	 not	 defined,	 the	 Recital	 refers	 to	 prioritised	 caseloads	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
Asylum	Procedures	Regulation652	as	an	example	warranting	earlier	labour	market	access.	
	
Detention		
The	 new	 ground	 for	 detention	 in	 Article	 8	 (3)	 of	 the	 proposal,	 allowing	 detention	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	
compliance	with	legal	obligations	of	the	asylum	seeker	on	the	basis	of	an	individual	decision	and	where	
there	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 absconding,	 seemingly	 reflect	 the	 terms	 of	 Article	 5(1)(b)	 ECHR.653	 In	 addition,	 the	
Explanatory	Memorandum	states	that	the	proposal	is	fully	compatible	with	Article	6	of	the	EU	Charter	of	
Fundamental	Rights,	read	in	the	light	of	Article	5	ECHR.654	This	is	noted	as	a	positive	development	in	the	
Commission’s	 reasoning	 on	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 detaining	 asylum	 seekers	 under	 the	 right	 to	 liberty	
guaranteed	by	the	Charter	as	compared	to	the	current	version	of	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive.655	
The	grounds	 for	detention	 in	Article	8(3)	however	do	not	 seem	 to	 fully	 reflect	 this	 reasoning.	 Several	
existing	 (and	 unaltered)	 grounds	 for	 detention	 are	 incompatible	 with	 the	 right	 to	 liberty	 under	 the	
Charter,	as	 they	are	not	connected	to	a	concrete	obligation	 incumbent	on	the	applicant656	or	because	
they	 are	 punitive657	 in	 nature.658	 The	 proposal	 also	 maintains	 the	 possibility	 to	 detain	 persons	 with	
special	needs	during	the	asylum	procedure,	even	though	a	number	of	Member	States	already	exempt	
these	persons	from	detention	based	on	provisions	of	national	law.659	
	
Other	observations	
The	definition	of	‘family	members	‘	in	Article	2(3)	refers	to	the	definition	contained	in	the	proposal	for	a	
Qualification	Regulation	 (also	see	Part	 III,	Chapter	6)	and	now	extends	 to	also	 include	 families	 formed	
after	leaving	the	country	of	origin	but	before	arrival	on	the	territory	of	the	Member	State.	While	this	is	
considered	to	be	a	welcome	amendment,	 it	 is	suggested	that	the	definition	of	family	members	should	
be	aligned	with	 the	proposal	 to	 recast	 the	Dublin	Regulation	and	 further	extend	 to	also	 include	other	
close	 family	members,	 such	 as	 dependent	 children	 or	 the	 dependent	 parents	 of	 an	 adult,	 as	 well	 as	
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siblings.660	 Same	 sex	 couples	 should	 also	be	 considered	 favourably	 in	 line	with	 the	principle	 of	 family	
unity.	
	
Whereas	the	concept	of	 ‘risk	of	absconding’	has	been	codified	 in	Article	2(n)	of	the	Dublin	Regulation,	
the	notion	of	‘absconding’	per	se	is	defined	for	the	first	time	in	the	EU	asylum	acquis	in	Article	2(10)	of	
the	proposal.	Comments	are	made	on	the	connotation	of	morally	blameworthy	conduct	that	is	attached	
to	the	term	‘absconding’.661	The	 ‘risk	of	absconding’	 is	defined	by	Article	2(11)	 in	accordance	with	the	
definition	 in	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation	 and	 leaves	 it	 up	 to	 the	 national	 legal	 systems	 to	 define	 objective	
criteria.	 Such	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	 discretion	 for	 Member	 States	 could	 however	 lead	 to	 open-ended	
definitions	 of	 the	 criteria	 for	 determining	 the	 risk	 of	 absconding,	 which	 increase	 risks	 of	 arbitrary	
deprivation	of	liberty	by	national	authorities	and	does	not	contribute	to	a	harmonised	approach	in	the	
EU.662	 In	 view	 of	 the	 far-reaching	 consequences663	 of	 the	 determination	 of	 a	 risk	 of	 absconding,	 the	
objective	criteria	for	such	an	assessment	should	be	exhaustively	and	restrictively	defined	in	Article	2(11)	
of	 the	proposed	recast	of	 the	Reception	Conditions	Directive	and	the	corollary	provision	 in	 the	Dublin	
Regulation.664		
	
The	proposal	contains	strengthened	safeguards	for	accompanied665	and	unaccompanied666	children.	The	
introduction	of	a	maximum	period	for	appointing	a	guardian	as	an	enforceable	obligation	is	considered	
to	be	a	key	improvement	of	the	proposal.667	
	
Article	 28	 introduces	 a	 contingency	 planning	 obligation.	 Member	 States	 must	 submit	 to	 the	 Asylum	
Agency	 their	 contingency	 plans	 for	 ensuring	 adequate	 reception	 needs	 when	 faced	 with	
disproportionate	pressure,	which	 is	a	welcome	measure	with	a	view	to	ensuring	greater	preparedness	
towards	 large-scale	 arrivals	 in	 the	 future.668	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 criticism	 is	 expressed	 on	Article	 28(1),	
which	 conditions	 Member	 States’	 reception	 planning	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 while	
practice	has	shown	that	pressure	on	reception	systems	may	be	exerted	on	Member	States	regardless	of	
their	formal	responsibilities	under	the	Dublin	Regulation.669	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
660		 UNHCR	(2017)	UNHCR	Comments	on	the	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	laying	down	standards	for		
the	reception	of	applicants	for	international	protection	(recast)	–	COM(2016)	465,	8.	
661		 ECRE	(2016)	ECRE	Comments	on	the	Commission	Proposal	to	recast	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	8.	
662		 Ibid.,	9;	UNHCR	(2017)	UNHCR	Comments	on	the	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	laying	down		
standards	for	the	reception	of	applicants	for	international	protection	(recast)	–	COM(2016)	465,	8-9.	
663		 Recital	19	proposal	recast	RCD.	
664		 ECRE	(2016)	ECRE	Comments	on	the	Commission	Proposal	to	recast	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	9.	
665		 Article	22	proposal	recast	RCD.	
666		 Article	23	proposal	recast	RCD.	
667		 UNHCR	(2017)	UNHCR	Comments	on	the	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	laying	down		
standards	for	the	reception	of	applicants	for	international	protection	(recast)	–	COM(2016)	465,	16.	
668		 ECRE	(2016)	ECRE	Comments	on	the	Commission	Proposal	to	recast	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	15;	UNHCR	(2017)	UNHCR		
Comments	on	the	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	laying	down	standards	for	the	reception	of		
applicants	for	international	protection	(recast)	–	COM(2016)	465,	17-18.	
669		 ECRE	(2016)	ECRE	Comments	on	the	Commission	Proposal	to	recast	the	Reception	Conditions	Directive,	15.	
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